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“So cyberspace is real. And so are the risks that come with it. It’s the great 
irony of our Information Age - the very technologies that empower us to 
create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. And 
this paradox – seen and unseen - is something that we experience every day” 
 
- Barack Obama, 2009 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background on the field that this research is targeting. It 
explains the motivation and relevance of the research and presents the key 
research questions. Research methodology as well as the key findings and the 
structure of the research are also presented. 
1.1 Background 
There are no borders, as greatest hackers know (Rice & Bucholz, 2003, p. 1289) 
and there are little or no rules to obey – welcome to the Era of Cyber. Actually, 
we have been living that era since first computers emerged, however, as the 
scale of practically everything related to data and information with 
technology enabling its processing is overwhelmingly increasing (Cukier, 
2010). A phenomenon, which is creating challenges to organizations’ data 
management practices (Das & Mishra, 2011). Both practitioners and academics 
are struggling to stay onboard. It might be just Titanic they are trying to hang 
on, not realizing the real challenge, we as one world, are facing, not seeing the 
sea surface steadily approaching them. 
In short, what cyber – be it cyber defence, cyber resilience, cyber war, cyber 
risk and so forth – is ultimately about is information and data from which this 
information is built from. Information is power, money and even a weapon – 
all lucrative drivers for committing a cybercrime for hacker individuals, crime 
organizations, hacktivist groups, terrorists, and even nations. Especially, as 
risk of even getting identified yet alone caught is low (Kshetri, 2005). 
Although the ship is slowly turning, many companies and public institutions 
still believe that cybersecurity or information security is about defence of their 
own perimeters, malware and virus detection and network security – about 
technology in short ((Crossler, Johnston, Lowry & al., 2013),  (Ahmad, 
Hadgkiss & Ruighaver, 2012),  (Tondel, Line& Jaatun, 2014)). On the positive 
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side, the awareness of information’s role and the role of people and processes 
creating and using that information is on an increase (Ahmad, Bosua & 
Scheepers, 2014). Nevertheless, more education on the “what are we trying to 
protect” is needed. A quote from Morrow (2012) summarizes this well: “One of 
the biggest challenges for organizations is that corporate data is being 
delivered to devices that are not managed by the IT department, which has 
security implications for data leakage, data theft and regulatory compliance 
[…] organizations need to focus on securing and controlling their sensitive 
corporate information”. It both shows that the environment is getting more 
complex and that the focus should be on the asset itself – the information. 
It seems that through the constant media visibility of cyber events something 
positive is also happening: companies and institutions are realizing that 
information is their key, if not even the most important asset, worth treating 
as such via starting security/cyber –programs and acknowledging the 
importance of information security, as a wide concept, for the resilience of 
their cyber operations. Some are even starting to implement wider concepts 
like cyber resilience, combining both aspects of cyber security  and business 
resilience (IT Governance, 2014). This presents an approach which, if deployed 
successfully, provides the institution with the best practices of the industry 
(e.g. the ISO Standards family) for capabilities on both protecting them against 
cyber threats (ISO’s security management) and managing realized risks (ISO’s 
risk management) associated on activated threats with damage control and 
business recovery (business continuity management). Even though helpful, 
ISO-standards (and standards in general) are fit-for-all guidelines, hence one 
can argue like Siponen (2006) does that having standards in place and being 
compliant could just prove out treating those as an end of its own right – not 
necessarily offering the organization any real information security value.  
Nevertheless the problems and high likelihood of major risks getting realized 
is not yet solved. As the institution struggles with general global data volume 
increase trend (The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) - Gov 
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UK, 2013), constantly evolving threat landscape (Council on CyberSecurity, 
2014 (a)) more and more of self-produced and/or outside sourced data, open 
data, big data, internet/industry of things data and so on, it finds itself unable 
to actually answer the question: “What data or information should we be 
protecting?”. The question becomes relevant also as all data is not equal in 
importance, i.e. there is data critical to operations versus there is data such as 
20 years old scanned meeting minutes of project ages ago gone. The 
institution realizes that even though how hard they tried, they cannot manage 
(even if they had rigorous data management practices in place) all the data 
with the resources they have – be it technical or people. Its data amount and 
diversity raises almost exponentially over time, and the complexity of the 
environment processing it (e.g. IT technology) is getting out of control of IT 
department (Silic & Back, 2014) – however the resources available to manage 
this chaos do not scale in the same way. 
In fact many companies admit that they no longer have grasp on the situation, 
if they ever had (Walters, 2013). This is a very worrying trend, implicit of the 
fact that at some stage all organizations, no matter what the information 
security capabilities in place, will suffer an information security incident 
(attack) (Ahmad, Hadgkiss & Ruighaver, 2012) - one which can damage 
business operations, reputation, finance resilience from low realization to 
something, which can bankrupt the company (ISACA, 2012). On national 
perspective those can seriously hinder critical infrastructure service providers’ 
capability to provide national critical services ((Secretariat of the Security 
Committee, 2013), (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
2014)). There is no longer, if there ever was, absolute defence.  
Considering the afore mentioned, the few resources the institution has must 
be addressed to controls where they have the most effect. No institution can 
any longer bet on investing everything on perimeter defences (firewalls, 
network traffic scanners etc.). If their operations are not yet compromised by 
cyber-attack/security breach, it will happen rather sooner than later – no 
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matter what technology there is in place (The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) - Gov UK, 2013). The author does not downplay 
the importance of these defences. Instead he only states that they alone, even 
with state of the art intrusion detection systems (IDS), cannot remove the fact 
that the perimeters will be breached (PwC, 2014) and the core asset of the 
institution, the data they have, is compromised. Further, if the attacker is a 
real professional with clear intention and knowledge on the institution, there 
is high chance the institution will not even know what hit them, before they 
read it from the headlines.  
So, the identification and management of the data and information, which 
matters the most for the institution, is where the high focus should be: on the 
subset of that information, which for each point in time (as strategies and 
business change over time) matters the most to the strategic, tactical and 
operational functions of the institution. Further considering the constantly 
changing nature of businesses, this core information assets’ (data) 
management must accordingly be considered as an ongoing, not “fire and 
forget” function. It must constantly focus on the data and information 
mattering the most, however at the same time, be prepared to anticipate 
changes in the institution’s strategy, which might provoke needs for re-
focusing the data management efforts to different set of data.  
The facts of not being able to protect the perimeters of the institution, that 
successful attack through those is inevitable and assets will get compromised 
presents the Chief Information Security Officers (CISO), Chief Information 
Officers (CIO), Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and risk management units 
with a another question: “What to do – to what capability should the 
resources be invested to provide maximum resilience for the money spent?” 
Added rationale is that it just is not economically feasible, not in many cases 
even possible to try to fully protect all the information systems and 
information in those (Tondel, Line & Jaatun, 2014). 
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The above summarizes the purpose of this research: addressing practical, but 
society wide, problem of “what to do” by providing high yield national-scope 
solutions via challenging views that single disciplines like information 
security management and data governance provide - fusing them together to 
find synergies and then providing holistic value from those for example in 
form of a model for controlling organizations’ critical information’s’ integrity 
and thus business continuity and resilience, and sharing these e.g. integrity-
quality information with other parties for common purposes and good of all. 
Something, which when put to context of national cybersecurity’s situational 
awareness of critical infrastructure providers’ integrity and changes in those 
could prove out to be quite an interesting concept and have significant value 
for the society as whole. As an example it should be interesting to Finnish 
Cyber Security Centre, as Finland’s Cyber security Strategy (Secretariat of the 
Security Committee, 2013) explicitly and in several parts highlights the 
importance of situational awareness, stating for example that “The strategic 
guidelines of the Cyber Security Strategy are advanced by intensifying active 
collaboration between actors whose aim is to achieve a shared situation 
awareness and effective defence against the threats”, while at the same time 
even cyber strategists in the field see very little turning into real action or 
capabilities. Something, this research is directly contributing to and doing so 
by innovative and novel approach not yet seen presented. 
While these mentioned capabilities are important for organizations, their 
value chains, national emergency supply –functions and so forth, they can 
strongly contribute also to single citizen’s perception of cyber environment 
and the internet. Trends show that EU citizens, at least, are more and more 
worried about their digital identities and personal information. They have low 
trust in public authorities skills to protect their information (64% are 
concerned over this), have reported experiencing online-fraud (10%), some 7% 
had experienced online credit card fraud, 28% are not at all confident on their 
skills in internet and in general are increasingly feeling that the risk of being 
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crime victim in the internet has increased over the last year (76% agree so) – 
all this telling the message that cyber security (or lack of it) is happening on 
many levels at the same time – national, organizational and even single 
citizen’s concept of information security(the European Commission, 
Directorate-General Home Affairs, 2013). The implications on all levels of 
society even more highlights the importance of the study at hand. 
1.2 Short introduction of key concepts 
To minimize misunderstandings, the key concepts of this research are 
introduced briefly with selected (as there are many presented in this thesis) 
definition used as generalization of the concept. The intention of this thesis is 
not provide extensive syntheses of different definition, hence those, most 
appealing to author’s eye (and his experience background) are used: 
Cybersecurity (or cyber security) – The activity or process, ability or capability, or 
state whereby information and communications systems and the information 
contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized 
use or modification, or exploitation 
Information Security Management – [Function which] Ensures that within the 
enterprise, information is protected against disclosure to unauthorized users 
(confidentiality), improper modification (integrity) and non-access when required 
(availability) 
Information Security Governance - system by which organization’s information 
security activities are directed and controlled 
Master Data Management – Processes and practices for managing Master Data - 
those entries, relationships, and attributes that are critical for an enterprise and 
foundational to key business processes and application systems 
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Data Governance – A process and quality control discipline focused on managing 
the quality, consistency, usability, security, and availability of information. 
Data Quality - The totality of features and characteristics of data that bears on their 
ability to satisfy a given purpose; the sum of the degrees of excellence for factors 
related to data  
Policy –Intentions and direction of an organization as formally expressed by its top 
management 
Risk - All organizations are encountering internal or external factors and influences, 
that might compromise the organization’s capability to reach its objectives, make 
things uncertain. The effect this uncertainty has on the objectives set is called risk 
Threat - potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a 
system or organization 
Situation awareness – the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and projection of their 
status in near future 
1.3 Motivation and objective of the study 
There are many motivating factors, which encouraged the author to conduct 
this research. Few of them are mentioned below: 
 The general confusion in literature about what cybersecurity is, what it 
might include and how important it actually is, and how little literature 
exists on the topic. At the same time recognition that “cyber” is 
increasingly noted phenomenon and attracting peoples’ attention 
worldwide (Franke & Brynielsson, 2014). 
 There is a need to underline that information in many cases is the 
corporate’s or public institution’s most valuable asset ( (Ahmad, Bosua 
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& Scheepers, 2014), (Morrow, 2012), (System Experts, 2004)), yet they 
seem to pay very little real interest in rigorously protecting it and thus 
present themselves and all dependent parties (value- or supply chain) 
at high risk of loss of business continuity. 
 Information systems research in information security area seems to be 
concentrating more on technology than information itself or people, 
which author feels needs balancing - more research emphasis on 
information assets securing and people involved in organizations 
operations. This notion is supported by remark “[…] predominant 
weakness in properly securing information assets is the individual user 
in the organization”(Crossler, Johnston, Lowry & al., 2013). 
 Just like the author has experienced and many literature entries state 
((Kobielus, 2006), (Berson & Dubov, 2007, p. 286)) master data 
Management and data governance should not be considered IT –
owned operations, business should run those. Still mainstream 
consider these as “IT’s work to be done”. The author sees similar 
problematics here that cybersecurity and information security 
management are seen as IT (Council on CyberSecurity, 2014 (a)). In 
their very essence they are business topics and should rank high on 
board’s priority lists (von Solms , 2005). Similar observations are made 
by Henry (2003, p. 667), where he states that the security department 
should not report to IT director, because this could create conflicts of 
interest between secure processes and the push to develop new 
systems.  
 It is noted in Franke & Brynielsson’s (2014) extensive literature study 
that cyber situation awareness is largely centered on IT security, and 
that much of discussion is centered on cyber sensors rather than 
investigating whether ordinary sensors could contribute to the cyber 
situation, which is getting very little attention. The author wants to 
present the role of information itself (which is the target of protection) 
and investigate, whether ordinary data quality sensors, i.e. data quality 
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metrics and control system could contribute to cyber situational 
awareness. 
 From the discussions the author has had with cybersecurity 
professionals, he has become more and more convinced that the much 
mentioned “situation awareness” greatly emphasized in e.g. Finland 
Cyber Security Strategy (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013) is 
somewhat elusive and not yet well concretized or materialized in the 
operative capabilities of Finland’s cybersecurity.  
 Previous, summed up with notions of information security 
management not perhaps really concentrating on the assets themselves 
(i.e. the information and how to identify the critical part of whole asset 
with capability to tell the objective quality of the asset) hints that there 
might be room for combining several disciplines and concepts for 
holistic gains. 
The author recognizes that entwining so many different complex constructs 
and concepts and their possible dependencies is usually out of the scope of 
Master’s thesis researches. Yet, the author does want to face the challenge and 
is confident that his years of experience in the industry allow him to handle 
and process the complex big picture. At the same time the author sees that 
only through analyzing these constructs and concepts together, can the 
possible synergies, new models and systems be created. Most of the themes, 
apart from situation awareness, presented in this research are familiar and 
well known to the author and thus constructing the big picture view has 
become possible. 
The scope of this research is to investigate two “root” phenomenon (with their 
materialized disciplines and models included, where needed) which the 
author recognizes from personal experience: data quality and information 
security. Further, the concept of situation awareness is included to present the 
novel new construct made possible by the two phenomena. It should be 
mentioned that to limit the scope of the research, the concepts and constructs 
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presented are researched only to the level where sufficient general knowledge 
of the themes is achieved and can be used for the empirical part of the study. 
Intention is not to discover all facets of concepts presented. Following explicit 
limitations must be mentioned: 
1) Data governance and information security governance are observed 
only for the parts, which present possible synergy or overlaps between 
these two 
2) Analogously, master data management and information security 
management are restricted in scope 
3) Data quality, being likewise a concept worth hundreds of studies, is 
limited to be investigated only for the author’s own conceptual model 
of it supported by literature, with intention to build a bridge between 
data governance and information security governance as well as master 
data management and information security management 
4) Cybersecurity is considered for purposes of building the study context 
that the other concepts are operating in. Physical infrastructure like 
hardware and first line defences (firewalls, antivirus, network traffic 
analysis etc.) as well as information systems security are outscoped – 
the focus is on data /information and management of those. 
5) Classifications, hierarchies and taxonomies -building are out of scope 
of this thesis. This limitation is worth highlighting as e.g. data 
governance and data quality can be seen as sub-parts of master data 
management (Antikainen & Käkölä, 2011) and the other way round data 
governance can be inclusive of data management and data quality (Berson 
& Dubov, 2007, s. 114). To raise the complexity, data quality can be seen 
as ultimate wrapper of all concepts mentioned, as it can for example 
include the Consistency, Integrity and Accuracy – ultimate targets of 
information security management (DAMA (UK), 2013) as mere few 
quality dimensions of overall data quality. Hence, it depends on the 
context in which these are observed - there exists no rigorous definition 
on how these concepts relate and organize. 
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6) Although few theories like Situation Awareness (SA) are presented as 
frameworks to study the concepts, the intention is not to present results 
via rigorous exercise of those. Target is merely to present initial, high 
level model and concepts, from which rigorous research follows later.  
The context of this research is cybersecurity and the focus is on “information 
as an asset needing appropriate security and quality monitoring added with 
capability of sharing the quality metrics to outside party”. Time span of the 
focus is continuous operations of an organization, so the findings can be 
applied to any lifecycle phase of an organization, where they are deemed 
practically applicable. When presenting the concept of the model this thesis is 
aiming to create (Chapter 7), the time focus spans over boundaries of single 
critical infrastructure operators (like a company). The latter concept hence 
considers different life cycles of nations and infrastructure operators of it – be 
they public or private.  
The main objective of this research can be summarized as follows: Investigate, 
whether a novel and innovative model can be made for enabling situation 
awareness via monitoring critical infrastructure service providers critical 
information assets’ data quality, especially data integrity. This is studied via 
combining established disciplines of information management, information 
security management, data governance, information security governance and 
situation awareness. The model is to be constructed and empirical evidence on 
the model’s applicability and possible relevance via interviews of recognized 
Finnish cybersecurity strategists and tacticians is to be obtained as well.  
1.4 Research questions 
There are three main research questions (Qs) which the author intends to 
answer. These questions have emerged from the author’s extensive experience 
in information management and business development; especially from the 
notions of the author, where he has felt that his personal empiric experience is 
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in contradiction with scientific and common practitioners’ views and practices 
or that those views are limited in forming synergies or evolving new concepts 
that author sees beneficial. Hence the intuitional “There is a need for novel 
models”-feelings have been formalized to research questions, studied via 
literature and formation of a theoretical prototype and further investigated 
and enriched with data from an empirical study of five cybersecurity experts 
from both strategic as well as tactical and operational mindset. The key 
questions forming the standing stone of this research are: 
Q1: Can a novel model be built leveraging from established 
disciplines of master data management (and data governance), 
information security management (and information security 
governance)combined with situation awareness for purposes of: 
1. providing organizations capability to identify their critical 
information, build controls over it and identify any attempts 
to tamper the critical information assets 
2. presenting command and control -type operator (like Cyber 
Security Command Center) with a situation awareness and 
early warning capability over threats compromising 
information assets of identified critical service providers? 
 
Q2: If such a novel model (as per Q1) could be built, what would be 
its potential value for national cybersecurity capability of Finland? 
 
Q3: In Finland’s cybersecurity context, is information understood as 
an asset by critical infrastructure service providers: 
1. Are these assets identified and protected accordingly? 
2. Are there decent controls over information assets? 
3. Is the concept of data quality and its monitoring present? 
 
A wide range of research questions could be derived from the potent of this 
research and the findings presented, however to prevent the research from 
exploding in scope the focus is on the three main questions. Some of these 
possibilities are discussed further in section 10.8. 
23 
1.5 Research methodology 
The present research consists of three parts. Firstly, a conceptual research 
based on literature review is conducted to understand the main concepts and 
constructs of the research to form conceptual models needed later as well as to 
make initial observations from the secondary data. The second part is a 
construction phase, where the formed conceptual models are fused into a 
prototype novel model – the focus of the RQ1. The last is the third part - an 
empirical qualitative research based on a semi-structured interview: theme 
interview. The research approach and plan is visualized in FIGURE 1. The 
research approach 
 
FIGURE 1. The research approach  
FIGURE 1. The research approach explains that the research has started with a 
research plan (including initial literature study). The research questions have 
then arisen from the research plan. The conceptual models and constructions 
needed for the research questions are produced from the literature study part. 
Questions 1 is concluded partly already (by demonstrating the model) in 
Model construction phase (Chapter 7) and concluding is finished in Chapter 
10.1: Concluding research question 1. Question 2 is concluded almost as such 
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from the interviewee answers in the Theme interview analysis part (Chapter 
9), whereas Question 3 is answered in Chapter 10.3: Concluding research 
question 3. 
The figure also shows the data collection approach in the research: the 
secondary data (the data already available as known/published and easily 
available) is gathered from literature reviews and it works as input to the 
model building as well as theme interviews; the primary data is the data 
gathered and analyzed from the interviews. Both the primary and the 
secondary data contribute to the conclusions. 
Qualitative research conducted and the methodology used is further 
elaborated in Section 8.1. Possible limitations and reliability of the research are 
covered in Sections 8.3 and 10.6. 
1.6 Key findings 
Only the findings central to the presented research questions are briefly 
introduced here. All other, significant, findings are available in Chapter 9: 
Interview study analysis and Chapter 10: Conclusions, limitations and future 
research. The following findings should be seriously considered, especially in 
the context of cybersecurity, for the purposes of developing situation 
awareness in an organization or on national scope or when either researching 
or practicing information management and information security management:  
 Very promising models for needs of situation awareness and critical 
information asset integrity assurance, control and monitoring can be 
built and combined from established disciplines and models of master 
data management, information security management, data quality and 
governance of these. 
 The model proposed in this research was deemed as extremely 
important and promising by leading Finnish cybersecurity strategists, 
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tacticians and operative persons. There is great potential for early 
warning system of threats targeting to compromise critical 
infrastructure service providers’ critical information assets and thus 
cause great nation-wide damage. Similar models might prove out to be 
very useful in preventing battle damage escalations and controlling the 
threat or attack vectors targeting to degrade information assets. 
 There is evidence in both literature and from the interviews conducted 
that “information as an asset” -thinking is still not established in but 
few organizations. Security measures are more concerned about 
technology than the information the technology should be processing 
and thus efforts are somewhat inefficiently directed. To enhance the 
situation, organizations should treat information as any other key asset, 
identify where it resides, name the most critical part of it and establish 
decent controls over these assets. Also, streamlining could be realized 
between information management functions and those of information 
security functions for better efficiency and shared goals.  
1.7 Significance of the research 
This research has been initiated from the author’s keen interest on the topics 
covered and the author’s perceived importance of these topic. The author has 
been led by his intuition that the findings of the study are also very relevant to 
the scientific community, to the practitioner community of enterprise as well 
as cyber strategists and tacticians working on national level thriving to 
improve nation’s cyber security. On the last listed, author sees this work 
contributing directly and at the same time with high possible gain to society’s 
resilience and general feeling of positive control and safety. 
Classic roles of Chief Information Security Officers, Chief Information 
Officers, Risk Managers, Information Security managers and even top 
management e.g. Chief Executive Officers responsible especially for the 
governance of information and its security are target group of this study. 
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As this research is limited in its data scope, namely the number of interviews, 
some care must be practiced when utilizing the findings of the research. 
Generalization should only be applied with caution and generally only to 
similar contexts as the research is presenting. Although a limited number of 
cyber-professionals was interviewed, it is worth noting that the persons 
interviewed have been very central for example to formulation of Finland’s 
Cyber Strategy and deriving operational plan for executing it. Hence, the 
findings should be considered very significant through their views on them - 
at least when inspecting the findings in Finland’s national scope.  
This research contributes to rethinking the dominant classical silo -models in 
information management, information security management, data quality and 
governance of these by introducing a fusion of concepts -view on a very little 
researched area (although there is extensive literature on all of the separate 
topics). The perspective presented is challenging, as it weaves together many 
concepts and constructs and thus challenges academics and practitioners to 
further integrate the studied areas. 
Yet, the research presents a fresh and innovative view and a new way of 
thinking, not yet seen in any previous studies and offers many open windows 
for further research as elaborated in Section 10.8: Further research possibilities 
1.8 Structure of the research 
For being able to draw the “big picture” of the researched topic, the author is 
presenting the key concepts and constructs in literature study from Chapter 2 
to Chapter 6. All the concepts and models referred later in this research, 
especially the themes investigated in the empirical part, can be grounded back 
to the entities in the literature part. Although synthesis is always important in 
scientific results delivery, the literature part’s main function is to present 
concepts to be fused together, not rethink the established concepts or provide 
innovative syntheses of those.  
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Drawing from the literature study, a novel and innovative new model 
proposed in RQ1 is formulated and presented in Chapter 7. The model is later 
tested in empirical study.  
As the knowledge background is established, the approach and justification 
for the empirical study is explained in Chapter 8. Once the approach is 
elaborated and the interviewees are presented, Chapter 9 shows the analysis 
of the interviews separated into themes that investigate related phenomenon 
or questions and it also reflects the author’s personal opinions and findings in 
comparison with those in the expert interviews. 
Chapter 10 draws the conclusions as answers to the presented research 
questions and provides other conclusions that are related to the research 
questions and can help further to understand the answers to the research 
questions. It also closes this research with suggestions for future research. 
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2 CYBERSECURITY 
For the empirical part of this thesis it is relevant for both the readers and the 
interviewees to investigate the elusive term and definitions of cybersecurity as 
it is the context, in which other concepts of this study are investigated in. This 
chapter will start with inspecting different definitions for cyber security and 
providing conceptual synthesis of it for the purposes of this thesis. 
Furthermore, cyber security threats are introduced for the reader to 
understand why cybersecurity either is or is not an important theme. Lastly, 
notions made through the chapter are summarized. 
2.1 Cybersecurity definition 
It is identified that there is no universally accepted definition for cyber 
security. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, some synthesis must be 
derived from found information on the subject to put other phenomenon 
identified into context. 
Even organizations like Council on Cyber Security seem to avoid and only 
offer results of compromised cyber security like (Council on CyberSecurity, 
2014 (a)): “Massive data losses, theft of intellectual property, credit card 
breaches, identity theft, threats to our privacy, denial of service – these have 
become a way of life for all of us in cyberspace”. The closest they come to any 
definition is (Council of Cybersecurity, 2014 (b)): “We are at a fascinating 
point in the evolution of what we now call cyber defence”. As such, this 
definition, even if not even trying to address cybersecurity is ambiguous and 
evasive. For them “cyber” seems to be a yet undefined period in time, where 
frightening ICT-technology assisted crimes happen in “cyberspace”. They still 
see that this “cyber” is something, which is blurring traditional infrastructure 
borders like company’s networks by stating that the data that used to be there, 
is now distributed across multiple locations, not part of that “old times” 
classis technology nor physical infrastructure (Council of Cybersecurity, 2014 
29 
(b)). All this leaves a notion that the “cyber” and the time dimension of it is 
something, that is somewhat changing the rules and control over things (like 
data) is getting harder to maintain. This notion is worth noting as it describes 
the “spirit” of the “cyber” to an extent. 
Further definitions follow as “The state of being protected against criminal or 
unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this” 
(Oxford University Press, 2014). Although a university press, this definition 
lacks the recognition of other assets than information (e.g. people, 
technology). The interesting viewpoint of an desired state of “being 
protected” is good and practically aligns with Finland’s Cyber security 
Strategy’s(Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013) (note, written forms do 
also differ between definitions, e.g. cybersecurity vs. cyber security) 
definition: “Cyber security means the desired end state in which the cyber 
domain is reliable and in which its functioning is ensured”. The Strategy’s 
definition further elaborates the desired end state, there is no disturbance to 
operations or functions dependent on electronic information (data) processing 
and relies on actors in cyber domain (companies and institutions) 
implementing appropriate and sufficient information security procedures 
(Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013).  
Some definitions are quite narrow in view (naturally common people need 
definitions, which they can understand) and are sure to create disparity on 
discussions and literature, should someone adopt them. Such an example is 
Merriam- Webster’s(Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2014) definition of: 
“measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the 
Internet) against unauthorized access or attack”. Now, as quite obvious, focus 
is solely on technology, the information -part is neglected.  
An online tech dictionary for IT professionals and educators, Webopedia 
(QuinStreet Inc., 2014), offers the following definition: “Cybersecurity refers to 
the technologies and processes designed to protect computers, networks and 
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data from unauthorized access, vulnerabilities and attacks delivered via the 
Internet by cyber criminals”. This definition identifying the core components 
possibly affected by lack of cybersecurity, although it puts cybersecurity into 
context of Internet, which might not be the case, e.g. SCADA-vulnerabilities 
(Teixeira, Dán, Sandberg & Johansson, 2011) on isolated and not internet-
connected automation networks. Also, the term “cyber-criminal” is interesting 
and could lead to long philosophical discussion whether a state is a cyber 
criminal, if it actively renders useless a technology of an attacker 
compromising its cybersecurity status.  
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies definition (2014) is 
very activity centric with: “The activity or process, ability or capability, or 
state whereby information and communications systems and the information 
contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, 
unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation”. According to this 
definition, it is not anymore about mere protection and security, but also 
about defence, which can be in military terms “active” (Denning, 2014). 
Definition lacks the part of critical infrastructure per se, but considers the ICT-
side of it solely. 
Gartner, although quite recognized professional company falls dramatically 
short in its own definition, totally lacking the information (i.e. asset to be 
secured) –part of the definition. Gartner(2013) defines cybersecurity as: 
“Cybersecurity encompasses a broad range of practices, tools and concepts 
related closely to those of information and operational technology security. 
Cybersecurity is distinctive in its inclusion of the offensive use of information 
technology to attack adversaries”. Additionally to neglecting the information 
asset, Gartner distinct itself with explicit inclusion of IT in cybersecurity. 
Last definition investigated is provided by International Telecommunication 
Union (2014) and states as follows: 
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Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security 
safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s 
assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, 
applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of 
transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. 
Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the 
security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant 
security risks in the cyber environment. The general security objectives 
comprise the following: 
 Availability 
 Integrity, which may include authenticity and non-repudiation 
 Confidentiality 
ITU’s definition is rather extensive, nevertheless at the same it includes 
everything and thus nothing. For example “cyber” can be single person or 
“cyber environment”. Although nation can be understood as “organization” 
of a sort, ITU’s proposal lacks the many times mentioned intention to affect 
infrastructure of a nation, which to author seems of importance to be included 
in a synthesis of cybersecurity. On the positive side, ITU recognizes the classic 
CIA-dimensions of information security as integral part of cybersecurity and 
thus building glue between these two concepts. 
That being said, the author feels that in general the definitions offered (via not 
rigorous scientific search on the topic) all base more on classis information 
security (management) responsibilities, targets and controls. What is 
distinctive is that scope of definitions varies a lot from almost single computer 
to very large systems of systems, of which nobody really even can understand 
the causalities and relationships they form. Terms are somewhat confusing 
and even mixed, there is a clear need for standardization bodies to take strong 
initiative on setting the same meanings for key concepts. 
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2.2 Snapshot on cybersecurity threat landscape 
Naturally as “cyber” is getting more and more media attention there is a 
human nature’s trait to think along the line that cybersecurity threats are 
dramatically increasing. This could be called “bias of availability” as per 
(Kahneman, 2012, p. 129). It is thus feasible to research few studies done on 
the volumes of cyber threats and present statistics to build a general view on 
the trend and the phenomenon.  
First, it is worth noting what these threats are about. Where financial sector is 
very good at (in theory) is that they are capable of identifying and processing 
risks and manage as well as govern the organization through risks. With this 
mindset, it possible to form a simple classification of cyber threats through 
seeing them via risks. An example of such view is provided by The Atlantic 
Council in co-operation with Zürich Insurance Company (2014) shown in 
TABLE 1, in which risks are aggregated to seven main categories. It shows 
that the risks (and thus threats) are very multifaceted in nature and come both 
in technology and people. 
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TABLE 1. Seven aggregations of cyber risk (The Atlantic Council and Zurich 
Insurance Group, 2014) 
 
The technology vs. people threats is discussed next, but a note should be 
made to highlight two risk categories (TABLE 1): 
 Internal It enterprise – what is very worrying is that according to 
the study only 1/3 of London Stock Exchange 350 companies 
management had clear understanding of their information assets, 
60% reported “basic understanding” and further – 25% reported 
that the board –in 25% of the studied companies – had very poor 
understanding of where their information assets resided and were 
they shared e.g. with third parties  
 Supply Chain – is not commented by Atlantic Council, but author 
would like to pay attention to this risk category as organizations are 
increasingly outsourcing and building value and supply chains, 
over which they perhaps ultimately have only contractual control, 
which provides, in authors thinking, major risk escalations. The 
organization might even quite well manage its own information 
asset, but if the other parts in the chain do not and the organization 
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has no visibility to this, its own functions are very much in 
jeopardy. This is investigated further in the empirical part. 
 Without drilling into details, as cyber risks and threats are studies of several 
dissertations, author wishes to underline one aspect of cyber threats, which is 
relevant for this study too, as the problem statement in Chapter 7 is assuming 
that there is no absolute defence. It further assumes that organizations do not 
generally have clear understanding, ownership and control over their 
information assets (as noted e.g. in  “Internal It enterprise” –risk elaboration 
earlier). Fundamentally increasing the later presented threat –description’s 
danger is that technology cannot prevent the perimeters from being breached. 
This is shown well in The Global State of Information Security Survey 2015 
(PwC, 2014) with indication of the sources from which cyber threats (and 
information security threats in general) hail from. 
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FIGURE 2. Insider vs. outsiders –threats (PwC, 2014) 
Survey well identifies the sources of threats and shows trend changes (year 
2014 is represented by solid color, while 2013 by striped fill of the graph) all 
this good for purposes of introducing the scene. Author stresses a fact, which 
elaborates the importance of understanding the role of insider threat: “In the 
2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, we found that almost one-third (32%) of 
respondents said insider crimes are more costly or damaging than incidents 
perpetrated by outsiders”. (PwC, 2014) 
On the numbers of how the amount of threats/risks has been developing it is 
also worth to investigate few studies presenting figures from before 2010 as 
well as the development from 2009 and onwards. A steady trend on malicious 
cyber activity targeting US Department of Defence can be observed in TABLE 
2 and although the increase is high on annual perspective, the growth is more 
linear than e.g. exponentially increasing. 
TABLE 2. Cyber activity targeting US Department of Defence (adapted from 
(Choo, 2011))  
 
The increasing trend, seems to continue from that of 2009 (TABLE 2) in 2013 
as similar observations are made in a security breaches study in UK by The 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills (2013) reporting that 93% of 
Calendar year Number of reported 
incidents of 
malicious cyber 
activity
Percent increase 
from previous year
2000 1415 N/A
2001 3651 158,02
2002 4352 19,2
2003 9919 127,92
2004 16110 62,42
2005 23031 42,96
2006 30215 31,19
2007 43880 45,23
2008 54640 24,52
2009 71661 31,15
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UKs large companies had breaches 2012 with median of 113 breaches suffered 
annually for large companies and that the general trend is increasing in 
security breaches.  
A global survey(PwC, 2014) of some 9700 (2014) security, IT and business 
executives conducted annually since 2009, reports (FIGURE 3) steady increase 
with a rather dramatic jump from 2013 to 2014 (48%) as well as the number of 
reported security incidents in the study summing up to 42,8 million annual or 
117 339 per day – compound annual growth rate from 2009 to 2014 has been 
66% 
 
FIGURE 3. Incidents growth rate from global survey 2009-2014 (adapted from 
(PwC, 2014)) 
 
These few views combined, yes, there is a clear increase, but due to what the 
increase mostly is, remains a question, which is not even intended to be 
answered here. It could be plain increase of ICT -technology, which would 
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correlate with the threat number; better technological capability to detect the 
attacks and so forth. 
To just show trends (like most of these surveys do) on something without 
trying to explain, what the reason is for it, is in author’s mind even 
misleading. Should we be more worried about cyber threats increase, or put it 
into context of ICT-technology trends all being on the raise (e.g. number of 
devices, computing capacity)? 
Whatever the reason is, it seems to be impacting on how EU citizens are 
feeling more insecure in the internet-connected technology domain. 
According to one of the surveys, “Special Euro barometer 404 ´Cyber 
security´”(the European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, 
2013), users are worried about their personal identities getting stolen (52%) 
and are generally worried that their personal information is not kept safe in 
website (70%). What is very worrying is that citizens have rather low trust on 
public authorities, where only 36% have no concern on these authorities not 
compromising their personal information and in general 76% agree that the 
change of finding oneself as cybercrime target has increased over last year(the 
European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, 2013). With even 
only these figures presented by somewhat trustworthy authority, it seems that 
the general opinion is on increase of cyber crimes and thus feeling less secure 
in the digital world. 
2.3 The author’s elaboration and a summary on cybersecurity 
First the term cybersecurity was researched to provide enough material for 
being able to build a conceptual model on the phenomenon, which seems so 
much to be in the headlines and which is the context of this study. Few 
remarks are to be done. First, it is quite clear that the terminology is not 
established yet and thus cybersecurity is seen both as miniature as protecting 
single IT-system to something of universal entropy taking over. This naturally 
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is not desirable as it is more oil for tabloids to build headlines, which build 
availability of bias for the community at large – although nothing dramatic 
would not being happening at all. At the same time, “cyber” is nothing new, it 
has been known with names like information warfare or electronic warfare, 
when put to military context.  
Second, it a short study was introduced for sake of understanding what the 
cyber (and information security) threats are about through risk management 
thinking and further it was shown that insider threats are very important, if 
not even more important than outsider threats, for cybersecurity for 
realization of damages from the threats. Later, through few reports the trends 
of cybersecurity breaches and attacks were investigated to build some 
understanding through numbers. Looking through the numbers, increase is 
more like linear (although significantly increasing), not anything exponential 
by nature. How the growth then can be explained are several answers, which 
are not studied here, which one is closest to reality. First, it can be that as 
information security breaches have been and are still, very delicate matters 
especially to listed and high brand-value corporate, the interest of sharing 
security compromises has not been high, but culture could be changing and 
sharing information is seen as good of everyone. Second, as technologies to 
prevent and detect threats have advanced late few years, so are the number of 
threats increasing with perhaps even 1:1 causality. Third, one should not 
forget that information, computing capacity, sheer number of mobile devices 
is increasing quite dramatically also – could the trend be explained much due 
to this correlation? 
The author recognizes the fact that producing malware and “cyber threats” 
have become more and more available to even persons of almost entry levels 
in utilizing ICT-technologies – it is no longer geeks with soda and pizza in the 
cellar, it could be the neighbor next door. This naturally has impact on the 
trend. Again, there are also trends like digitalization having more and more 
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attention, which means there more to attack, more to gain, which could also 
have impact on the trend. 
In short, terms and definitions are a mess, which fosters confusion, 
misunderstanding and tabloid scandal reporting, trends are increasing, be the 
reason whatever – so, the “cyber” sure is here, has been here and will be here 
more in increasingly amount. It is better to be safe than sorry.  
Now that the context is much set, next chapter starts investigating the 
disciplines of which the Research Question 1’s model is to be into fusion.  
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3 INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND 
INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
The author has put much significant elaboration effort on describing what 
information security governance (ISG) and information security management (ISM) 
are about. The purpose of this is to create a deep enough conceptual model for 
the reader, so she can process ISG and ISM in the closely linked concept of 
cybersecurity presented earlier (Chapter 2). Concepts are also needed to be 
studied to a level that alignment with empirical part’s interviews can be 
assured. 
This chapter starts by introducing information security governance, followed 
by inspecting few conceptual definitions of ISM. Next, the threats against 
which ISG and ISM are offering protection against are studied. Followed by 
the threats, cybersecurity as an operation function in scope of single 
organization is perceived. Reason for including the previous viewpoint is to 
compare, if ISM and cybersecurity do differ significantly in context of single 
organization (which is especially not part of e.g. emergency supply network). 
Closing the chapter a summary is provided on the extensive list of concepts 
studied. 
3.1 Information security governance 
To better understand the following concepts of information security 
governance and later data governance, first a look is taken at the concept of 
governance in general. Doing that, the concepts of data governance and 
information security governance as sub-classes of governance can be 
reclected. Governance comes in tens of definitions and hundreds, if put to 
context. For relevant purpose, corporate governance was selected to set the 
boundaries in which both data governance and information security 
governance operate. A neutral synthesizing source was used. Wikipedia 
defines (with 66 references) it as (Wikipedia, 2014): 
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 “Corporate governance broadly refers to the mechanisms, processes and 
relations by which corporations are controlled and directed. Governance 
structures identify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation (such as the board of directors, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) 
and includes the rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate 
affairs. Corporate governance includes the processes through which 
corporations' objectives are set and pursued in the context of the social, 
regulatory and market environment.” 
As the concept of governance set, information security governance is to be 
explored starting with ISO27000 –standard’s(ISO/IEC, 2014) definition as: 
“system by which organization’s information security activities are directed 
and controlled” and the governing body as “person or group of people who 
are accountable for the performance and conformance of the organization”. 
As ISO is talking about accountability, which naturally is important factor, a 
view can be also taken via commitment as leadership, like Von Solms (2005) 
does: “Information Security Governance consists of the management 
commitment and leadership, organizational structures, user awareness and 
commitment, policies, procedures, processes, technologies and compliance 
enforcement mechanisms, all working together to ensure that the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (C-I-A) of the company’s electronic 
assets (data, information, software, hardware, people, etc.) are maintained at 
all times”. 
One viewpoint to information security governance is to see it consisting of 
two parts – the operational information security management and information 
security compliancy management (von Solms, 2005). This line of thinking is 
based on good company government principles that no function should be 
auditing itself (like IT department should not do IT audit, nor financial 
compliancy audit done by finance department). Thus as von Solms (von Solms 
, 2005) puts it, the separation of operational management and the compliancy 
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management must be separated and “[…] the Information Security 
Compliancy Management function must be housed either as a totally separate 
department or section, or hosted by some other department or section, for e.g. 
Audit or Risk Management”. This governance separation from operative 
function is supported by Henry (2003, p. 667) when he underlines that 
separation is needed as conflicts are otherwise risen between interests of 
secure processes and IT-systems development. Such compliancy function 
should have quite direct lines or even be part of C-level operations to be able 
to 1) monitor and report data security related IT risks in a model where IT is a 
service function to compliancy function (von Solms , 2005) and to 2) capture 
the policies made by the top management and force the policies made by top 
management with needed authority. 
Now that the concept of information security governance has been explored in 
short, it is worth investigating, what operational capability the governance 
then should be governing, i.e. management of information security, which is 
following next. 
3.2 Information security management 
Hardy (2006) expresses it well, why information security management is 
important by saying that just one – just one – successful security breach, theft, 
error, hack or virus attack on a company may result in serious reputational or 
financial damage.  
There are numerous definitions for information security management (ISM) . 
Some are studied to form a needed level of consensus between studied 
definitions for purpose of being able to provide a synthesis of ISM for both 
creating information so that reader can form a conceptual model of ISM and 
also to check the definitions with definitions gained from empirical part.  
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One way to define ISM is through purpose, as von Solms & von Solms (2004) 
do by stating that the purpose of information security management is 
presenting measures, which mitigate risks addressing information resources. 
Per that information security management can be seen as form of risk 
management for certain functionalities of the company. Capability to mitigate 
the risks comes back to notion in Background –section (1.1) to need to 
understand, what the company is protecting, i.e. what are the assets needing 
protection.  
A view through objectives setting is presented as a short synthesis from 
Bernand, Gerber and von Solms and Mellado et al by Mas & Mesquida (2014) 
as “The main objective of information security (management) is to properly 
protect information from unauthorized access, use disclosure, disruption, 
modification and destruction”. Again the definition is lacking the target other 
than “information”. Something, as the volumes of data  information  
knowledge  wisdom assets are getting out of hands as per problem stated in 
Introduction Chapter 1, is getting more and more important. 
The author sees that the synthesis to be provided should consider the 
priorization of data-derived information assets to be resource-wise and 
protect that, which is most vital to operations or compliancy –needs. The sheer 
volumes and complexity of the information is presenting a situation, where 
not all the information can and should not (invest vs. gain) be protected and 
quality assured the same way. 
A Classical view (from the 90s already) is to view information management 
through CIA-concept. A definition from ISACA (2012), provider of COBIT 5 
IT management frameworks, is short for the purpose of presenting CIA via 
their definition of information security: “Ensures that within the enterprise, 
information is protected against disclosure to unauthorized users 
(confidentiality), improper modification (integrity) and non-access when 
required (availability)”.  
44 
Now that the relation of ISG and what it covers, i.e. IMS is introduced it is 
worth adding into formula the factor of what is ISM presenting protection 
against – this is studied as follows. 
3.3 Information Security threats and risks  
Measures to prevent information security incidents, unwanted or unexpected 
security event with high probability of affecting negatively business 
operations and information security (ISO/IEC, 2011) are numerous. Four 
notions, which are relevant for the scope of the thesis should be noted, which 
will be tested later in the empirical part. The author summarizes the situation 
we have reached in 2014 as “partly the battle is lost”. Organizations have to 
accept that they will be attacked successfully and that they cannot protect all 
their assets”: 
1) Sheer volume of data and the number systems processing it are steadily 
growing(Cukier, 2010) – it has become obvious that protecting all 
systems (and the data in those) fully just is not economically 
sound(Tondel, Line & Jaatun, 2014). 
2) As Ahmad, Hadgkiss & Rughaver (2012) put it: “It is inevitable at some 
stage that organizations will suffer an information security incident. 
Such an incident may result in multiple negative impacts, such as loss 
of company reputation and customer confidence, legal issues, a loss of 
productivity and direct financial loss.”  
3) Common and flawed thinking has been that threats to assets come from 
outside (PwC, 2014), be it the main gate or firewall and defences 
needed are perimeter defences. “Inside” and “outside” has greatly 
diminished in meaning or there is no more such things, it’s all blurred 
(Trope, Power, Polley & Morley, 2007). This is greatly due to s people 
are bringing their own devices (BYOD) and -applications (BYOA) to 
environments (e.g. workplace) which are not prepared to manage, i.e. 
IT has no control over those and thus present major information 
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security threat and a way through which cyber threats can realize their 
potential ((PwC, 2014), (Silic & Back, 2014), (Morrow, 2012) & (Walters, 
2013) 
4) Many organizations’ management do not know what their information 
assets are or where they reside (The Atlantic Council and Zurich 
Insurance Group, 2014). With the misalignment between business and 
IT, this leads to situation that neither does the IT department has 
control over them. And via increasing use of cloud services, 
outsourcing etc. this is getting more and more vague ((Webb, Atif, 
Maynard & Shanks, 2014) & (PwC, 2014)) 
All organizations encounter internal or external factors and influences that 
might compromise the organization’s capability to reach its objectives, make 
things uncertain. The effect this uncertainty has on the objectives set is called 
risk. (ISO/IEC, 2009) 
Threat can be defined as(ISO/IEC, 2014) “potential cause of an unwanted 
incident, which may result in harm to a system or organization”. Information 
security risk associates with a threat or threats and the potential of those 
causing damage to information assets and via that to the organization. 
Information security threats exploit vulnerabilities, i.e. weaknesses of assets or 
controls modifying the risk associated with the threat.  
Threats and information security concerns are everyone’s business. The trends 
show (Tondel, Line & Jaatun, 2014) that it is the people, like employees, that 
the attacks are directly targeting, not so much the technical systems. The soft 
side of information security is more emphasized with notion of: “Although a 
predominant weakness in properly securing information assets is the 
individual user within an organization, much of the focus of extant security 
research is on technical issues”(Crossler, Johnston, Lowry & al., 2013). Hence 
it is really a question to consider – “how should an organization balance its 
limited security resources – on the technical domain or people and 
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information”? A possible answer is provided Kevin Mitnick (2004, p. 4), a 
reformed computer criminal and later a security advisor: “It is much easier to 
trick someone into giving a password for a system than to spend the effort to 
crack into the system”. 
That being said, still researchers report via many studies that information 
security is still viewed as technical issue – report like this are identified in 
Tondel et al’s (2014) study e.g. made by Jaatun et al. (2012) and Ahmad et al 
(2012). Question should be relevant as even scientific researchers indicate (and 
they have a natural lag on their findings due to review-cycles) that nearly half 
of intrusions and violations of security are actually caused within the 
organization by insider to the organization (Crossler, Johnston, Lowry & al., 
2013). Similarly studies show that information security is not about technical 
security performance, but that some of the most serious security incidents are 
in fact due to people threats (Henry, 2003).  
Threats in context of information security management can be roughly 
categorized as being technical or people threats. This classification is the same 
as presented in Chapter 2.2. Further the same chapter it was identified that 
threats can be classified of being either internal (insider) or external threats 
(outsider). Like it was in context of cyber, it is worth even though through 
repetition to underline the importance of people in the formula. In short - by 
Henry (2003, p. 663) - people are thought to be the weakest link in information 
security management. 
As detail taxonomies building of threats is out of this study’s scope, it is 
sufficient to proceed with the notions made already and threats introduced in 
Chapter 2.2. It is to be noted that the threats (classic information security vs. 
cyber threats) are actually much the same thing, when looked in the scope of a 
single organization. A remark, which hints of possible near 1:1 –relation of 
cybersecurity and information security management in the scope mentioned. 
This is to be investigated further in the empirical part. 
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In the following chapter author is presenting cybersecurity as it can be 
understood as tactical and operational capability. The intention with this 
presentation is to form a picture of “what cybersecurity on practical level” 
could mean. Forming a conceptual model, it can be further compared to 
model presented earlier for ISM.  
3.4 Cybersecurity tactical operations in an organization – same as ISM? 
To better understand, what cybersecurity does mean in form of action and 
capabilities a few elaborations are made a short introduction to a framework, 
which entitles itself as being cybersecurity –framework is given. All this done 
with intention to understand practical cybersecurity operations and further 
compare that with operations of ISM presented earlier in Chapter 3.2. 
The author wishes to make some distinction, if there is any, between controls 
suggested by “classical” information security and management of it, like ISO 
27000-family and COBIT5 and frameworks, models, and literature in general, 
which is describing controls or processes for management of information 
security. To further simplify, there is no line drawn between controls and 
processes, although the author recognizes that controls (which modify risk) 
can consist of process, policy, device, practice or other actions have impact on 
the risk control is addressing(ISO/IEC, 2014). 
Looking at “The Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence” by 
Council of Cybersecurity one makes two notions. First the critical controls 
presented are “nothing new” as such – they are just a subset of controls 
presented in NIST –framework or ISO 270002:2013 and can actually be 
mapped to those. Hence, they can be considered as one unofficial (not aiming 
to regulatory compliance or internationally acknowledged standard) best 
practice model for information security management via approach of “quick 
wins”, i.e. identifying the controls, which have the most effect. The second, 
and very unfortunate observation is that none of the “First Five Quick Wins” 
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has any contact surface on information itself, merely technology (Council of 
Cybersecurity, 2014 (b)): 
For those wanting a highly focused and direct starting point, we have 
emphasized the “First Five Quick Wins”: sub-controls that have the most 
immediate impact on preventing attacks. These actions are specially noted in 
the Controls listings, and consist of:  
 1. application whitelisting (found in CSC 2); 2. use of standard, secure system 
configurations (found in CSC 3);  
 3. patch application software within 48 hours (found in CSC 4);  
 4. patch system software within 48 hours (found in CSC 4); and  
 5. reduced number of users with administrative privileges (found in CSC 3 
and CSC 12).  
Actually, of the 20 controls (FIGURE 4) only four have any direct relevance to 
managing the information as an asset. There is no practical advice (which is 
supposed to be the core of the whole framework) on how to really identify 
information assets, classify them, understand their system and business 
lifecycle or how to ensure their integrity and confidentiality. Advice is much 
limited to encrypting data and proving classification of “public data” and 
“private data”. Control concepts like data quality management or master data 
management to define and manage the assets are everything but mentioned.  
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FIGURE 4. 20 Controls per (Council of Cybersecurity, 2014 (b), p. 8) 
Of the presented 20 critical controls only controls 8, 15 and 17 try to address 
the asset itself, information, in any reasonable way. This shows that Council of 
CyberSecurity’s approach is very technology centric and cannot provide much 
help for organizations viewing security through information management 
glasses. Of the attack vectors or attack types, which were basis for the 
prioritization of critical controls presented only four (out of 23) address 
information integrity and confidentiality directly. Even though the attack 
vectors are relevant, the remedies and protections presented produce very 
little real value. The four attack types are listed in TABLE 3. Shortlisted attack 
types from (Council of Cybersecurity, 2014 (b), pp. 106-107), which address 
information assets. The number on the right hand side column refers to 
presented 20 Critical Controls (FIGURE 4), which are addressing the attack 
type risk. One note to be made is also that the Control #8, which author 
associates remotely with “information as an asset” is not mentioned in any of 
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the Attack Types (total of 23) as a Control to block, detect or manage the 
problem. This presents a question on why the Control #8 was even selected as 
“Critical”, if it does not address any of the Attack Types, which were basis for 
selecting the Controls?  
TABLE 3. Shortlisted attack types from (Council of Cybersecurity, 2014 (b), 
pp. 106-107), which address information assets  
Attack type 
Critical 
Control 
Attackers use malicious code to gain and maintain control of target machines, 
capture sensitive data, and then spread it to other systems, sometimes wielding 
code that disables or dodges signature-based anti-virus tools. 
5, 15, 
17 
Attackers gain access to sensitive documents in an organization that does not 
properly identify and protect sensitive information or separate it from non-
sensitive information. 15, 17 
Attackers gain access to internal enterprise systems and gather and exfiltrate 
sensitive information without detection by the victim organization. 17 
Attackers compromise systems and alter important data, potentially jeopardizing 
organizational effectiveness via polluted information. 15, 17 
 
Regarding from the scope of the study -point of view, the four Controls 
identified here are the ones, which can be mapped as the Controls that 
contribute (even remotely) to author’s later in Chapter 7 presented model for 
establishing and maintaining critical information’s integrity and sharing its 
quality metrics to command and control functions in national cybersecurity 
context. 
Next a summary of rough comparison between ISM and cybersecurity 
operative capabilities is given. 
3.5 Operative Cybersecurity and information security are much the same 
When limiting the scope to a single organization and its operations in security 
and comparing the concepts of ISM in Chapter 3.2 and concept, which 
describes cybersecurity on operational level in Chapter 3.4, observation is 
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raised that they are very much akin. Why this notion can prove important is 
that it could reduce the “noise” and misunderstanding, which seems to 
prevail in the industry on how single companies – especially those not part of 
any emergency critical supply network – should comprehend cybersecurity in 
their operations. 
With much fraction done, author does perceive that they can be understood as 
the same for sake of simplicity. A Remark, which is backed up by e.g. 
Finland’s Cyber Strategy. It states that an individual organization normally 
implements cyber preparedness through the traditional means, methods and 
structures of information security (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 
2013). Never the less, companies (and organizations in general) should be 
better prepared to evaluate the risks and consequences of cyber attacks as well 
as the required action. 
Closing the chapter, a summary of the extensive themes covered is provided. 
3.6 Summary on information security governance and information 
security management  
Although the chapter was mainly about ISG and ISM which were introduced, 
and covered in form of few definition and conceptualization with related 
threats described, it was also intending to build a capability to compare ISM 
with operational cybersecurity in scope of a single organization. 
The author wished to do this to how that the best single organization –
especially when not part of critical infrastructure services supply network 
(which has complex dependencies and little room for error in times of crisis), 
can start considering cybersecurity in operations as investing more on their 
current ISM capabilities by enhancing those practices and frameworks 
familiar. This is not to downplay cybersecurity as mere ISM, which is not, but 
to provide some practical guidance for organizations struggling with trying to 
understand cybersecurity and at worth getting paralyzed by the situation.  
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Although organization’s need to accept the hard facts that absolute defence is 
impossible (via threats presented), surrender is not required. Identifying 
critical information assets, protecting those with priority one via well 
established data- and information management practices, as defined 
throughout this thesis, remains the key. It is essential that the most valuable 
data and information is well managed and protected – as this should be the 
primary mission of any information security operation. 
Following chapter presents information governance (IG) and master data 
management (MDM) – already mentioned disciplines, which are (with ISM and 
ISG and later data quality (DQ) and situation awareness (SA)) the key 
components, which are to form the model as per Research Question1 (RQ1). 
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4 DATA GOVERNANCE, DATA QUALITY AND MASTER 
DATA MANAGEMENT  
National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) arguments 
in short, but with a clear message the importance of good quality data – 
NASCIO (2014): “Government performance depends on accurate and timely 
information” – accurate and timely being few dimensions of data quality. It 
might prove out to be endless debate among academics whether for example, 
data quality is a part of master data management or is master data 
management merely a materialization of a tool to achieve better data quality. 
The author is not wishing to start a philosophical discussion. In this chapter 
he presents data governance, data quality and master data management only on the 
very surface, however with enough information to be able to form the “Novel, 
innovative model” presented later in Chapter 7 which combines the wide 
concepts presented.  
4.1 Data governance 
“Data governance refers to the operating discipline for managing data and 
information as a key enterprise asset. This operating discipline includes 
organization, processes and tools for establishing and exercising decision 
rights regarding valuation and management of data” (NASCIO), 2008), a well 
put definition for data governance. A specially worth noting is that NASCIO 
includes data quality, data security and –access as well as data risk 
management data valuation as part of this whole framework.  
The few special notes to be made from the presented NASCIO-definition is 
that it is inclusive of governing the following (but not limited to) (NASCIO, 
2008): 
1) Data valuation 
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2) Data risk management 
3) Data quality 
4) Data security 
5) Data access 
These make it an extensive (heavy), however at the same time holistic 
governance framework.  
What was worth noting in the presented definition, and thus within the scope 
of data governance (DG) is, that it is explicitly inclusive of information security 
aspects, as well as inclusive of identifying the information assets – something, 
which is mentioned also in the top challenges of information security incident 
management capabilities for establishing the operative capability  (Webb, Atif, 
Maynard & Shanks, 2014). 
Data governance can be seen as the unifying program for bringing together 
people, processes and IT in order to identify the needed roles and 
responsibilities for naming the organization’s critical data and simultaneously 
ensuring its quality (de Freitas, Michel, de Macedo Rodrigues, dos Reis & 
Gronovicz, 2013). This again highlighting that DG is holistic and covers 
(among other things) data quality and control over critical information assets, 
e.g. master data. 
Partly, it still remains the situation as it was back in the 2000 (Hinde, 2000) 
that corporate executives, although nowadays most understand that they can 
be held liable for neglecting their responsibilities over information and its 
quality, still consider in risk plans for example the destruction of a computing 
center as “an IT problem”. So, they recognize their governance responsibility 
over information security, but fail to see the assets to be protected – the data 
and information derived from it. 
55 
Last, it is to be noted that only through integrating heavily in organization’s 
strategy can DG be established. A cite from Cochrane (2009) illustrates this 
fact by: “Data policies. Data standardization, compliance regulations and 
quality controls will be major areas of focus for driving overall data quality 
[…] Remember that data governance should be seen as a core competency and 
not as a project with predefined start and end dates”. 
4.2 Data quality 
Most CIOs have had the courage to admit that their data is of poor quality. A 
study run by IBM (Cukier, 2010) tells that half of the managers who need to 
make a decision based on information received do not trust the information. It 
seems that data is besting us. Saha & Srivastava (2014) reveal that poor quality 
data is estimated to cost some 600 billion dollars annually to US businesses 
alone. The effect for building new warehousing systems that the low quality 
data is causing is a wide estimate from 30% to 80% of the whole development 
time and budget (Saha & Srivastava, 2014) – they are calling for data quality 
management to remedy the situation. Even though the estimate is +/-25% (in 
average 55%) it is still a remarkable effect that bad data quality can have.  
As the other concepts, data quality (DQ) is huge in scope. It has been discussed 
in several sections of the thesis already and for example, ultimately the next 
topic, master data management, is about data quality. So is data governance. 
So is much of information security (management) as they all can be translated 
to quality dimensions at the end of the day. For example information security 
management has been classically concerned about C-I-A (confidentiality, 
integrity and availability) (ISACA, 2012) of the information assets the 
organization has (if ever identified through classic information security 
management). C-I-A can be translated to quality dimensions (feature of the 
data that can be measured), thus they are actually about DQ – and the other 
way around. For the purposes of this thesis a definition to author’s own liking 
describing DQ is used: “The totality of features and characteristics of data that 
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bears on their ability to satisfy a given purpose; the sum of the degrees of 
excellence for factors related to data” (Roebuck, 2011).  
Not to complicate the concept more, it is only necessary to understand that 
DQ is implicitly a part of the presented other key concept apart from perhaps 
situational awareness. Although there are no standards for DQ dimensions, 
Data Management non-profit organization DAMA (UK chapter especially) has 
presented in author’s opinion the best description of key DQ dimensions. 
They are presented in FIGURE 5 where the six dimensions together can build 
a complete view on the quality of the data, although they are not always (and 
in many cases with good justification) used in combination of all six. DAMA 
(2013) itself defines data quality dimension as: “[…] feature (characteristic, 
attribute or facet) of data that can be measured or assessed against defined 
standards in order to determine the quality of data”. 
 
FIGURE 5. –Six Core Data Quality Dimensions (DAMA (UK), 2013, p. 8) 
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The dimensions of data quality as per DAMA are introduced in short, as they 
build the capability to form trustable master data (introduced in Chapter 4.3), 
critical information for operations to run. Once trustable and good quality 
master data is formed, it can be change controlled to ensure only valid 
changes to master data are taking place. Further via data quality monitoring we 
can capture possible changes violating business data definitions and data 
quality rules and manage their incident handling.  
The six data quality dimensions are defined as (DAMA (UK), 2013): 
1. Completeness is “The proportion of stored data against the potential of 
"100% complete"” 
2. Uniqueness is “No thing will be recorded more than once based upon how 
that thing is identified.” 
3. Timeliness is “The degree to which data represent reality from the required 
point in time.” 
4. Validity is “Data are valid if it conforms to the syntax (format, type, range) 
of its definition.” 
5. Accuracy is “The degree to which data correctly describes the "real world" 
object or event being described.” 
6. Consistency is “The absence of difference, when comparing two or more 
representations of a thing against a definition.” 
 
The last mentioned DAMA DQ dimension, consistency, needs to be further 
elaborated, which is following next. 
4.2.1 Consistency –data quality dimension 
For the purposes of providing the “Novel innovative model” in Chapter 7, 
which encompasses all the studied main concepts, DAMA’s data quality 
dimension of “Consistency” is most relevant to note (described in TABLE 4). It 
is later used for monitoring purposes of established and quality assured (other 
DAMA dimensions are verified) baseline critical operational data and 
controlling changes in that. 
TABLE 4. Consistency – one of the DAMA UK’s (2013) DQ -dimensions 
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Consistency as per DAMA is not enough for the model construction purposes 
(Chapter 7) purposes, but it will be encompassed with integrity as described in 
the following chapter. 
4.2.2 Integrity of information (data) 
Integrity of information is seen playing a major part today in managing 
information in general (Cukier, 2010). There are readily available meters for 
many dimensions of data quality as mentioned in the previous chapter. For 
the purposes of this thesis integrity is focused on, as it is the key data quality 
dimension to be monitored and subject of inter-organizational data quality 
status information exchange presented in Chapter 7. Integrity of information 
can be seen as (ISACA, 2012) “[…] means guarding against improper 
information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information 
non-repudiation and authenticity”. Integrity for ICASA (2012) purposes is 
broken down into dimensions of completeness and accuracy, but for this 
study, the ICASAs definition (without accuracy & completeness breakdown) 
is better suited.  
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Next, Master Data Management – a framework, which instantiates data 
governance, as well as data quality and parts of information security 
management also, is presented to provide the needed pieces for building the 
big picture later in Chapter 7. 
4.3 Master data management 
Information (which is data put into a context) should be handled just like 
other important assets of the organization. In information intensive 
organizations information actually is their most important asset (Mesquida & 
Mas, 2014), (Cukier, 2010), (NASCIO, 2008) &  (ISACA, 2012)). It should be 
addressed with same control and supervision as other major assets (Hardy, 
2006). This requirement is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill, as sheer 
volumes of digital information (data) are were increasing tenfold every five 
years (Cukier, 2010). Yet, many organizations treat their information assets as 
a by-product, not as product – a problem already highlighted before the turn 
of millennia (Wang, Lee, Strong & Strong, 1998). 
Master Data Management (MDM) is conceptually very elusive, and no 
generally agreed upon definition for it exists to this date(Antikainen & 
Käkölä, 2011). One definition, which is according to author’s extensive 
experience on the topic of MDM, quite comprehensive and to the point is 
provided by Berson and Dubov: (2007, p. 11) MDM is a “framework of 
processes and technologies aimed at creating and maintaining an 
authoritative, reliable, sustainable, accurate, and secure data environment that 
represents a ´single version of truth´, an accepted system of record used both 
intra- and inter-enterprise across a diverse set of application systems, lines of 
business and user communities”. 
Again, as with data governance, it is worth underlining the words from the 
previous: “reliable, “sustainable” “accurate” and “secure”. These adjectives 
can be linked directly to data quality and information security management as 
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well as information security governance. It is becoming obvious that the main 
concepts of the thesis do indeed link closely together. 
Master Data (MD) can be observed as being the critical information related to 
the transactional and analytical operations of the organization. Alarmingly 
high, 75%, of leading companies were reported not being able to form a 
“single view” of their customer across operational silos and islands of data. 
What MDM can do, is bring common definitions for main organizations 
entities (like customer, product, supplier, chart of accounts, person and so on), 
provide business consistency and importantly – data integrity (Das & Mishra, 
2011). In this context, consistency and data integrity are the glue between the 
larger studied concepts. 
Master data, as defined earlier, is shared critical information across the 
organization as a whole. The relation of master data to rest of the 
organization’s data is shown in FIGURE 6. Master data is at the very core of 
the data set and the other data and functions very much rely on it. In its 
nature, master data is slowly changing or even almost constant, unlike 
transactional data, which relies on master data to provide the key elements of 
a transaction – an example: customer to whom product was sold and to who’s 
warehouse location it was delivered and to which accounts receivable the transaction 
should be recorded. In the example, the verbs present the transactions and the 
nouns the master data. 
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FIGURE 6. Relation of Master Data and its governance between different 
levels of organizational functions as well as IT-systems – an 
example of “person master data” 
The data standard in the FIGURE 6 represents the technical data quality rules (the 
form and fit of the data are in order (the data looks right) and the business 
quality rules (the function of the data is right, i.e. it presents the right business 
concept in the context) combined into a presentation, which both drives 
consistent creation of master data, but as well as any changes to it – all which 
need to comply to the requirements of the data standard. In short, data 
standard is a set of rules for the data in a set context, which define whether the 
data (information) is of good quality or not when metered against set data 
quality metrics (dimensions) set (see 4.2). 
MDM as a framework (or a body of knowledge as there are no standards for it 
yet) is not new. Along the lines already presented one finds a elaboration from 
2006 by Kobelius (2006) describing MDM as key to corporate compliance, and 
the term referring to infrastructure, tools and best practices for governance of 
official corporate records and that MDM is also about data quality, integrity 
and security, which are everything, when compliance is concerned. By this 
definition and the one’s before that, one can consider MDM as “instantiation of 
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data governance, which is targeting the very critical core information of the 
enterprise, ensuring its good quality, providing controls to maintain & enhance that 
quality, providing capability to efficiently share the information across function in a 
secure way and taking care of information’s integrity across systems and departments 
of the organization – all this while maintaining rigorous control over master data’s 
changes”. 
A characteristic, which is common for master data management and its data 
management processes is important to be mentioned as it is later used in the 
Chapter 7: The model of inter-organisation information assets’ integrity 
monitoring for situational awareness. Segregation of duties is a operational 
principle of breaking an operation into tasks, which no single person can 
complete all on her own from process initiation to its end (Henry, 2003, p. 
675). This principle, that it take more than one person to execute a process is 
crucial for ensuring that the controls for creation and change (master data 
very seldom is deleted) of master data, called data management process(es), 
cannot be executed by a single person. Only via change approval process of 
n+1 (where n=>1) persons, can created or changed master data be released 
into system landscape and be used in any business operations. Rationale is 
extensive, but this principle realized via data management processes is there 
in MDM to: 
 minimize the number of human errors made to critical data (two 
eyeball checks minimum) and also to 
 provide a model, where persons or systems without deep business 
knowledge can create or change “draft” (not published yet) data objects 
with the form & fit of the data as per defined in e.g. data standard. 
 Later in the approval flow a business context-aware person can 
validate for functional correctness. 
 Via this person’s approval is the data promoted to be used in 
operations. 
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There are numerous various conceptual models for MDM. These models are 
ignored as being irrelevant for the scope of the thesis. MDM is presented as 
“instantiation” of both data governance and data quality. Although it is partly 
already in many comments show, these concepts are heavily entwined, and 
overlapping but for good shared purposes. As said, in the context of this 
study MDM –capability is a concrete operational “way of working”, which 
realizes the targets of both data governance (introduced in Chapter 4.1) and data 
quality (Chapter 4.2), where both mentioned are apart of most MDM models. 
The following chapter is to summarize this theme focused on information 
asset –concepts. 
4.4 Summary on Data Governance Data Quality and Master Data 
Management 
This chapter introduced the concepts and disciplines of data governance, data 
quality and master data management. They are a crucial part for building the 
model envisioned in the topic of this thesis. 
Data governance is a governance function, which should reside as part of 
organization’s other governance functions. Only via such approach can a 
organization state that it treats information (or data) as a real asset and it is 
governed and managed (via e.g. MDM) as other key assets are. Master data 
management was presented as a framework for managing master data - 
entities, relationships and attributes that are critical for an organization and 
foundational to key business processes and application systems. As such, the 
management function consists of roughly of the processes and technologies 
aimed at creating and maintaining the mentioned master data. 
Data quality was studied and although controversial definitions and 
dependencies exist between DG-MDM-DQ (classic chicken-egg –problem) 
and there was no intention to dig into those, DQ was introduced via metrics 
(or dimensions), which are meaningful for e.g. estimating data’s (or 
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information’s) usability and trust one should put into it, they are at the very 
core of the model to be build in Chapter 7, as they are the measure, through 
which the model observes, if information is compromised by a threat or is it 
worth the trust needed to make decisions and operate processes based on it. 
Although it was earlier mentioned through Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 that people 
were seen as possibly the weakest link in information security management, 
the author argues that through systems (process, people, technology) like 
Master Data Management (MDM, which is presented in next chapter), people 
can actually be the key enablers of information security. This is through their 
capability to process tacit business understanding and logic implicit in the 
data that cannot be easily modeled for automation and data validity 
estimation. 
Where automated data quality rules can analyze the form and fit of the data, 
the function of the data, i.e. does it describe valid business logic, is something, 
which is very hard or impossible to teach to the machine. And the people in 
this form-fit-function -link need to be those executing the core business 
functions, not IT-people. This is best supported by a notion of a very common 
practice in any business data migration or quality improvement related IT-
activity that the data is “checked and corrected” by business. This means that 
although IT-department people can screen the data for the form and fit, they 
do not understand the business context of it (the function) and the rules on 
which the data is deemed either “ok” or “not ok” - only business operations’ 
persons can define that. 
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5 OVERLAPS BETWEEN STUDIED CONCEPTS 
Through introduction of key concepts relevant for this study from Chapter 2 
to Chapter 4, there has been clear signs observed by the author that the 
concepts are somewhat overlapped, although they are well separated in 
literature and in practice. In this chapter, some of the obvious overlaps are 
listed. This serves as part of the grounding on which the model presented in 
Chapter 7 is based on. It serves also as further study’s possibility to rethink 
these silo-models and gain possible synergy by unison of them.  
5.1 Information security policy and data policy 
First to understand what both information security policy and data policy 
should both present is framed by ISO’s(ISO/IEC, 2014) definition of policy as 
“intentions and direction of an organization as formally expressed by its top 
management“. One can understand this as part of realization of organizations 
overall strategy. Hence, both information security and data policies should be 
directly manifestations of operative guidelines, i.e. realizations of the overall 
strategy in contexts of ISM and DM.  
For a strategy to be realized it is common that policies are needed to drive the 
change needed to reach the target of the strategy, these policies been 
considered as guidelines according to which actions should be considered, so 
vision could be realized one day. In information security management 
programs the lack of vision and thus policies is seen as one main reason these 
programs provide little if any results (Henry, 2003, p. 664).  
Von Solms & von Solms (2004) argue very strongly that according to their 
knowledge all international best practices, i.e. standards (like ISO or COBIT) 
are stressing the fact that an information security policy is the very starting 
point of proper ISG of and standing point for all sub-policies, standards and 
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procedures. They state that policy should be a short one and signed by CEO to 
show executive management’s commitment. 
This fact that policy, which should align with organizations’ strategy, is an 
important success factor, is further underlined. It is even noted that in many 
cases policy is understood and interpreted as strategy (Knapp, Morris, 
Marshall & Byrd, 2009), which is rather understandable from operational level 
point of view. The non-existence of information security policy leaves the 
company and its information security enabler programs with little if any 
anchoring points and thus render them weak and not able to provide real 
results (von Solms & von Solms, 2004). 
5.2 Synergies of Data Governance and Information Security Governance 
Through literature study made, it seems there is already obvious overlap also 
between data governance and information security governance. Some were 
already mentioned, nevertheless this chapter lists few more secondary data 
findings from literature, which concretize the mentioned relation.  
One possible glue between mentioned governance concepts can be found by 
taking a look on what Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD (2004) has stated in its “Principles of Corporate 
Governance”:  
[Responsibilities of the Board include] ensuring the integrity of the 
corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the 
independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in 
particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, 
and compliance with the law and relevant standards.’ 
[...] 
‘In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to 
accurate, relevant and timely information.’ 
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Here we can observe explicitly observe that the board has direct responsibility 
over controls, which requires effort of governance from them. Also integrity is 
called after, which means (with the controls added into equitation) that ISG –
capabilities are needed as well as DG-capabilities (DQ explicitly addressed) in 
the latter snippet “[...]should have access to[...]” need to be in place.  
Demanding more push for the need of information security governance 
Hardy (2006) says that board of directors and senior management should 
ensure their information assets’ protection and that governance of those 
should be on top of agenda with being regularly addressed. This promotes 
again union between ISG and DG as it implicitly means that the assets must 
be identified (DG) to be protected (ISG) and that this should happen as a 
continuous governance capability rather than one time effort.  
Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 (107th Congress of the United States of America, 
2002) both requires that CEO/CFO ensuring that the company has proper 
controls in place and at the same time also requires that any deficiencies in the 
data used must be identified. This means that the signing officer must have a 
concept of the quality of the data used and also acknowledges the risks that 
might be addressing the reporting data, which can be translated to 
information security (as integrity being one security requirement as well as 
data quality indicator). Also, one should not be able to say that internal 
controls are good if the information management systems are not secure. 
These requirement put together show more synergy between ISG-DG as well 
as on operational level uniting MDM and ISM.  
Overlaps are clearly presented in regulations and compliances which have 
been introduced  in the previous few years. Many of those are driving 
towards realizing of information’s relevance to whole corporate operational 
capability, e.g. ones like SOX, BASEL II/III and Solvency II. These, like 
Solvency II does (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), 2009) directly and quite explicitly demand capabilities to manage the 
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data in a formalized and demonstrable way (data management processes, 
data standards, data integrity, etc.), something, which requires a governance 
structure to really be compliant. Hence, board of directors has a direct 
corporate governance responsibility over data assets as well as their security 
((von Solms , 2005) & (Hardy, 2006)).  
Last, although it is out of the scope of this study, how the governance should 
be organized or executed, the following needs to be taken into consideration 
on the matter. It highlights the disparity between IT and business (it has been 
there and not vanished yet), especially in light of what was earlier noted about 
compliancy governance requirements (e.g. controls in place to systems, 
security and reliable data). Why ISG and DG should not reside as part of IT, 
already back in 2006 (Hardy, 2006) states that according to a non-profit 
organization, ITGI’s, survey of 335 CEOs, CIOs and other executives more 
than 2/3 of the CEOs were not comfortable answering questions about 
governance and control over their IT processes. A finding that with good 
probability indicates that even with their current responsibilities (if they are 
even defined) IT is somewhat detached from the business, i.e. they are not 
governed and controlled as should. Similar evidence on the linkage between 
business strategy and IT projects being weak is summarized for example by 
Steward (2008, p. 206) summarizes as follows: ”[…] IT investments are often 
accompanied by poor vision and implementation approaches, insufficient 
planning and coordination and are rarely linked to business strategies”. 
Next, some clear overlaps between master data management and information 
security management are observed. 
5.3 Overlaps of Master data management and information security 
management 
As done for data governance and information security governance, now some 
observed connections and possible synergies between master data 
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management and information security management (as well as thus implicitly 
data quality) are presented as secondary data findings from literature. 
Through literature study made, it seems there is already obvious overlap also 
between master data management and information security management. Some 
were already mentioned, nevertheless this chapter lists few secondary data 
findings from literature, which concretize the mentioned relation.  
ISO/IEC 27000:2014’s definition for information security is one anchor 
between information security management and master data management. ISO 
(2014) states that information security can be seen as: “preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information”. These are the classic 
C-I-A –properties of information security (Chapter 3.2), nevertheless these are at 
the same time also at the very core dimensions in data quality (Chapter 4.2), 
which is a key driver of MDM (Chapter 4.3). A clear overlap can be seen here 
between these three concepts.  
Accountability of information is another anchor point. For example, if there 
are no clear responsibilities and a named individual to be responsible for a 
piece of information as an owner for that information, serious security risks 
will arise (von Solms & von Solms, 2004). Ownership is a shared target of both 
MDM and ISM, although most ISM -models only mention it, not providing 
concrete means to establish data ownership, whereas MDM does.  
Last notion, however of significant relevance is that it is seen that neither ISM 
nor MDM for either compliancy monitoring and enforcement capabilities(von 
Solms & von Solms, 2004) nor data standards and processes definition should 
reside in IT operations. This promotes the need to find a home for these 
business operations, which both need clear identification of information assets 
to be managed and both need being governed as ongoing operations. It makes 
sense to consider, whether these two concepts of ISM and MDM should be 
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combined for synergy benefits and for removal of overlap to same operative 
and governing bodies? 
Although some conclusions based on literature data findings were already 
made on presented concepts overlaps, the next sub-chapters summarize the 
topic. 
5.4 Other possible synergies between the concepts – per author 
Few additional remarks need to be made, which author deems significant for 
the topic. Remarks, which could enhance the connection between the 
concepts, remove redundancy and build efficiency as well as capability to 
execute successful organizational change management, something, which is of 
essence in any change.  
First, all discussed governance establishments, MDM, ISM and data quality 
exercises are very difficult, due to their nature to address almost whole of the 
organization and presenting significant need for change. It is noted by Talburt 
& Williams (2014) that there is strong resistance from e.g. data owners for 
information quality programs and the “who” (i.e. people) need to be 
addressed, while they also state that skills in project and change management 
are seen essential for these exercises. The author cannot but agree, as he sees 
the mentioned themes of MDM, DQ, ISM, etc. are cross-organization scope 
exercises requiring a real paradigm shift. In similar “classic” exercises like 
ERP -deployments, which cross organizational boundaries it has been 
discovered that organizational change management is the single utmost 
theme project and program managers should focus on to obtaining success 
(Antikainen & Käkölä, 2010). 
Second, within the topic of information security risk management (ISRM) Webb, 
Ahmad, Maybard & Shanks (2014) make a remark that efficient ISRM is 
extremely difficult to establish as a function as it requires thorough 
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identification of information asset (complete and accurate list of discrete 
information assets, vulnerabilities etc.), which is an expensive task in many 
organizations. As this task is similarly involved in any MDM/DQ 
establishment to certain degree and should be addressed in any ISM-exercise, 
the common goal could provide reasoning for joining resources. 
Considering the mentioned difficulty of both getting the top management’s 
commitment and establishing the capabilities of e.g. MDM and ISM, it should 
be considered – especially the in light of shown evidence between presented 
concepts, that should they be governed and even operatively executed as joint 
efforts as many of the targets of the concepts are the same? Could the shown 
overlap and even synergy out win more easily also the organizational change 
resistance, if run as joint-program. To the author it sounds resource wise. This 
question will be further investigated in empirical study. 
5.5 Summary of overlaps of the concepts 
Both the governance –dimension of information and security of it (DG and 
ISG) as well operational level frameworks and capabilities (ISM and MDM) 
were further investigated for both negative (e.g. double organization, lack of 
efficiency, conflict of interests) and positive overlaps (e.g. same goals). 
Through the details provided and already partly observed in previous 
chapters, it seems that the concepts are not that tightly separated as one could 
think. The overlaps, if used positively, could results in synergies, which can 
execute even very demanding change projects, even paradigm changes in an 
organization with shared goals and resources efficiently used. Some of these 
possibilities are extendable for example to information security risk 
management (ISRM) – a risk management centric view on information security, 
where identifying the information assets is deemed the utmost success factor 
and at the same time the most difficult tasks, where things usually fail (Webb, 
Atif, Maynard & Shanks, 2014). 
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In short, there is clear overlap between the concepts, it would make sense to 
harvest the overlaps in positive way and fusion them for capabilities not 
achievable, when the concepts operate on their separated silos. All this being 
foundation for Chapter 7. Before introducing the model this thesis is thriving 
to create, it is necessary to pay attention to last critical component of the 
model, situation awareness (SA), which is covered next. 
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6 SITUATION AWARENESS 
The last concept to be presented prior to combining the seemingly (somewhat) 
detached earlier concepts is Situation awareness. In this chapter, situation 
awareness is presented through one well established model; there is no need 
to investigate multiple conceptual models and definitions. Next, some 
remarks of situation awareness are made in context of cybersecurity and 
mainly through raising remarks from Finland’s Cyber Strategy concerning 
situation awareness as well as few general information security –related 
situation awareness findings. Last, an existing example of (limited) nation 
critical infrastructure SA capability, HAVARO, is presented. 
6.1 Concept of situation awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is defined by the mother of the  theory, Endsley (1995) 
as: ”the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and projection of their 
status in near future”. The main reasoning for selecting SA for this study is 
that it is widely recognized scientific construct, as well as recognized at least 
as high level construct in for example Finland’s Cyber Strategy (Secretariat of 
the Security Committee, 2013), which is in focus in next sub-chapter. It can be 
also understood via process thinking, as a chain of actions(Webb et al., 2014) – 
an approach which is highly compatible with the other parts of the study’s 
fusion of concepts.  
Endsley’s model (FIGURE 7) is presented as whole SA –“process” with factors 
of systems and individuals affecting the ability to utilize the SA. For the scope 
of the study the progressive stages (perception-comprehension-projection) in 
Endsley’s model as well as the mentioned factors are not investigated. 
Scoping is limited to offering “State of the environment” (highlighted in red in 
FIGURE 7) for both organization’s roles responsible over data quality and 
data management processes as well as for operators in national cyber 
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command & control –function. How they perceive the state with all connected 
factors is a matter of a whole completely new study. Nevertheless, 
explanation of key elements and “process” of the Endsley’s model needs to be 
done. 
The model depicts the whole of the process, how SA is achieved in steps 
(Endsley, 1995): 
1) Level 1 is, where actor builds a perception of the environments different 
elements and e.g. their status and dynamics (as model concerns time 
and space), from which the actor moves to  
2) Level 2, where the actor does comparison of actor’s own “mental 
models” which have been built over time (e.g. knowledge on similar 
situations with some recognizable features, which unite them with the 
one compared) – i.e. actors own understanding of the perceived state. 
The actor has achieve comprehension, from which the actor moves to 
3) Level 3, where the actor becomes aware of the perceived information’s 
meaning and significance to the goals and objectives. At this last SA-
“stage” the actor can predict (projection), what will probably happen 
next through actor’s understanding of causality. 
If the actor does not fail at any of the levels, the actor has achieved the SA and 
has the basis available for informed decision making and execute action and 
thus provide feedback (e.g. possibly change the environment) to the state of the 
environment. The task/systems factors as well as individual factors influence 
the SA building, nevertheless they are always context-tied and thus become 
meaningful on a specific situation. Examples of system/task factors could be 
complexity of the system used for SA building, UI design of it, level of 
visualization, the task load presented by the system. On the Individual factors 
examples could be a person’s experience, the expectations the person has, how 
well the person is trained for the SA buildup and systems enabling it as well 
as his own concepts of set goals and objectives.  
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FIGURE 7. Endsley’s (1995, p. 35) SA model  
As the fundamentals and purpose of SA (build understanding of the existing 
situation and be able to predict its continuums in various scenarios so that 
informed decision can be made and acted upon) is presented, it is worth 
examining, how SA relates to Finland’s Cyber strategy. SA is mentioned in 
several countries’ cyber strategies e.g. Australia, USA, France, Estonia, 
Germany, Canada and the UK (Franke & Brynielsson, 2014). Considering its 
visibility in national strategies, it is logical to be used as an anchoring point. 
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6.2 Situation awareness as part of Finland’s Cyber strategy 
For building more context and relevance for the study made, the author is 
situating the research question 1’s (Q1) model (Chapter 7) into Finland’s 
current cybersecurity situation and its future development activities. Primary 
data is gathered through the interviews, however to limit the scope of the 
theme interview, it is relevant to highlight some findings from Finland’s 
Cyber security Strategy as secondary data, which builds justification for the 
theme interview questions asked and also connects the construct of situation 
awareness into national cyber security context. 
Finland published its Cyber Security Strategy early 2013 and the execution of 
targets set by strategy are ongoing during writing of this thesis. The status is 
elaborated via the interviews results presentation in Chapter 9.5. Finland sees 
that cyber threats are on a dramatically increasing trend and nation’s cyber 
resiliency is in need of enhancement, especially for scope of critical 
infrastructure, which is defined as “[…]structures and functions indispensable 
for the vital functions of society. They comprise physical facilities and 
structures as well as electronic functions and services”. Further critical 
information infrastructure, which can be seen as a “tool” for enabling critical 
infrastructure services is: “[…] the structures and functions behind the 
information systems of the vital functions of society which electronically 
transmit, transfer, receive, store or otherwise process information (data)”. The 
empirical part relies on these definitions, when validating that interviewer 
and interviewee are discussing the conceptually same topic. (Secretariat of the 
Security Committee, 2013).  
USA’s presidential Executive Order 13636 (via (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), 2014)) from February 2013 somewhat more integrates 
the physical word and the digital one by referring to cybersecurity as: 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
77 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters”. The scope, meaning 
and “spirit” of the definitions are very close to each other . 
Finland’s vision for cyber security (“desired end state in which the cyber domain is 
reliable and in which its functioning is ensured”). Finland’s Cyber Strategy 
process is part of the holistic Security Strategy for Society, where vital 
functions (seven in number) of society are identified as per illustrated in 
FIGURE 8. This figure also states Finland’s vision for cyber security, on which 
Finland sees itself as possessing excellent changes to be in the vanguard of 
cyber security. (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013) 
 
FIGURE 8. Finland’s(Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013, p. 3) Vision 
for cyber security 
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Finland does see few key themes (SA and information sharing, later also 
relevant for scope of the study), in which situation awareness seems to play a 
major role for realizing the vision set in the strategy. The strategy’s 
management part (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013) states: “Cyber 
security management and disturbance management require that the 
Government and different actors have a reliable, real-time cyber security 
situation picture of the condition of society’s vital functions as well as 
disturbances which affect their functioning”. The principles of the strategy 
further highlight the importance of shared situation awareness, which is 
partly enabled by efficient information collection, analysis and gathering 
system, something that both require establishment of Cyber Security Center. 
Noteworthy quotes from the strategic guidelines are(Secretariat of the 
Security Committee, 2013): 
 The strategic guidelines of the Cyber Security Strategy are advanced by 
intensifying active collaboration between actors whose aim is to achieve a 
shared situation awareness and effective defence against the threats. 
 Cyber defence will be advanced by promoting the exchange of information and 
regulations as well as through cooperation between the authorities and the 
business community. 
 […] improve the situation awareness of different actors by furnishing them 
with real-time, shared and analysed information regarding vulnerabilities, 
disturbances and their effects. 
 The Government situation centre must have a reliable, comprehensive and 
real-time total assessment of the cyber security situation at its disposal. The 
assessment encompasses the combined situation picture compiled by the Cyber 
Security Centre[…] 
The quotes were picked from the very first two principles (out of ten), in 
which situation awareness (and information sharing to establish SA). 
In the background dossier of the strategy, several picks are worth underlining 
to set the importance of SA for Finland’s Cyber security strategy (Secretariat 
of the Security Committee, 2013): 
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 Strategic sensitivity entails the capability to rapidly compile a situation 
picture and establish situation awareness. The commitment of the leadership 
requires integrated situation awareness, coordinated and networked 
management and the optimisation of collective benefits. 
 As the vulnerability of society increases it is necessary to be able to rapidly 
start managing sudden disturbances in the cyber domain, aka cyber incidents 
(implicitly requiring slow latency situation awareness over critical 
services). 
 On the responsibilities of the (now established) Cyber Security Centre: 
The most important service of the Cyber Security Centre is to compile, 
maintain and distribute the cyber security situation picture to those who need 
it. The compilation of the situation picture requires the ability to collect and 
analyse relevant information and to meet the information requirements of 
different actors. The integrated situation picture, compiled by the Cyber 
Security Centre and its support network, comprises a technical situation 
picture and an evaluation of the total consequences of the cyber security 
violations to the vital functions of society. 
In the light of the presented direct quotes from the cyber strategy, it is noted 
that situation awareness seems as key enabler for the strategy to reach its 
vision and it is also the main responsibility of the operative cyber security – 
the Cyber Security Centre. Also to be noted is that efficient and across actors’ 
borders realized real time information sharing further enables capability to 
provide the timely and valuable situation picture (awareness). The latter is 
supported e.g. by Choo on the topic of cyber threat landscape and its future 
challenges and research directions. Choo (2011) makes a strong remark that 
information-sharing mechanisms for secure, timely and actionable cyber-
threat information between actors both on private and public sector must 
exist. Although the author but agrees, it is worth noting that idealism hardly 
ever meets reality and one major challenge to overcome is the “trust 
question”. This is well noted by Webb et al. (2014) on context of SA for 
security risk management by stating that one of the key challenges will be 
intelligence acquisition from other necessary stakeholders (beyond own 
institution’s borders) as it would require profound trust relationship between 
the actors.  
How could SA then manifest itself in the context of a single organization or its 
supply and value chain – that is briefly described next. 
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6.3 Information security’s situation awareness in context of single critical 
infrastructure services provider 
As summarized in sub-chapter  3.6, cyber security is for individual 
organization’s preparedness means and actions mostly classical ISM. 
Nevertheless, individual organizations should note their role in e.g. supply 
chains, especially, as production practices like just in time (JIT) have become 
very popular and e.g. material stocks are low and replenished only, when 
production planning is so instructing to be done. Hence, the organization 
should identify the possible risks to them on breakage of supply chain and the 
impact from them downstream the supply chain, should information breaches 
impact either critical services providing or even normal business operations 
essential to the organization. They should be aware of their business 
environment and possible threats to them or from them to other parties on 
prioritized basis – NIST Cybersecurity Framework recognizes this function as 
“Business Environment (ID.BE)” (2014), otherwise single points of failures are 
easily starting to exist in the chain. 
Limited by the scope of the study, and the model to be created (Chapter 7), 
individual (especially critical infrastructure services provider) organization 
should have control over their information assets on prioritized basis. This 
means that information, which is critical to operations and continuity of the 
critical processes producing critical infrastructure services, should have 
special focus, data quality metering and information governance instantiated 
by business capability like MDM. Via DQ -monitoring and MDM data quality 
assurance, inclusive of anomaly detection (critical data does not comply to 
defined data standards and business rules or breaks data lifecycle rules), 
organization should be able to build a situation awareness and control over 
their critical information. Last, they should be able to share that information 
over organization borders ((Choo, 2011) & (NIST, 2014)) to function like Cyber 
Security Centre on real-time basis (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 
2013). 
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Before closing the chapter, an existing instantiation of a system providing 
some SA visibility over (limited number of) Finnish critical infrastructure 
service providers cyber threat situation is presented.  
6.4 HAVARO – and existing SA implementation 
As it was many times highlighted in Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and 
noted as Cyber Security Center’s primary responsibility, building SA over 
Finnish critical infrastructure services providers’ cyber-status is essential ( 
Chapter 6.2). Steps towards those target capabilities have been taken. There 
exists a service provided in joint operation with Cyber Security Center and 
The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA). It needs introduction, as the 
model created (Chapter 7) and HAVARO present possibilities where they 
could complement each other for extended SA over cybersecurity status at 
critical infrastructure organizations. Named after “detect”(HAVaitse) and 
“alarm”(vAROita), HAVARO is an intrusion detection system (IDS) operating at 
the network perimeter of observed organization, analyzing (selected subset) of 
inbound and outbound traffic and detecting patterns and anomalies in traffic 
further informing Cyber Security Center’s operations on detections ((Lagus, 
2013) & (NESA, 2014)). 
There is very little public information available about HAVARO, however 
according to National Emergency Security Center’s Manager Christian Fjäder 
(NESA, 2014) there is no corresponding system available on the open markets 
and that HAVARO does have constantly added new threat profiles, some 
public, some exchanged as international cooperation between governmental 
functions. Fjäder (NESA, 2014) reveals that some 20 organizations (private 
sector) involved in national emergency supply –network have HAVARO 
coverage and intention is to double that during 2014; also, there is 
representation from all seven sectors of the emergency supply network in the 
mentioned 20 organizations. 
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One of those organizations is Fingrid Oyj, the enterprise responsible for 
functioning of the nation-wide high-voltage grid, the backbone of electricity 
transmission. Fingrid’s CIO Kari Suominen states in an interview of Yle –
news, a national news agency, that they have had few “red alerts” via 
HAVARO -system; the worst case being a malware penetrating perimeters 
and starting sending user IDs/rights outbound from the company. 
Compromising of the system was detected by HAVARO and the infected 
computer was identified during resolution. In those cases the separated 
networks, in which automation systems controlling the power grid reside, 
were not compromised. Still, Suominen states that it is not a question, if an 
advanced threat especially targeted at Fingrid will emerge, it is more a 
question of when it will happen - preparations need to be made.(Yle News, 
2014) 
Closing the theme of situation awareness, a summary is presented next. 
6.5 Summary on situation awareness 
A widely adopted theory for situation awareness was presented, which is will 
prove out to be a crucial component of the model created in Chapter 7. It was 
noted that many G20 countries in the world have raised situation awareness 
as one of the key themes they see their cybersecurity capabilities developing 
through. Finland is not an exception in that sense. SA is strongly promoted in 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy and highlighted as no1. capability to focus 
on.  
But SA is not just for national orchestrators to get benefit from. SA is very 
relevant for single companies also, especially, as trends are suggesting that 
information security breaches are on a rise and the threats are getting more 
and more advanced. Hence, for the purposes of leveraging SA also in scope of 
single companies it was shortly studied with MDM and DQ to prototype 
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capability, which could establish controls over organization’s key information 
assets and integrity of those.  
Last, HAVARO, an intrusion detection system (IDS), which is offered for 
Finnish critical infrastructure private sector service providers by National 
Emergency Supply Agency, was introduced to the level that its public 
information exists on. HAVARO is a good step towards national SA build up, 
however it is limited in that sense as it cannot provide any visibility to the 
integrity and quality of the critical information of the organization providing 
critical services. Hence, the model created in next Chapter is in author’s 
thinking deemed as something, which combined with e.g. HAVARO, could 
provide significant improvement to national SA over critical infrastructure 
service providers’ operational status. As it is regulated for example in 
aviation, that incidents compromising security must be reported to 
authorities, thus does the author believe that will be the case for reporting 
information security threats of organizations to e.g. Cyber Security Command 
Center - perhaps in the near future already. 
With the closure of SA, the author transports the attention to what this thesis 
is mostly about – the novel model challenged to be created by Research 
Question 1.  
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7 THE MODEL OF INTER-ORGANISATION INFORMATION 
ASSETS’ INTEGRITY MONITORING FOR SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
This chapter combines the concepts presented to form a model of a system of 
systems, which enables separated organizational actors to establish control and 
monitoring over their critical information’s quality (especially dimension of 
integrity), capability to process anomalies in critical information (master data) 
and report them real-time to any outside party, which needs situation 
awareness over multiple actors’ critical information quality. The chapter 
introduces the general basic model and instantiates it later by placing it into 
context of cybersecurity and adding components’ synergy benefits. Last, the 
model is presented in more formalized mode.  
7.1 Purpose of the model  
The sole purpose of the model is to present a solution to a perceived practical 
problem that although national critical infrastructure situation awareness is 
promoted as most important responsibility of Cyber Command Center and 
the Finland’s Cyber Strategy promotes is important strategic objective, there 
seems to be shortage of solutions for building SA to (national) critical 
information assets state and attributes. At the same time, information is 
recognized as the important asset to be protected, be it information for critical 
infrastructure operators’ capability to provide their core services. Situation 
might not be any better from single organization’s point of view on their 
information assets (if even recognized as assets ) quality. 
This considered, a general model consisting from both practitioner as well as 
academia recognized concepts was put together to provide a solution via 
“standard components” to achieve something more than the sum of the parts.  
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The significance and potential of the model and the hypothetic capabilities it 
brings along, once operational, are tested on the empirical part. Although the 
basic model is context-agnostic, in the interviews of cyber strategists and 
tactical professionals, the model is presented as one instantiated into context 
of cybersecurity. In that presented context critical infrastructure service 
providers operate with a requirement of a situational awareness over their 
critical information’s quality being needed by Cyber Command Center. Cyber 
C&C needs to build a national status of critical service providers’ information 
integrity for purposes of detecting anomalies, which might be due to attacker 
compromising service providers’ capability to deliver services via using 
stealth persistent threat targeting to degrade targets critical information – a 
attack type hard to detect via traditional security measures and even 
advanced IDS-tools like presented HAVARO. 
7.2 Approach taken for the model development 
For ease of implementation, author has selected (from his own knowledge 
base and literature study) well established concepts, which are combined to 
create a system, that on its own does not exist and which could prove out to 
be difficult to be built from the scratch. 
Selected concepts and the synergies detected between them are integrated 
parts of the model and are used for realizing the proposed internal models for 
the organizations as well as for the capability to build SA for needing 
party(parties) outside monitored organizations. 
As start of many design science research, this effort has also began with 
simplified conceptualization and representation of a problem to be solved for 
serving human purposes (Hevner, March, Park & Ram, 2004). The presented 
model does not comply with Design-Science Research guidelines, neither is it 
intending to, as thesis in Higher Polytechnic degree is targeted more to 
address very practical, even “hands on” results delivery, not needing to 
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comply with e.g. requirement of scientific rigor or use of established models 
and theories. 
Concerning the mentioned, the approach taken in this thesis is far beyond 
scope of higher polytechnic thesis (with detectable scientific approach), 
however at the same time fulfilling the requirements of thesis with providing 
practical problem solving in form of a very relevant solution (e.g. the model 
built). On the other hand, the provided model, i.e. the solution is wider in 
scope than classic design science as in the model exists both implicit and 
explicit concepts (like joining ISM and MDM –efforts) for organizational 
deployment of the model, which usually are out of scope of information 
systems design science research as per Hevner et al. (2004). Possibilities of 
further developing the prototype model (and concept it represents) are 
discussed in Chapter 10.8. 
7.3 The created generic basic model  
As mentioned, the model is constructed based on concepts investigated 
(mostly detached from each other) in the literature part and findings from it. 
As the scope of the thesis is already immersive, the model is not examined 
into e.g. process level of each main component (like data governance) - only the 
fundamental conceptual basics are highlighted. 
With the introduction of the very basic model FIGURE 9, it is seen that 
although the model has the elements and key responsibilities in place and as a 
conceptualization should fulfill the problem solution expectations, it shows 
much of the overlap on responsibilities of different “components (e.g. both 
information security governance and data governance are to identify (and 
later “prioritize”) organization’s information assets). In the following 
subchapter (7.4) an instantiated version of the model is presented, which 
realizes the positive overlaps of key components. 
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FIGURE 9. The very basic model with components, their dependencies and 
key responsibilities of the components in this study’s scope 
A short explanatory legend for the model (FIGURE 9): 
 Blue frame around elements is the context for which the basic model 
is agnostic and hence the context should always be established 
 Orange rounded rectangle can be perceived as the same as the 
organization. More, it represents the perimeters of the organization, 
e.g. the fiber optic connection to which organizations first router 
connects to. It is also inclusive of internal information security, e.g. 
classic malware, network traffic analysis, and also security of any 
technology or media  
 Grey/brown rounded rectangle is a “zoom in” into one of the 
organizations in context’s scope 
 Zoomed out organizations are 1:1 with inspected Organization1 
 The main components (concepts) investigated in earlier chapters are 
the blue boxes 
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 Sea-blue “Information Assets” represents all the information the 
organization has (non tacit / tacit) 
 Red “Critical information assets” are in the model’s case master data of 
the organization and other identified critical services production 
continuity data/information – the model highlights that critical 
information assets are only part of the inventory of information assets. 
At the same time they are  the part, which needs most attention, control 
and quality metering 
 Yellow Data Quality is the capability to define, meter and monitor the 
objective quality of the inspected data/information asset. In this model 
Data Quality is implemented by MDM-capability and deferred to it 
 Data Quality Incident Management can be seen as capability or 
process owned by MDM-component, however due to its central role in 
the model’s operation it is shown as a separate component 
 Arrows are representing responsibilities of the components 
 Data quality monitoring body is the abstraction, which is interested 
to monitor inspected organizations’ internal operations data quality 
and possibly data quality incidents (e.g. DQ thresholds are broken or 
critical information asset has been compromised) 
 Red lightning are the outside or inside threats addressing the 
Organization, be it directly targeting the critical information asset 
(which is the special scope of interest for DQ monitoring body), classic 
malware threat or stolen computer etc. 
As the graphical presentation does not show time dimension and 
dependencies between components’ operational capability, it needs to be 
elaborated further. The elaboration is explained only for the parts, which 
require the operational maturity to distribute critical information assets’ 
integrity data quality (and optionally other data quality metrics status) to an 
outside party, which must be capable of receiving and processing the 
information. 
89 
The capability as scoped in previous paragraph is materialized through time-
linear expectations (or build-process steps), which are: 
For the organization: 
1. Some form of ISG and DG must exist, if not they are to be established 
and policies formed 
2. ISM and MDM are establishing (if not existing) by ISG and DG 
3. ISM builds incident management process execution capability, which 
can operate for purposes of taking inputs of possible data quality 
deviations 
4. MDM –function builds the following capabilities: 
a. Through identification of organization’s information assets, the 
sub-set of it is scoped, which is designated as critical information 
asset through e.g. inspecting critical business processes, and the 
information those processes needs 
b. The critical information is defined organization wide for: 
i.  technical data quality rules (form-fit (e.g. allowed values 
like, taxonomies etc.) and  
ii. business quality rules (logic how separated information 
elements relate to each other and should interact (e.g. if 
product must have a internal product owner role-person 
as owner of it (dependency between “person” and 
“product”) and the person assigned resigns from the 
organization, a signal to designate new internal person 
with sufficient role qualifications is raised) 
c. Baseline Critical information data set is formed and set as 
“reference point” for trustable critical information to which 
other systems critical information is compared, ownership of 
parts of critical information is defined and responsible roles 
formed  
d. Quality metrics (e.g. completeness, accuracy, timeliness) are 
established and their thresholds and targets set 
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e. Change control (create, edit, delete) with segregation of duties –
philosophy data management processes is forced to change 
manage critical information assets 
i. This includes both human parts of change control as well 
as.. 
ii. …the technical system part, which must comply to critical 
information lifecycle management, e.g. rules on which 
systems can create/change/delete which critical 
information and… 
iii. …to which systems is the critical information supposed to 
be published to and with what logic (e.g. scope of data, 
timing rules) 
iv. Critical information lifecycle control must be able to 
detect breaches of earlier defined rules and take control of 
the critical information, which breach targets and further: 
1. Halt the distribution of the breached critical 
information further in the system landscape (stop 
the possible damage from escalating further) 
2. Raise an exception to DQ to handle the breach 
f. Monitoring capability over system landscape of critical systems’ 
information (those producing critical services and needing 
critical information) and its lifecycle is established – this 
monitors the rules set in “d.” 
i. For internal purposes (e.g. ensuring good quality 
business, decision making and analytics data) 
ii. For external purposes of releasing data quality status to 
monitoring body (optional) 
g. Exception handling process for “d.”&”e.” to raise the DQ-issue 
to further investigation process (Data quality incident 
management) 
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5. Combination of MDM and ISM –components form Data quality 
incident management process –capability (handling DQ-exceptions) to: 
a. Interpret, if the critical information create/change/delete-events 
or set other breach of set rules subject to exception handling is 
root caused to: 
i. Normal user or system error, i.e. “not intentional”, in 
which case the critical information inspected is put to 
change management –process to correct it (business 
approval needed) – critical information assets’ integrity is 
not compromised 
ii. “Intentional”, which means security breach (someone or 
something is trying to degrade the critical information 
asset – critical information assets’ integrity is 
compromised). The incident needs attention of risk 
management and it needs publishing to Data quality 
monitoring body 
6. Capability to publish the critical information asset integrity 
compromise –event to Data quality monitoring body. For method and 
form the general basic model is agnostic – only requirement being the 
near “real time”/online information exchange.  
For the Data quality monitoring body (capabilities can be built parallel to 
previous mentioned: 
1. Establish capability to receive: 
a. Critical information assets’ integrity compromised –event 
information from monitored organizations  
b. Continuous data quality metrics status information from 
monitored organizations (optional) 
2. Situational awareness –continuous production process over 
monitored landscape, i.e. the organizations in scope of monitoring 
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3. Capability to share information further from SA to designated 
parties (e.g. warn other monitored organizations of escalating data 
integrity – compromising attack vectors) 
With these capabilities established in designated components of the model, 
the continuous operation (cyclic process) of the model is enabled. 
Few limitations to be mentioned: 
 Presentation techniques available do have some shortcomings: 
o e.g. MDM and DG cannot be presented for their overlapping 
part, i.e. DG can establish (as it does in the model) operational 
capability MDM, which establishes data definitions, data 
controls and monitoring of DQ and on the other hand if there is 
no existing DG in place, MDM can be established on its own and 
it will implicitly be inclusive of DG for master data / critical 
information assets, though not having control over the rest of the 
assets (which holistic DG should consider) 
 What is left of simplicity, for its sake: 
o  the model is not e.g. making differentiation between 
information assets “inside” and “outside” of the organization. 
All information assets are considered to be subject to same 
capabilities of control. 
o In “later-to-be-developed” -version of the model there should be 
distinction between assets controllable and assets, which 
Organization has little or practically no control over (e.g. critical 
customer data in CRM cloud service provided by PartyX, hosted 
in country Y by party Z in premises <unknown> with 
implemented security measures of <not verifiable> or total lack 
of them). 
 Basic model does not either consider e.g. supply chain of the 
organization and its data assets’ DQ-status for organization of being 
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able to build SA over its whole supply chain. Neither does the 
advanced model next – this is left for future development also. 
7.4 An advanced model instantiated in cybersecurity context 
The basic model presented in previous sub-chapter is refined to highlight the 
synergies of the concepts/components from the literature study. At the same 
time, the model is instantiated into context of cybersecurity – the context, 
which is relevant for the scope of the empirical research part (Chapter 9).  
Furthermore, the cybersecurity-context is scoped to “Cybersecurity of 
Finland” for the sake of being able to introduce “HAVARO” and naming the 
organizational components. A sample threat is presented to which the model 
presented is offering significant security.  
Setting the context of cybersecurity affects the model by: 
 Context is set to Cybersecurity  in Finland 
 Data quality monitoring body is Finland’s “Cyber Security Command 
Center 
 Organizations are named as existing examples of Finland’s critical 
infrastructure organizations 
o NOTE: the instantiated model does not represent in any way the 
named organizations’ execution capability of the model! 
 “HAVARO” IDS is introduced into model, describing its different 
posture and capabilities to those of the capability presented by 
suggested critical information integrity SA. 
o At the same time, instantiation shows, how these two concepts 
(HAVARO IDS and Critical infrastructure service providers’ 
critical information integrity SA complement each other for 
more holistic national SA for the Cyber Security Command 
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Center) – this is more described in summary of the theme, 
Chapter 7.6. 
 Not a known feature of current Cyber Security Command Center’s SA-
capability, still for purposes of providing an example, the SA data for 
monitored organizations is visualized by simple traffic lights to give 
the reader an idea, what a simple SA -process could base on 
(perception of the environment) for critical information monitoring 
purposes. 
o Green – current critical information asset is not under incident 
management 
o Yellow - incident management is ongoing for critical information 
asset integrity breach or a breach is verified without assets being 
compromised 
o Red – verified critical information asset integrity compromised-
event in effect 
The components changes over basic model – providing more synergy - are:  
 Governance of critical information assets (Pink rounded rectangle): 
o ISG and DG are united for overlapping parts (e.g. need to 
identify and govern Information assets 
o Governance synergy is also presented by shared Policy of Secure 
Data (combines the overlaps between Data policy and 
Information security policy) 
 Management of critical information asset(Light green rounded 
rectangle): 
o MDM and ISM are combined to form Management of Secure 
Information to emphasize that ultimately both have 
responsibility over critical data (information) from different 
viewpoints, which are more efficiently, should the efforts be 
combined e.g. 
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 MDM includes security of data, roles and responsibilities 
– focus is more on people, process & data -lifecycle 
management, where security is often not understood 
thoroughly 
 ISM is inclusive of data security, though often the assets 
to be protected are more systems, not the information. 
ISM often fails to target “what to protect” also and is not 
capable of providing decent data management processes.  
 Cyber Security Control Center has responsibility over 
sharing SA on critical infrastructure service providers’ 
information integrity status as per “traffic lights” (to 
prevent competition –sensitive legal issues, abstraction 
level is made high enough). 
Example APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) -threat description materialized 
as an attack, which the instantiated model is subject to: 
 Threat’s attack capability is advanced and targeting specific 
organization (and its information assets)  
 It is a persistent stealthy deception threat, where organization’s (and its 
supply and value chain’s) data - critical operational and tactical assets - 
is silently degraded over longer period of time 
 It has a passive profile, i.e. 
o Threat does not present e.g. significant network traffic, which 
could be detected as a anomaly, it operates during business 
hours 
o It does not need to communicate to “outside” of the organization 
(thus e.g. HAVARO does not recognize it) 
o It masquerades itself as “normal user activity” possibly using 
valid credentials of an existing user 
 Detection of the threat is difficult due to its silent nature and non- 
aggressive attack philosophy 
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 It degenerates the data via trying to maintain form-fit of the data, e.g. 
replacing delivery addresses with other “valid” addresses  
 Possibly detected only via user reporting or slow general 
understanding that something is “wrong” as deliveries for example 
end up in many cases to wrong places 
 Why especially dangerous: attacked organization (or organizations in a 
orchestrated large scale attack on critical infrastructure) involved 
possibly could not, with required certainty, reference the point in time, 
in which the attack started, making back up recovery and business 
continuity challenging tasks 
o This is due to they have no understanding of their (critical) 
information assets’ “normal state”, e.g. business validated 
master data 
o Even though the degraded data could be identified and fixed, 
the impact to victim organization could still prove out to be 
enormous as the operations done during effect of the attack 
(which could be weeks/months) need to be backtracked and 
effects risk managed 
With the modifications and instantiating factors presented, the model is 
presented in FIGURE 10. The synergy-added model instantiated in 
cybersecurity-context in Finland. 
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FIGURE 10. The synergy-added model instantiated in cybersecurity-context in 
Finland 
 Notions, why author deems the model efficient to handle the example threat: 
 It provides early detection of attack (through rigorous critical 
information asset controls (change control, segregation of duties, 
lifecycle management) 
 It prevents attack escalation in organization 
 It understands business context and rules, which few, if any solutions 
do, thus detecting attack, which is degrading critical information by 
trying to maintain form-fit rules (data seems right, however it is 
actually misinformation) 
 Online data quality monitoring with previous mentioned capabilities 
provides (if wished) instant “heads up” to Cyber Security Command 
Center) 
 Via previous Cyber Security Command Center can update their SA fast 
and form holistic picture through the monitored organizations and 
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o follow and analyze trends (like number of incidents, frequency 
of incidents, heat map of incidents in the environment etc) 
inform relevant parties, monitor threat in inspected landscape) 
based on which (SA) it can 
o decide on taking/not taking action (form of action not 
discussed) 
 Classic IDSs struggle hard to detect threats like this due to its nature of 
not presenting “clear” anomalies. This is especially the case, if the 
organization has not defined its standard (form-fit-function) for data 
entities (like product, customer, location) and has no quality controlled 
baseline data – in such a case, detecting threat like this is of pure luck 
or through user reporting, in which case some damage has already 
taken place. 
7.5 Putting it all together – a formalized presentation of the model 
The model for enabling organizations’ objective visibility over their critical 
information assets’ state as quality indicators, at the same time building 
controls over critical information, leveraging the key participating 
components synergies and last being able to share the status information to an 
outside party, which can receive status information from multiple 
organizations and build situation awareness over them all has been presented. 
The visualizations emphasizing the interactions and key responsibilities (in 
this study’s scope) of the main components of the model was done in Chapter 
7.3 and Chapter 7.4. The principles behind the model (e.g. utilizing existing 
resources and targets) and the key process involved, i.e. the capability to react 
on detected anomalies in data quality and assess those, are now put together. 
FIGURE 11. The formalized advanced model, represents this effort as a more 
formalized presentation layer. 
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FIGURE 11. The formalized advanced model 
A time-dimensioned conceptual model for it can be built by: 
 Start from the Principles – these are the drivers behind the model, which 
are to build basis for gaining upper management (and board) attention 
and commitment (e.g. build the business case) for the model’s 
implementation and use 
 Continuous model describes the key processes to be executed to build the 
capability for continuous and ever-developing operative way of 
working. 
 Data quality anomaly process is the key process in operative ways of 
working to handle any anomalies detected in critical information assets 
state, which could either indicate human error or possible threat 
targeting the assets and thus operative continuity 
 C&C Co-operation process is an if-then –process, describing prototype 
processes of how outside party, monitoring the organization’s data 
PRINCIPLES
1) Utilizes already existing
capabilities more
efficiently
2) Becomes integrated part
of organization processes
3) Strong controlover
information assets
4) Competitive advantage
through high quality data 
for operations, reporting
and predictive analytics
5) Removes possible
overlaps from otherwise
”silo” -functions
6) Builds momentum and 
success of combining
otheriwise separated and 
resource short
development efforts
7) Facilitates continual
improvement, dynamic
8) Explicitely focuses on 
uncertainty and 
management of it
9) Practical and 
establishable in parts
10) Tailored into context
11) Integrates otherwise
detached policies and 
strategies
12) Focuses the resources to 
where they are needed, 
managing what is of most
importance
13) Readily compatible with
process thinking models
CONTINUOUS MODEL DATA QUALITY ANOMALY PROCESS
C&C: CO-OPERATION PROCESS
1.1 Form shared strategies, policies (assets to 
focus on), targets. Join resources and governance
of DG and ISG  - gain commitment momentum
1.2 Integrate DG,ISG, ISM & 
MDM (+DQ) to a shared model:
 Fit the model to existing
and/or operations to be
established
1.3 Identify critical
information assets, 
define their standards, 
establish controls & 
DQ-reporting
1.4 Provide real time
DQ-visibility and 
detect critical
information asset
anomalies
1.5 Continual model
improvement via 
principles and 
changed operational
environment (int/ext)
2.2 Establish context and 
diffrentiate between normal
DQ-issue or possible real critical
information asset integrity issue
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2.4.1 Control anomaly’s possible
effect on critical services, take
needed mitigating actions
2.4 Incident management
2.4.2 Detail analysis –
distinguish between intended or
non-intended integrity anomaly
2.4.4 
Intended-
Breach is 
immident:
Transfer to 
resiliency
(risk
managemen
t) and 
escalate to 
C&C center)
2.4.3 Non-
intended: 
(i.e. human
or
explainable
system
failure
OR
X.X Risk management 
of operations
resiliency ensurance
X.X Sitation awareness
X.X.1 Perception
X.X.2 Comprehension
X.X.3 Projection
X.X Provide
feedback on 
co-operation
and lessons
learnt
X.XDecisionX.X Performance of 
action
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quality, might react when organization’s Data quality anomaly process 
messages them that the organization’s critical information asset is 
compromised. 
Further elaboration follows for the parts of the model. 
7.5.1 Principles 
The principles listed are few of the guidelines and organizational change 
management rationales, why the model presentenced is at the same time 
practical, leverages existing resources and (perhaps) already existing 
capabilities (like information security incident management –process). 
Principles describe the benefits (e.g. control over information assets) the 
organization gains from its implementation and promotes to align and join 
otherwise silo-operations (e.g. ISG and DG) for synergy-benefits of both 
efficiency. What is perhaps even more important is the ability to gather the 
needed change momentum for common targets’ realization. Something those 
operations (e.g. ISG and DG) would otherwise (on their own) reach for 
without success. 
7.5.2 Continuous model 
This part of the model describes the build-up (or leveraging of existing 
capabilities and enhancing them) of the continuous operations needed for 
building up and maintaining solid control over critical information’s change-
processes as well as quality and any anomalies in those, which will in turn 
trigger the data quality anomaly process.  
1.1 Form shared strategies policies […] is a sub-process in which 
the principles presented are addressed by management and 
decision to establish the operative model has been made. Its 
main target is to build synergies from leadership and 
efficiency perspective, e.g. join (part of) operations of 
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different governance structures (if separate for data 
governance and information security governance and/or risk 
management). Through (possible) reorganization the policies 
and sub-strategies of formerly separated functions are 
combined for those parts that gain synergy and/or are 
overlapping and thus sub-optimization.  
1.2 Integrate DG, MDM […] sub-process is where the targets and 
organizational new models are deployed and start to work 
for targets set by the requirements of the model as a whole. 
1.3 Identify critical information[…] sub-process is the first and 
foremost task of the newly (re-)organized operation. 
Understanding of the information asset held by the 
organization (directly or indirectly) is formed, master- and 
critical information is defined out of it and standardized, i.e. 
bought to standard meaning and form. The controls over 
different information assets are established, of which the 
critical (“master”) information asset is rigorously change 
controlled, preferably via earlier defined segregation of 
duties-based data management process. As a key output of 
this challenging process phase is the standardized and 
business validated critical information asset, which is 
validated against DQ metrics like mentioned in Chapter 4.2. 
Once the baseline data quality is in place, process can 
proceed to “business as usual”. 
1.4 Provide real time DQ-visibility[…] Sub- process is the 
“everyday business” control process over data quality. It 
ensures that critical information is created and changed as 
per the defined rules and roles. The most important metrics, 
for the anomaly process are the mentioned integrity and 
consistency, which are there in place to detect, if any 
uncontrolled information change is taking place in the 
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system landscape as whole. Should it happen, exception 
handling process for data anomaly is initiated  2.1. 
Otherwise the cyclic process continues on decided time 
interval or is triggered by C&C: Co-operation process or 
internal need, which transforms the control to 1.5. 
1.5 Continual model improvement[…] sub-process is there to 
ensure that the controls and capability once established in 1.2 
is kept up with changing business environment, e.g. new 
regulation, merger, de-merger or change of business model. 
This process receives input also from external Co-operation 
function, especially, if Anomaly process continuum proceeds 
to Co-operation process, which in turn will thrive to enhance 
the co-operation working practices through the experience 
gained from exception handling jointly executed. The circle 
closes to 1.2 and possible adjustments and for example new 
capabilities are brought into the model for iteration. 
7.5.3 Data quality anomaly process 
When 1.4 sub-process detects data anomalies, it initiates an exception 
handling process, border lined as Data quality anomaly process. The nature of 
this process is reactive and it receives the triggering input of DQ –anomaly 
and takes the responsibility to investigate its nature. Further, it will guide the 
process outcome to normal data management change processes or escalate it 
(in case of intended anomaly, e.g. cyber threat) to C&C Co-operation process-
group and possibly e.g. organization’s risk management function.  
2.1 Communication and possible SME consultation sub-process is 
continuously involved in all the sub-processes of 2.x process 
group. The formalized and two-way verified 
Communication with clear roles is essential to involve the 
right people with right tasks to solve the anomaly. 2.1 
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receives communication from C&C Co-operation process 
execution also, i.e. across organization’s “outer perimeters”.  
2.2 Establish context and differentiate […] sub-process is where the 
analysis of the anomaly’s nature is investigated. It naturally 
involves setting priorities, resourcing accordingly etc., 
however the main responsibility of it  is to distinguish, 
whether anomaly is due to e.g. failed reporting or clear 
system failure. Communication (2.1) and Monitoring and 
reporting (2.3) are involved to maintain clear picture of the 
process status (anomaly process can be understood as 
“internal SA” over DQ). 
2.3 Monitor, report and build[…] sub-process is an integrated part 
of 2.2 through 2.4.x. Its responsibility is to provide 
monitoring over progress, report it to needing parties and 
build knowledge base so that next time similar cases are 
triggered, the whole of the exception process should have 
more knowledge and thus efficiency on how to react. 
2.4 Incident management Sub- process further analyses the 
possible effect of the anomaly to critical services(2.4.1) and 
takes needed mitigation or continuity management activities 
as agreed. It then further analyses (2.4.2) the anomaly to form 
a strong opinion on the anomaly’s nature of being intended 
(attack) or non-intended (internal process failure). At this 
stage the 2.4 –process is forked to 2.4.3, i.e. internal issue to 
be corrected (and escalated back to data management 
process e.g. 1.3), or if the nature is intentional, 2.4.4 is 
initiated. From 2.4.4 agreed parties are given control (e.g. risk 
management) and escalation to external C&C Co-operation 
process SA –process is triggered. 
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7.5.4 C&C: Co-operation model 
C&C Co-operation process group is the Situation awareness process of the 
external data integrity monitoring party (e.g. Cyber Security Command 
Center) and its intention is to detect the trigger (e.g. changed information or 
new information received from 2.4.4), i.e. perceive it in context, comprehend 
it, form a projection for decision making and then make decision to either act 
or not act and in “act”, perform the actions deemed needed. The process 
group is also responsible to communicate back to 2.1. and to provide feedback 
on overall process execution to 1.5, for possible Co-operation process 
improvement and knowledge sharing.  
With closure of the model description and a note that the model and its 
processes are not intended to describe formal process input-output-role –
model as it is a conceptual prototype and needs thus rigorous scientific 
improvement (e.g. usage of established incident management process-models) 
and empirical evidence and enhancement, author will close the Chapter in a 
form of a summary. 
7.6 Summary of developed model 
The presented model(s) draws from the knowledge base (both theoretical, as 
well as from industry best practices) combining those with author’s systems 
thinking and wide cross-domains experience on information management, 
business development, information security management, data and 
information governance and intermediate skills in information security 
governance – all this combined with practical experience and academic 
research done on process development, deployment of IT-artifacts, and on 
understanding the relevance of organizational change management for any 
development endeavor’s success. 
The model identifies synergies with its components (Chapter 5) for purposes 
of more easily establishing the operational capabilities of holistic of the model. 
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As the model is process driven in nature, a prototype of more formal 
presentation of the model, with process –thinking dimension heavily 
involved, was provided in addition to the visualizations shown earlier. It is 
worth noting that by nature the key components of the model are greatly 
process –oriented, hence compatible with process thinking of the model. 
In this chapter, it was also identified (as highlighted already in 6.5) that an IDS 
like HAVARO is practically helpless to those threats, which are happening 
inside the organization (even if HAVARO implemented to protect it), which 
execute on low profile, do not converse with outside world – instead it aims to 
degrade the critical information (advanced and targeted attack) of the 
organization slowly and undetected. With union of visibility to “what is 
happening outside” and that combined with the model’s “what is happening 
inside to our most valuable information assets”, a nation would have much 
covered. Added with the model’s active participation in maintaining 
information quality and controlling changes to critical information, emerging 
threat would be detectable and their escalation stopped at the very starting 
point of the threat realization. This would provide a paradigm change of 
current reactive threat handling to proactive, where the threats can do little, if 
any damage – a sure asset for business and national continuity.  
With this summary the theoretical part of the thesis is closed and focus moves 
to empiricism, as the concepts investigated and model produced are tested via 
interviews of cybersecurity veterans. 
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8 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
This thesis has been based on the author’s intuition that the research subject is 
relevant, up-to-date and the research is bringing value to both practice of 
science and industry practice. A strong convergence can be found in the 
research, as several domains and concepts (ISM, MDM, DG, ISG, DQ, SA) 
need to be knitted together to understand larger motivations and causes.  
In the empirical part of the research these seemingly stand-alone concepts and 
constructs are merged together, their interconnections are investigated, 
differences in importance are identified, the model created tested and research 
questions are answered. The empirical part is based on the qualitative 
research method using the approach of semi-structured interview, theme 
interview. This Chapter will also elaborate the background of the empirical 
research, the methods used, introduce the interviewees and explain the data 
gathering process and analysis of the data. 
8.1 Used research methodology and approach 
A general guideline for empirical studies, suggested by Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 
is used for executing the research. It comprises of four main stages (Hirsjärvi 
& Hurme, 2008): 
1) Defined research problem/question (select one with relevance for the 
community, not one which is just “easy” to cover); 
2) Further study of the research problem/question, further refining it and 
looking into literature and existing research; 
3) Collecting the data and analyzing it (observation, interview, databases, 
...); and 
4) Forming the conclusions and reporting the findings. 
The research method used in the empirical part is qualitative and the 
approach was selected, as the target in the research is to consider also the past 
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of the interviewees, the evolution in their expertise, and their notions of the 
research phenomenon (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). Unlike often with 
quantitative research, there is no expectation set for clear causal relationships 
between the interview themes and questions, although many are identified in 
the research. 
Interview, as the data gathering approach, was selected for several reasons, 
the first being that the subject of the research with its many dimensions and 
domains is so complex that trying to gather data via, for example, surveys 
would be very error prone and require a lot of elaboration in the questions, 
and most probably result in a very low response rate and mixed data. The 
second important reason is that there is a need to get further clarifications and 
“why so”s from the respondents and there is a need to deepen the received 
answers with opinions and free elaborations. The interview technique used 
can be categorized as half-structured interview, theme interview as per 
Hirsjärvi and Hurme (2008), which is based on focused interview presented by 
Merton, Fiske and Kendall. Most fundamentals of focused interview are well 
suited for this research as it provides the following characteristics (Merton, 
Fiske & Kendall, 1956, pp. 3-4): 
 It is known in advance that the interviewees have experienced 
certain situation; 
 The researcher has researched certain phenomenon’s presumably 
important aspects, structures, processes and holistic nature; 
 Based on the analysis, researcher has reached certain assumptions 
about the ruling factors of the researched situation and causes of it 
to ones experiencing it; and 
 The interview is directed on the subjective views of the 
interviewees, those that the interviewer has earlier researched. 
Most of the characteristics fit well into this research’s design and purpose, 
although in this research, one similar “certain situation” (experimentally 
produced) does not exist. The situation (experiencing cybersecurity related 
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novel concept development via connecting existing constructs and models), 
although it could produce similar conceptual models from all interviewees, is 
still a situation, which varies a lot. Because of this “shortcoming” of a 
clinically correct focused interview, theme interview is chosen. Although very 
similar to focused interview, it still allows all the interviewees’ experiences, 
thoughts, beliefs and feelings to be researched without an experimentally 
produced “certain situation” (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). This interview 
approach can also be recognized as “the general interview guide 
approach”(Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). 
8.2 Background of the respondents and the interviews 
Five subject matter experts were selected for the theme interviews. 
Respondents were selected by the author recognizing their work history as 
very considerable in cybersecurity and/or information security management 
strategical and/or tactical development both in practice as in academia. The 
background details are kept to minimum as through them, it would be very 
easy to identify the responds, as the scene is small and professionals of this 
caliber are few. Some elaborative points on respondents’ backgrounds are 
presented in Section 9.3. All of the respondents are active on the subject 
currently.  
On the selection criteria, the author has also acknowledged personally that the 
selected persons have been very successful in their activities. This fact even 
further assured the author on the selection choices as he wanted to 
investigate, what ”recognized names” value and see important in current and 
future cybersecurity scene. To summarize - all respondents have experience in 
endeavors very few of us have the opportunity to participate in. 
Possible shortcomings of the selection criteria are explained in the following 
Section 8.3: Reliability of the selected interview approach. At this point, the 
author wants to recognize the fact that the interviewees are considerably 
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experienced, they are perceived as being successful, and their view on the 
subjects interviewed is broad and holistic. Therefore it is quite possible that 
selecting respondents with different criteria, e.g. “not experienced”, “not 
being successful” and “not contributing as holistic thinkers” would produce 
different data than the one presented in this study. This was acknowledged 
already at the very planning of this study and the selection criteria was 
formed already back then.  
All respondents were asked for their permission and were given a very easy 
and discreet option to back off from the interview. Care was taken not to build 
any assumptions or expectations about the interview considering the topic of 
the study. The respondents were given general description of the interview; 
that it considered cybersecurity, information management and situation 
awareness. They were also told that they were selected based on their 
perceived experience on the subjects covered in the study. Even the title of the 
research was “kept secret” to ensure minimal bias on the answers. The 
respondents were told that the study does not compromise any laws and is 
kept strictly confidential and they are free to end the interview at any point, if 
they felt it being inappropriate. All the interviewees accepted the interview. 
Three of the interviews were conducted via phone (for reasons of persons’ 
availability for a meeting was limited) and two on face-to-face –basis. The 
phone calls were recorded as were the in-person interviews. This was told to 
the respondents, and as the subject is somewhat delicate, interviewer 
explained the data analysis process as: interview is recorded on a factory-
reseted cellular phone with no SIM-card or WLAN-connectivity. Interviews 
are processed on the same phone, interview files crypted and archived on the 
phone’s SD-memory card, which is removed and stored at secure place the 
interviewer only has access to. Memory card is physically destroyed, after 
author’s perception of adequate retention period of three years from thesis 
possible approval. 
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Where physical meeting was possible, the ambience for the interviews was 
selected as open and informal. The interviews were conducted in the 
respondents’ work place or a restaurant, generally in places, which would not 
pose any feeling of a too formal ambience to keep the conversations easy and 
fluent. The interviews were carried out mostly in a very friendly and open 
atmosphere and in a very open-minded mindset. The interview meetings 
were started with casual chatting about “this and that” to take the edge off 
and to reduce any possible excitement of the interview situation itself. 
Average interview duration was 1 hour and 29 minutes – shortest being 58 
minutes and longest 2 hours and 11 minutes. 
To aid the verbal interview, author presented a thin slide deck, which had 
elaborations of the questions in forms of text and very simplified figure of the 
proposed prototype model. The slide deck is attached as APPENDIX I - 
Interview slides. 
The author was left with impression that all the interviews were held in a 
open an honest spirit. It was also perceived that the interviewees did their best 
to be as precise as possible with their answers to provide maximum feedback. 
They also provided plenty of opinions and elaborations on their answers, 
which can be perceived as a sign that they were interested in the interview 
and thus probably provided their best possible answers. They showed their 
expertise with criticism and by enhancing the presented themes.  
8.3 Reliability of the selected interview approach 
Apart from the time consuming nature of interview approach, it is commonly 
recognized to have the shortcoming that the interview itself has the risk of 
possessing several error sources. These errors or faults can derive from the 
interviewer or the interviewees’. As an example, the reliability of the 
interview can be compromised by the interviewees’ tendency to provide 
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socially “correct” answers and please the interviewer. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 
2008). 
Another possible reliability factor is the selection of interviewees. It is 
possible, although it has been consciously avoided by the author, that the 
author has selected such interviewees, which he recognizes as respondents 
favorable to his opinions and views and thus produce research data, which is 
favorable to the researcher.  
The third possible shortcoming is the number of interviewees. How can the 
author say that an adequate number of people have been interviewed? The 
answer is: “He can’t”. There is no scientific nor commonly agreed minimum 
or maximum number of interviewees a theme interview should have 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). As the interviewees all are unique in nature, there 
is always a clear possibility that saturation of answers (i.e. answers from 
further interviewees would not probably produce new data) has not been 
reached, although the author is quite confident that the key findings are 
already presented in the answers of the interviewed people. Of the five 
interviewees all shared opinions on the critical research questions. The author 
deems this as a relevant finding in the study. A fact, which would not be 
altered by 10+ more interviews, even if the 10+ next interviews would 
produce different results. The findings still remain significant. The author 
concludes that the accuracy for the purposes of this research is adequate and 
the data gathering committed is of good scientific rigor when considering the 
availability of the author’s resources. Still, the possibility for undiscovered, 
fruitful data is recognized as a possible shortcoming. 
The fourth possible hindrance for the reliability is the experience of the 
interviewer with interviewed persons. Although the author has executed 
several interviews (formal and informal) during his professional career, he is 
not a professional interviewer. Hence it is possible that the author has missed 
one or several new aspects to the researched topic when interviewing the 
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respondents. One possible outcome of this would be too early and incorrect 
notion of reaching saturation and not interviewing further interviewees. 
Lastly, four of the interviewees and the interviewer were acquainted, 
although only by one or two meetings or phone calls, to each other, which is 
not commonly favored (neither forbidden) in interview guidelines (Hirsjärvi 
& Hurme, 2008). For the purposes of this research, as it compromises between 
several areas of expertise and requires acknowledged high experience in 
information- and cybersecurity, the possibility, within the resources of the 
author, was to identify the interviewees from his personal network to ensure 
an adequate level of expertise and know-how from the respondents.  
8.4 Summary on research approach 
The selected empirical research approach was presented and justification for 
the selection elaborated. Interview and especially theme interview was seen as 
the research method to collect the primary data from the presented 
respondents. The main reasons for the interview was that the concepts 
investigated are very complex in nature and the possibility for 
misunderstanding without effective dialog is high. Also, it was needed to get 
elaborations and discussion on the themes from the respondents, not 
statistical data. 
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9 INTERVIEW STUDY ANALYSIS 
This Chapter will continue from Chapter 8, where the settings and 
background of the research approach and interviewees were elaborated. The 
analysis of the primary data collection (interviews) is presented with most of 
the themes and questions already reduction processed and initial findings 
provided (interpreted via meaning).  
The data collected is thematized and coded and this thematization and 
classification of data is first explained. Later the identified themes are covered 
one by one, each in its own subsection with relevant coded entities attached to 
the theme.  
At the conclusion Section of each theme the author will provide his personal 
synthesis and key conclusions on the theme. This is to reflect the findings to 
his own extensive information-, master data management, business 
development and information technology knowledge added to authors 
(subjective, naturally) perception of possessing at least adequate information 
security knowledge – all this will further enhance the reliability of this 
research. The author will also, when needed, ground the findings back to the 
theoretical part of the thesis, i.e. the literature study of Chapters 2 through 6. 
A further concluding analysis is provided in Chapter 10: Conclusions, 
limitations and future research. 
9.1 Analysis approach 
The initial analysis of the data collected has already taken place at the 
interviews. The interviewer made remarks of relevant entries and 
summarized some of his interpretations to the interviewees, who then 
commented, whether the summary and interpretation was what they meant 
or corrected the interpretation. The approach could be classified as “self 
corrective interview” (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008).  
114 
Apart from the initial analysis started during the interviews, the analysis was 
executed after the collected primary data was decomposed. The author 
proceeded immediately after the primary data decomposition to the analysis 
of it, trusting his intuition. Only part of the primary data (circa 35%) was 
transcribed, and some of classifications and interpretations were made from 
the recordings directly and analyzed and reported.  
The reasoning practiced during the analysis phase can be considered as 
inductive reasoning. A considerable amount of interpretation of meaning has 
been applied and is always speculative in nature. This being especially the 
case, as the author had a personal view to the research subject and he is 
interpreting the data from this personal angle (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). 
9.2 Identified themes, classification and coding of data 
Although the approach utilized is that of a semi-structured theme interview, 
the author had quite a clear classification, or sub-themes, identified in his 
interview frame. The findings are classified under these identified sub-themes 
in the analysis. The used classification/sub-themes can be summarized as 
follows – to an extent they follow the general structure of the research’s 
literature structure: 
 Experience of the respondent in (cyber) security or information security  
 Cyber? 
 Cybersecurity 2014-2015 and Finland’s capability to answer to cyber 
threats on critical infrastructure 
 Information security management 
 Information management and data quality 
 Situation awareness and the relevance of the created model of critical 
information asset integrity-information sharing 
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A certain order of presenting the sub-themes is also applied. In the interviews 
the general idea was to first get the respondents own free definition of each 
item (e.g. “cybersecurity”, “information security management”) and then 
cross check those against the perceptions made in literature study. Then, only 
after this alignment, the most relevant questions concerning this research were 
posed. The order of themes getting discussed in the interviews corresponds to 
the order of the theme Sections following. 
Data coding varies from a sub-theme to another and is question/area specific. 
The used coding is elaborated with each usage. Generally, no numeric scale is 
used. However, if the importance of phenomenon is investigated and coding 
can describe the views of the respondents with reasonable certainty - 
decipherable in comparable terms - then comparison is done (e.g. “not 
important, somewhat important, important, and very important”). 
9.3 Theme: experience of the respondent in (cyber) security or information 
security  
To understand the answers later provided by the respondents, it was 
important to first get background information on the respondent. It was also 
important to validate the respondents’ background as subject matter experts 
(later SME) on the researched topic. From the theme several classifications 
were produced: 
 Experience in presented topic; 
 Focus of experience 
 Experience divided as either a practitioner or academia member 
9.3.1 Experience in presented topics 
A coding experience in presented topics was established to understand how 
many years they registered had been working (practice or academic) on the 
presented topic. All respondents registered a average of 15 years of (cyber) 
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security, ISM or information management experience. This means that they 
had been involved in work assignments where security or security of 
information management has been a central part of their work profiles.  
9.3.2 Focus of experience 
It was relevant to investigate the respondents’ work and academic history to 
further validate the interviewees fit for the research. This was enquired by 
investigating on which broad category the respondent belonged, when 
investigating through classic dimensions of operations – strategic, tactical & 
operations. It was coded as focus of experience. As the concepts presented 
required mostly strategic and tactical thinking (relevance of the presented 
model to national cyber security), it was essential to check needed strategic 
and tactical know-how was included. 
Three of the respondents can be perceived as belonging mostly to the strategic 
–class, one as a mix of strategic-tactical and one as mix of tactical-operational. 
For the purposes of validation of the respondent group’s relevance, this was 
very assuring finding.  
A further distinction was made, if the respondents were more on technology-
know-how or managing and development-know how. This was coded as a 
binary Technology focused, in which three of the responded were perceived 
“no” (SME1, SME3 & SME4), one “yes” (SME5) and one mix between yes/no 
(SME2), which author later perceived as no, resulting in four non-technology-
focused and one technology-focused respondent. The one technology-focused 
respondent was a good contrast to the strategists and provided a different 
perspective to the topic. 
9.3.3 Experience divided as either a practitioner or academia member 
For ensuring that respondents had enough practitioner experience on the 
topics a coding of Academic or practitioner was created with a rough 
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classification of “practitioner”, “academic” and “both”. None of the 
respondent belonged to academic per se. Four of them classified as “both” 
and one as “practitioner”. For the purposes of the interview this was 
encouraging.  
9.3.4 Summary of theme’s findings 
The target of the theme was to investigate, whether the respondents’ 
experience and background can be considered adequate for the purposes of 
the research. The author is convinced that the respondents have solid 
experience for providing subject matter expert opinions and views to the 
researched subject with their considerable involvement in high-profile 
security and cybersecurity strategic and tactical exercises. That, added with 
one respondent bringing in views of a more technical and operations –based 
role is strong base for expecting interesting results delivered.  
9.4 Theme: Cyber? 
The foundation of this theme was to explore the respondents’ own conceptual 
models and definitions for cybersecurity, cyber defence and information 
security for purposes of validating that what was found in literature study 
either correlated with the interview’s concepts or were totally different. 
Following classification is used: 
 Cybersecurity defined 
 Difference of cybersecurity and cyber defence 
 Difference of cybersecurity and information security 
 Cybersecurity in scope of single organization 
9.4.1 Cybersecurity defined 
Before posing the respondents any clues what the interviewer had defined for 
cybersecurity, their own definition was asked, which has the classification of 
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cybersecurity defined. The author was satisfied with the answers, because 
they were tuned in enough conceptually with the author’s own conceptual 
model and those found in literature (although no commonly agreed definition 
exist to this date). Hence, it was reasonable to proceed with the interviews. 
SME1 saw cybersecurity through the effect is can have: 
“It affects all the sectors of the society, those witch need to be also involved in 
it […] cybersecurity is a holistic concept with five dimensions political, 
technical, military’s involvement […] and the person or citizen must be seen 
in the picture[…] and the economical layer” 
SME2 also highlighted the effect factor: 
“Were talking about large-scale things, like the effect the (mis)information has 
on this physical world...like how this cyber environment, which consist of these 
information systems, and people that use those is safe and trustable, but how it 
guides things like trains and electric are controlled that this environment is 
safe – so, were not talking like information systems’ reliability but the whole of 
the things. Central is how the cyber assets are focused on to what, like that 
they should be put to functions which are critical […], people being the most 
important and that core information assets are secured. Information is the 
thing, not systems.” 
SME3 saw it as a state of trust: 
“It is about citizens, businesses, and public sector operators – about their 
possibility to operate in the network and its digital services with a feeling of 
trust and that they are not themselves cause for troubles. From the national 
perspective, there is a feeling of safety involved” 
SME4 saw it as an enabler: 
“For me cybersecurity is much along the official [Finnish Cyber Security 
Strategy], where citizens, officials and business can do their things effectively 
and safely… but, it is also something like whole of the information systems, a 
structure of those, which impacts the society as a whole” 
SME5 put it very shortly as a holistic phenomenon: 
“Something affecting everyone of us - a state of mind, which is not technical 
alone and it cannot be black and white told, when it is good or bad.”  
119 
 
9.4.2 Difference of cybersecurity and cyber defence 
To investigate how the respondents differentiated the concepts of cybersecurity 
and that of cyber defence, a question was asked to make a difference between 
these two – provided one existed. This was relevant to study as cybersecurity 
and cyber defence seem to mix up somewhat as was noted in literature study 
in Section 2.1. 
An open ended question, classification of difference of cybersecurity and 
cyber defence is investigated with coding conceptually the same & differ 
significantly. None of the respondents’ elaborated can be perceived as 
conceptually the same. All of them considered the concept different enough to 
code the answers as 5/5 differ significantly.  
SME1 highlights the difference with: 
“Cybersecurity is the big picture, where cyber defence is a part of it only […] 
cyber defence is more of a military issue, although borders are not that clear.” 
SME3 recognized the difference yielding from authorities perspective : 
“Cybersecurity is other officials, like the police.. the operations police and other 
security officials, which are to ensure that the cyber environment has nothing 
criminal going on, be it hackers, terrorists.., while cyber defence is part of cyber 
warfare involving armed forces utilizing cyber capabilities as part of armed 
operations […] so, it is about the line between these, but the border is not clear 
and neither responsibilities are all agreed yet.” 
SME4 sees cyber defence as military action and CS as the rest what is left: 
“Cyber defence is something belonging to armed forces and is part of its 
statutory responsibilities. Cybersecurity is then all the other problems too, 
which are happening in the cyber environment.” 
SME5’s interpretation is also along the line drawn between civil and military: 
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“Something involving and affecting us all, where as cyber defence is military 
force’s stuff.” 
 
9.4.3 Difference of cybersecurity and information security management 
Once the difference of cybersecurity and cyber defence was investigated, it 
was interesting to know whether the SME’s felt cybersecurity strongly 
corresponding to information security management. Classification of 
difference of cybersecurity and information security management is 
presented, which is studied through the viewpoints presented by the SMEs 
SME 1 draws the line: 
“Cybersecurity is holistic, information security management is in smaller 
context, so the context is the variator” 
SME3 is on similar thoughts with: 
“Cybersecurity is a larger concept, while information security is about 
elements of information and the C-I-A of those, so it’s about information 
whereas cybersecurity is also about physical networks, physical environment 
and add human cognitive understanding and trust towards operation of the 
cyber environment – hence, it’s abit more than information security” 
SME5 takes a view that cyber security crosses the lines of information being 
processed: 
“Difference is cyber can relate to much more, where information is not used” 
 
9.4.4 Cybersecurity in scope of single organization 
As the interviewees’ opinions on terms was investigated, it was interesting to 
hear , if they see previous sub-themes differently, when looked from the 
perspective of a single organization (e.g. corporate or educational institute). 
Possible difference from instantiated viewpoint of single organization was 
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studied by asking whether the respondents felt that information security 
management was actually the same as cybersecurity, if one had the goggles of 
e.g. information security manager, risk manager or CEO of a 
corporate/institution on, through which they would perceive the theme. 
This classifies as cybersecurity in scope of single organization and is coded 
with in practice the same, mostly the same & differ significantly. Results as per 
coding used are in TABLE 5.  
TABLE 5 . Cybersecurity materializing as ISM in single organization 
Respondent Answer 
SME1 in practice the same 
O 
SME2 in practice the same 
SME3 in practice the same 
SME4 in practice the same 
SME5 in practice the same 
 
SME1 commented on the in practice the same with: 
“Cyber and information security [management]are in practice the same 
things, when looking from the operational point of view. The difference is that 
cybersecurity must concern, what information security management does not, 
that if there are holes in information security, there might be implications and 
effects cyber domain[…] so cyber must consider the risks of connected things, 
the causality[…]”.  
SME2 summarized that cyber is something present in the big picture:  
“Yes, I’d pretty much sign that they are the same. As the cyber-aspect is 
brought into picture it comes present only in the totality and society’s scope 
and on the scope of a single actor it is more on securing critical systems” 
SME3 differentiates between different sorts of companies, nevertheless stating 
that: 
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”It depends on the company, but in many cases it is the same, especially, if one is 
not high information-intensive IT company with lots of IPRs and so on” 
SME4: 
“Depends naturally on the company or organization, if it’s a company offering 
connectivity for critical infra companies, then it is cybersecurity, but if the 
same company provides network cable to my summer house, then it’s not – so 
depends on the context. More it is anyways the classic ISM, but it can become 
cyber, if all the small companies in Finland are affected by it.” 
SME5: 
“Much the same thing. And physical security should also be connected here 
[mentions cases, where physical premises have been breached in otherwise 
strong information security places and monitoring software installed in server 
rooms].” 
 
9.4.5  Summary of theme 
It was found out that all the respondents shared compatible enough 
understanding of what “cyber”-related concepts were about and could build 
context for them, when needed. As it was found out in literature study, there 
exists no clear and agreed definition for cybersecurity and author found that 
quite confusing and actually a hindrance for future development of 
cybersecurity study. A clear definition is needed so that e.g. corporate can 
distinguish, whether to decide, if “cybersecurity”-related news, events, ways 
of working etc. were supposed to affect their organization or not. From the 
interviews, a good rule of thumb for telling apart cybersecurity and information 
security management,  is by the impact and effect the possible threat has or can 
have. 
On the differentiation of cybersecurity, once investigated it from single 
organization’s point of view, with information security (management) - there 
is mostly no practical variance. This messages that although “cyber” has been 
here for some time already, the terms are not rooted enough and cause 
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misunderstanding and perhaps even waste of resources on 
activities/information processing, which is irrelevant for the observing party. 
Although it would be easy to blame scandal and hype-driven reporters, it is 
ultimately for academia and educated practitioners to “remove the noise” and 
by educating the public, make a distinction between cybersecurity and 
information security management of a single actor. 
Findings do support the literature study findings that cybersecurity and 
information security could and in some cases even should be considered the 
same in single organization’s case. Benefit of doing so, is realized by not 
confusing the organization with phenomenon, which is hard to understand, 
instead to handle it through normalized terms and frameworks. Things are 
not this black and white, naturally, and the organization must understand its 
place in possible value and supply chains, which can have society-wide 
effects, if impaired.  
On the personal record of the author the findings are in line with personal 
conceptual models. The author has been even a bit annoyed of the scandal-
driven reporting and providing public with a clear bias-of-availability added 
with perhaps not so relevant threat scenarios of uncontrolled cyber-wars and 
so on. It is true that the “cyber-era” is still trying to settle itself in and the 
wisest prophet on this scene is the one that admits having no visibility to the 
future. Nevertheless, author strongly promotes the education need identified 
and encourages companies and institutions, especially, when they are not part 
of critical national services, to best prepare for cybersecurity by first 
identifying the assets they need most protecting and then utilizing already 
well-working information security frameworks – to start with.  
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9.5 Theme: Cybersecurity 2014-2015 and Finland’s capability to answer to 
cyber threats on critical infrastructure 
This theme is about getting the latest trends from SMEs riding the highest 
waves in cybersecurity. Viewpoints on 1) what have been current year’s 
cybersecurity hot topics for Finland, 2) what might the focus be in 2015 and 
last  - definitely not the least: 3) how do the SMEs perceive Finland’s 
capability to answer to cyber threats, when narrowing the scope of function to 
those of critical infrastructure service providers (CISP). Further still asking the 
SMEs for their subjective view on 4) CISPs capability to maintain their 
technical defence perimeters. Hence the classifications are: 
 Top cybersecurity challenges in Finland year 2014 
 Possible hot topics for 2015 
 Finland’s capability of answering to cyber threats on critical 
infrastructure scope 
 Critical infrastructure operators’ capability to maintain their 
perimeters? 
9.5.1 Top cybersecurity challenges in Finland year 2014 
The interviewees were asked to identify, if they had some in mind, the most 
discussed or otherwise worth noting cybersecurity challenges of 2014 in 
Finland. Similar classification was formed. i.e. top cybersecurity challenges in 
Finland year 2014. This classification has no coding, instead open comments 
are presented. 
SME1 remembered the year back with: 
“Sure things to remember have been the state administration’s vulnerabilities 
in public […] plus then this risk assessment, which we still have lots to do in. 
Also, this year has shown well the effects of information warfare, where this 
cyber is present – as Russia is it information warfare and other cyber 
warfare[…with these] 2014 will be remembered in the history as the year, 
which will change our long run security thinking plus European security 
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political architectures[…] although not much of this is yet discussed in the 
public”  
SME2 elaborated the topic with: 
“We more and more awaken to the fact that these threats are real and they can 
have significant consequences and this has brought the topic more onto 
agenda”. 
SME3 does also highlight the incident with the department of state: 
“Incident with the Department of State and the espionage happening there, 
which shows that somewhere the control over the environment is not working 
as it should. From which we can naturally start big questions that how much 
we should be interfering…” 
SME4 is on practical implementation actions: 
“What are the practices we must take, when something go wrong, how to 
detect something being wrong and further how to pinpoint the partners who 
should be informed, SA over problems.” 
SME5 does also bring in the department of state –case and does see the 
positive side of the incident getting publicity: 
“Perhaps the biggest thing has been the case of department of state’s attack, 
which has opened eyes and especially the thing that it has most probably been 
there for some time. In that sense it is good that these are brought to public, so 
we can better prepare for these in the future – there has been this [paradigm] 
that one has not been able to say what the threat is, if one has not been able to 
name the threat. This does not necessarily mean that there are more threats 
happening, but that the ability of detecting threats has improved-” 
9.5.2 Possible hot topics for 2015 
Having formed a view on status of the current year and its cyber –topics, it 
was interesting to hear, what SME’s saw as rising future trends for 2015 or 
otherwise noteworthy scenarios, which might emerge. Classification was 
presented: possible hot topics for 2015.  
SME2 predicted that the challenges will be on really getting things done and 
showing results out of cyber strategy: 
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“Challenge will be to see how we are driving these things forward on national 
level. Cyber operation plan, which came one year after the strategy, which I see 
as very bad thing – it has lots of things listed and those have been categorized 
to logical packets… but… one cannot still see how the different functions will 
contribute to some designated target state […] there is no coordination 
between functions […] it still seems that we are trying, on the national level, 
define what this cybersecurity really is about on the concrete”. 
SME3 is pondering the balance between enough control and that of too much 
control – an Orwellian perspective: 
“There will probably be discussion on how much we can control and how we 
can control that the information that should stay within this country stays 
here, … so more talk will be on the situation awareness and how to improve 
that. Third aspect might be the confidentiality of citizens’ personal information 
and how to ensure it stays where it should” 
SME4 is promoting that the role of intelligence operations will be discussed 
“It’s the same as 2014 with more emphasis being put to it. Possible very 
Finnish-culture-thingie will be discussion on what is the role of intelligence 
operations in the cyber security context and how national cyber security can be 
improved via efficient intelligence.” 
9.5.3 Finland’s capability of answering to cyber threats on critical 
infrastructure scope 
To grasp something really precious, i.e. topnotch SMEs’ -hopefully unfiltered- 
view on national capability to answer to current and near future cyber threats 
on critical infrastructure, a direct question: “What is Finland’s capability to 
answer to cyber threats on scope of critical infrastructure service providers” 
was asked and coding formed from the question: Finland’s capability of 
answering to cyber threats on critical infrastructure scope. 
A question like this can to a decent degree be coded, and thus a coding of poor, 
decent, good was provided, although the stress is on the comments themselves. 
Coded answers are presented in  
TABLE 6. 
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TABLE 6. Finland’s capability of reacting to cyber threats 
Respondent Answer 
SME1 decent 
SME2 decent 
SME3 good 
SME4 good 
SME5 decent 
 
SME1 noted on the capability through capability to recover and how it should 
be it should be enhanced: 
“[…] capability to predict, prevent and recover – this is what it is much about 
that the time to recover has be seen at large as surprisingly long, that 
companies target of cyber attacks … we’ve been talking months of recovery 
time, which is far too long for business and it even more far too long time for 
critical functions in the society. So, that the time can be shortened we must 
focus on prediction and prevention […] much of this comes down to situation 
awareness”. 
SME2 saw that single operators are on almost a good level, however 
understanding the dependencies and chains of reaction is something needing 
improvement: 
“Basic level is pretty good for critical functions, but there is much to improve 
and develop on that the value chain is scattered and longer that… well… like 
who owns what activity or is responsible of the operational security of it, is 
kind of blurring. I’d say it’s pretty scattered now and then we come to this 
shared situation picture and awareness and I think there is no such thing at 
the moment, and I do not see it as a technical problem but it all comes down to 
sharing understanding and definition of master information and operations 
and their criticality”. 
SME3 estimates the capability as “not bad”. Still he identifies that we have 
much of history’s burden still to carry with us: 
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“I don’t know this topic so I’ could tell that here things are ok and here they 
are not, but with a finger in the air, I’d say that the situation is not bad. As it 
is everywhere the situation with automation in industry and critical 
infrastructure is perhaps not any better that it anywhere else – there is lots of 
legacy still left and we are living a stage in evolution, where there are the new 
systems designed to answer to cyber threats and then old systems, which are 
not.” 
SME4 seems that critical operations will withstand: 
“I think we can maintain supply network Finland yes, but if major aggressive 
cyber activity is taking place, then I think we’ll lose some of the well-being-
Finland for sure… lot’s of “ifs” here, but it’s still far from optimal, anyways.” 
SME5 brings in the fact that there are no metrics yet to tell the capabilities 
apart: 
“Well, there are many factors involved here, which should be taken into 
consideration as unlike analog world, cyber environment loses meaning of time 
and space, so that we can be attacked by the best in the world, not just that is 
the “neighbor”, in which case we should be able to define how good the best of 
the world is and in that sense I’d not say we are at very good level.” 
 
9.5.4 Critical infrastructure operators’ capability to maintain their 
perimeters? 
The author asked the respondents for their opinion on how well they felt 
Finnish critical infrastructure service providers are able to maintain their 
technical perimeters in context of information technology security (i.e. not 
physical premises) or had the battle for “absolute defence” already been lost.  
This is classified as: critical infrastructure operators’ capability to maintain 
their perimeters. Coding presented is simple poor, adequate, good –scale, 
although the perspectives themselves are of interest as is also the “tone” or 
“dramatics” of the answer as they convey much information too. Coded 
entries follow in TABLE 7. 
TABLE 7. CISPs’ capability to maintain IT perimeters 
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Respondent Answer 
SME1 adequate 
SME2 poor 
SME3 adequate 
SME4 adequate 
SME5 N/A 
 
SME1 saw the capability established at decent level, nevertheless commented 
that: 
“They will be coming through that is for sure, there is no such thing as 
absolute security […] There are weak links in the chain, but then again, those 
are the links anyone planning to paralyze Finland are looking for.” 
SME2 observed a rat race - the defender is always on the losing side: 
“No, I’d claim that as some BYOD, Dropbox or something is closed out, 
something new will soon pop up, it’s a rat race and I’d not be certain at all that 
it is worth investing, at least on a longer run. It’s better to just raise your 
hands in the air with trying to be 99% protected and focus on the information, 
which matters the most. It at the same time means an ongoing capability to 
define, which information at which point is the critical one”. 
SME3 brings in the Finnish nature of character not being perhaps best fitted to 
harsh realities of cyber threats and is realistic about absolute defences:  
“I cannot say for even close to sure… I guess there are operators through the 
whole spectrum, but my hunch is… little pessimistic on this perhaps. Just that 
is it some Finnish national trait to believe in goodness of the world and then 
wake up as things happen, which should have not happened. And fact is that 
bomber always gets through, means we cannot build such a defence, which 
would not be penetrated. Attack will get through, it is more on continuity 
management, resilience and risk management – these are parts of company’s 
safety policy” 
SME4 is on similar lines of thought: 
“Can’t think anymore as something absolute… something will come through 
that is for sure, so thinking should start from there that there will be things 
happening inside and prepare for those.” 
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SME5 seems the topic multifaceted and highlights that although new threats 
are immune to defences of 90’s they still prove their place, e.g. firewalls are 
needed: 
“Several things here, first that this security is in that sense an interesting 
phenomenon that we have to drag along all the things from the 90’s although 
new stuff is constantly flowing in. Like there is discussion that new malware is 
on the rise which these [90’s stuff] have no effect on –still a firewall is a good 
network hygiene product … we can increase the [attack] cost with all of these 
[perimeter defence tools] and have an effect that attacker needs to spend 
more time and resources … to make it as difficult as possible … so the co-
operation of these [old tools and new tools] is essential, not single tools per 
se.” 
 
9.5.5 Summary of theme 
In this theme the current landscape and topics of discussion about cyber-scene 
were first interviewed and possible future trends identified. This was done for 
a reason of general interest and also to build insight into topics at the very 
surface, if situation awareness or other this researches topics would appear. 
Actually, interesting items popped up, especially the case with department of 
state, where a persistent threat had compromised information for a long time 
at the very core of national operations. Although not a good thing in general, 
it still brought implicitly more value for the proposed model, which is 
targeting to identify this sort of “planned longer time presence” – threat at the 
very early stage. In general, the threats getting publicity have been also as eye 
openers for more attention to prevent future threats doing similar damage. 
Interesting note was that although (in later Chapter) operational plan 
execution is seen as producing results, it was noted here, as it will be noted 
later that a different view of not really observing any results from the strategy 
prevails too. A sure sign for the operative plan execution group to facilitate 
more communication and awareness building. 
From the interviews coding on Finland’s capability to answer to cyber threats 
in critical infrastructure the insight and feeling (there are no meters, though) is 
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that the general capability is between decent and good. Emphasis was put on 
accepting that attacks will come through and accepting that, to invest into fast 
recovery from the treats, which is asking for more rigorous risk management 
and business continuity management in general. A clear problem, which is 
emphasized many times later is that the control of supply chains is not at 
adequate level, which is something a serious harm meaner will be sure to 
exploit. 
In literature part it was brought to attention several times that absolute 
defence is impossible. This was nevertheless enquired from the respondents. 
The coded answers of “adequate minus” tells that although there is trust in 
the operation of the critical infrastructure network continuity, it sure is not 
based on trust of their perimeter defences capability to keep threats out. In 
fact it was again brought to attention that chain has weaknesses, which will be 
exploited, if not filled. Also, assurance for the literature part was presented 
with notions that the complexity is raising at such rate with BYOD, cloud 
services etc that is virtually impossible to maintain decent perimeter defence. 
This signals that the resilience must come from something else than 
perimeters. Some hint was already given about risk management and business 
continuity management, which might prove out worth more emphasis. 
9.6 Theme: Information security Management 
Of the main concepts the created model in Chapter 7 consist, the next one 
studied and to which SMEs views are concepts close to information security 
management. Indication on how ISM and cybersecurity differ and on what 
parts they are the same, was discussed in Chapter 9.4.3. This theme 
investigates ISM further with gaining more insight into the concept. 
Of interest is to have insight into on how efficient organizations in practice are 
in conducting ISM, does the information security policy(-ies) play significant 
part and last, where should the operational management of information 
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security and the governance of it reside organizationally for best results and 
lack of conflicts of interest. 
The following main classifications were identified and will be covered next: 
 The term Information Security Management 
 Organizational location of ISG/ISM 
 Relevance of information security policies 
 Organizational location of ISG/ISM for most efficiency 
9.6.1 The term Information Security Management 
Few definitions and characteristics for ISM were researched in literature study 
to form a concept to be used in model-building purposes (Chapter 7) and also 
to compare the definitions/characteristics of literature with those of the 
practitioners’ – how similar would they prove out to be? 
The classification for this is definition of Information Security Management. 
It does not have coding as such, however similarities are identified from SME- 
comments and quotes provided for showing the alignment and/or lack of it. 
SME1 seems things through processes: 
“Information security... --- …I see it as a process, like that it is made from 
securing the information, securing the process, it involves educating people 
and then that there is this technical side to it. It will not turn into flesh, if the 
significance is not understood at the top of the company – much more must be 
put effort onto this”. 
While SME2 is underlining classic C-I-A –approach:  
“Oh. Heheheh! Pretty much the CIA model, especially the availability… and 
sure integrity is important as well as confidentiality” 
SME3 perceives also the security management by a state to be achieved: 
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“I’d again throw in the feeling of safety here, that I trust the systems being safe 
like some online banking system, i.e. I trust it and thus consider things safe” 
SME4 was a bit taken by surprise and had to align his thoughts: 
“Well, is it not information integrity, confidentiality, usability – these things, 
right? I’m thinking … … … that it could be the system level things too, or is 
it the information; have to think a bit about this.” 
SME5 presented a rather interesting and anti-dogmatic view: 
“Well, doh – it’s the security of the information. I’ve not in my own work been 
thinking too much of information security [tietoturva in Finnish], as we only 
have one word where in English there is security and safety and in that sense, 
when thinking about critical infrastructure, like energy plant, then safety is of 
utmost importance there as it means that people will die if it fails and 
information security can play a smaller role there.” 
 
9.6.2 Organizations’ capability for efficient information security 
management 
In short, this classification of: organizations’ capability for efficient 
information security management drills into subjective views of the 
interviewees on how well they felt ISM practices are practiced in CISP –
organizations. Coding of poor, decent, good N/A is used and coding results 
presented in TABLE 8. 
 TABLE 8. Capabilities for efficient ISM 
Respondent Rating 
SME1 decent 
SME2 poor 
SME3 N/A 
SME4 N/A 
SME5 decent 
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SME1 seems the maturity varying a lot and challenges not as technical ones: 
“Difficult question… there are good and bad examples, but I think we are 
heading the right direction here. Challenges are more on governance, not 
technical, this is seen too much as an technology issue, but ignorance is one 
important driving the society…” 
As well as does SME2: : 
“On the paper, it works well, but in practice there is much disparity between 
information security management’s and that of top management’s as well as 
even functions expectations and views. I see it very much as low efficiency and 
the thing is the perspective differences of operations and those of information 
security management”. 
SME5 notes that in theory education is there - still action is not yet realized: 
“The principles are quite well understood, but the problem is they do not 
materialize from the slideware.” 
 
9.6.3 Relevance of information security policies 
A certain understanding can be already formed from the earlier chapters’ 
comments on ISM’s role. However it is worth investigating, how much on 
SME’s opinion do policies have effect on the capability to deliver ISM. 
Classification for this is: relevance of information security policies, and 
coding of low, medium, high & N/A is used, while results follow in TABLE 9. 
 TABLE 9. Relevance of IS policies  
Respondent Rating 
SME1 N/A 
SME2 medium 
SME3 high 
SME4 medium 
SME5 N/A 
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SME2 seems that much more commitment is needed from management: 
“Improvement is seen and ownership has gotten more attention, but still it 
should be more CEO signed paper, which she communicates and shows 
management’s commitment and form a target state… but then the ball drop to 
the floor [and if someone picks it]that there should be management of the 
policy more and this varies a lot” 
SME3 states the policy as the very fundamental needed: 
“The existence of the policy is whole basis for efficient ISM, but it requires that 
it is a living document and tied closely to practical activities of everyday 
business, not just a paper or declaration, but a process and which unites the 
different layers of the organization. This is essential to do to get the different 
operations like ICT and management to talk to each other and see common 
goals.” 
SME4 uses general reasoning and brings it into context: 
“I’m not from this scene, but I feel that if there are commonly agreed practices 
and targets with policies, where the process owners, IT, risk and continuity 
management are involved, then things will work. If information security is 
done from only one perspective, then it gets worse.” 
SME5 calls out for practical approach and something everyone can utilize: 
“Depends on the policies established, like there can be those of 80 or 180 pages 
with very detail information in them, but they do not necessarily flow through 
the organization. They must be and good precise and fit to the business where 
they are used in. Further they must be such that one does not need 20 years of 
security experience to execute them – so, understandable and actionable” 
 
9.6.4 Organizational location of ISG/ISM  
Last on the ISM-theme, as it was found out in literature study, there are 
indications that information security and governance are not perhaps always 
best placed in organization for them to be efficient and ISM and ISG can even 
compete on different targets, e.g. ISG and ISM were not good to be seen in for 
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example CIO-office as ISG should be able to audit compliance etc. and no 
organization should be made possible to audit its own operations. 
A classification of: organizational location of ISG/ISM for efficiency 
maximization is made and is presented with no coding, instead open 
comments are seen more relevant. 
SME1 has a view that: 
“[Long pause] one cannot just see that it place in somewhere, but it must be 
able to affect the processes of the organization, where it matter. Risk 
management and risk analyses… that is where we are not yet good at … that 
exactly should be the tool for the upper management, from which 
understanding is drawn from. Without question, we are to ICT-centric on this 
one.  
SME2 seems this needing to happen as close to the operations as possible: 
“It is essential that these activities link close to the operations, which they are 
supposed to support. So, data ownership could come reality and the dialog real. 
I see data ownership here as most important thing – A and O – and also the 
greatest shortcoming and if that would be ok, then [ISM] could dramatically 
improve. Information integrity, information security and ownership of these 
must be part of the process so we can tell, if the process is secure and trustable 
or not”. 
SME3 is thinking possible paradigm change as new possibilities: 
“Hmm… a thought rises that could they be organized somehow different than 
they now are, i.e. usually in the IT. IT being considered as a support function 
and this is the essence of the problem as it will, through being in IT just like 
that to top management – support function and operative business processes 
are more of interest and importance. […] The cyber officer in the company 
should understand the business and that it is more than just about email 
working[…] A good topic for further study for someone to find a model, which 
would work well here. Anyways, the security personnel like this should reside 
as close to the top management as possible, possibly as part of the executive 
board and then the dialogue would work” 
SME4 seems supporting function (IT) as not the best possible location: 
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“Well, everything should be upper management’s business like this, but they 
are short on time. It might be good to reside in risk management. Definitely 
not good to be in IT as if the CIO is put to save money and he tells the security 
guy to save on security, he’ll probably will do so, but if it’s in the risk 
management, then they can come and say that you guys are breaking the 
jointly agreed rules, this will not do – these risks you are taking are 
unbearable.“ 
SME5 experiences the subject as very context sensitive: 
“There is no one sure location, because it depends so much on how the 
company operates. It should still have much of linking to what the upper 
management is doing, consider the size of the company, e.g. large companies 
could need more mandate and approvals.” 
 
9.6.5 Summary of theme 
Information security management was investigated to better understand the 
findings behind the main research questions and to be able to answer to RQ3. 
It turned out that respondents had very different conceptual models of 
information security (management). One saw it as a state of mind (trust), 
some classic CIA- views were presented with emphasis on integrity (which is 
promising finding for the model) and  it was also observed from perspective 
of human safety, which was an interesting (and valid) viewpoint – actually 
worth further investigation as a perception angle to safe information. 
Quite dramatic coding results were received for CISP-organizations’ 
capability for efficient ISM. There the verdict is (with three answers, which 
could be coded) a “decent minus”, which indicates this should be put more 
attention in both research and practice. One reason was observed as lack of 
management commitment and seeing ISM as technical exercise, which it is 
not. The notion was twice made that general knowledge exists, it’s a problem 
of commitment and governance. 
The mentioned is getting support when the importance of shared and agreed 
security policies were investigated. They were seen as important and the same 
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need for management support was encountered again. So, the policies must 
exist, they are seen as fundamental – however, they are in many cases just 
paper without action and sometimes made not fit-for-purpose. Some of the 
reasons, which might explain this and the previous problem could be due to 
how ISM is organized. 
Where ISM/ISG should reside in the organization gave no clear 
“department”.  Nevertheless a good indication was detected on what might be 
the problem. From the interviews it seems that IT is not the place for ISM/ISG 
to reside, it is in these cases left with little attention and could even provoke 
conflict of interests of the organizations’ security interests and those of CIOs 
need to reduce costs. It was also suggested that ownership should either be in 
e.g. risk management, or then the ownership should be tightly integrated to 
processes. Data ownership was seen important and it was suggested that 
processes could even own the data as well as the security of it and the risks 
associated and their management. 
Findings also indicate that it would be valid to understand ISM as a 
continuous process (just like described in Model creation in Chapter 7) and 
several highlights combining all the three – ISM efficiency, policies and 
organizational position of ISM/ISG indicate that IT is not the best possible 
place and that management support is more than crucial. Findings, which 
further underline the synergy-indications earlier in the study between ISM-
MDM, ISG-DG. 
The author’s personal views are much in alignment with the findings and 
thus, once again, more enforce the hypothesis that the author had, once he 
planned to conduct this study.  Hence executing this research has educated 
the author much more and put words to meanings, which earlier did not have 
solid concepts, and names for the concepts the models already existed. 
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Justification of this theme lies also in the fact that the findings are very 
relevant for possible further study and development of the created model 
(Chapter 7). The possibilities of this are discussed more in Chapter 10.8.  
9.7 Theme: Information management and data quality 
As information as an asset and its quality have been very central themes and 
the fundamental basis for the model created in Chapter 7 , it was more than 
necessary to get interviewees’ conceptual models opened up on management 
of information and their concept of good quality data. 
Further it was worth investigating CISP’s capability to both identify their 
whole of the information assets and locate the information in system 
landscape, their ability to tell apart the critical part of the information asset 
and reactivity of the data quality-approach of the CISPs. Last, SME’s were 
inquired about how important they saw information quality as component of 
CISPs’ ability to operate in crisis situations. 
The classification of the theme is divided as: 
 Information quality conceptualized 
 CISPs ability to name their information assets, locate them and further 
segment critical assets 
 CISPs information quality management approach – reactive/proactive 
 Importance of information quality for CISP to operate in crisis 
situations 
 SME’s view on relevance of named information ownership 
9.7.1 Information quality conceptualized 
Classification is information quality conceptualized and it investigates the 
SMEs’ concept of what information quality meant for them, e.g. how they 
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would describe operation-, decision making- and analysis information of good 
quality. This is best described just with open comments. 
SME1 does not go into defining what it really means, instead  he just describes 
good quality information through short and to the point comment:  
“Information’s quality is defined by its[information’s] usability . 
SME2 sees DQ through criticality : 
“Well, what is the information needed to perform a function and those owning 
those functions should be able to tell how they weight what is important for 
them [respondent refers to C-I-A, i.e. function owners should define the 
risk with each “dimension” that they are willing to accept] That 
information owner also must be better to define what, like integrity, is 
important – they should be able to do that better than they do it today”. 
SME3 underlines the availability of information: 
“Availability is closely linked to quality – timely, so it for the right moment for 
decision making, meaning it is relevant and that is enough in volume.” 
SME4 seems quality as something, which has processed the raw data: 
“Good quality information.. hmmm…. Trash or noise has been removed from 
the data and it’s thus material one can build upon, be it person of software.” 
SME5 observes many views on the matter and he highlights relevancy: 
“Again, many dimensions here […] it must be valid and up-todate so that I 
know that it is relevant or I will know when it WILL be relevant […]and in 
many organizations there are decisions made based on the information, which 
is thought to be the whole of it, when it has in fact not been – the information 
can be a lie, it might require correlation and enrichment and in my mind all of 
these are linked to data quality” 
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9.7.2 CISPs ability to name their information assets, locate them and 
further segment critical assets 
This classification explores the fundamentals of information management as 
well as those of information security management with relevant governance 
functions attached, e.g. data governance and information security governance. 
Some organizations exercise operations much through risk management, so it 
should be considered also the included in the list. The very point of this 
enquiry to SME’s is that if CISP cannot tell what information they have, which 
part of it is critical (to be able to produce critical services) and to tell where 
this information resides (be it CISP own systems, outsources systems or cloud 
services, where information resides) they practically cannot have any control 
over their information assets and logically to its quality.  
Classification of CISPs ability to name their information assets, locate them 
and further segment critical assets is presented with coding of low, adequate & 
good and for clarity’s sake are presented combined in TABLE 10.  
TABLE 10. CISP’s capabilities over information management 
Respondent Identify assets Locate assets Crit. Assets identification 
SME1 low low low 
SME2 adequate low low 
SME3 adequate adequate low 
SME4 good adequate low 
SME5 N/A low N/A 
 
SME1 seems that CISPs capability for each area is pretty low and there is 
much room for improvement: 
“Altogether bad … that is the situation, have to admit. Information is taken as 
granted and the criticality of it is not generally understood. […] one could 
describe it as social vulnerability. […] As a needed trend I see that more and 
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more we must be able to tell what information is mission critical and what is 
not and what can be even open. The amount of information is increasing at the 
speed where we cannot and should not try to protect all information, but focus 
on identifying the critical part of it and secure it, that A and O of it – 
knowledge and skills at this are not at the needed level yet, much due to fact 
that this is seen as a technical problem, which is it not”  
SME2 sees the same possibility for major improvement:  
“Perhaps they know the information in their own systems, if they anymore 
have ‘own systems’, but as we move any further towards the outer rim, then 
especially the lack of information ownership presents problems, and it is no 
more know, to where the information is going or from where the information is 
coming and especially for critical information that of what does it actually 
consist of[…] then it becomes very unclear. It comes to information ownership 
as mattering the most, or otherwise I do not even see that we could reach any 
situation even remotely close to safe.” 
SME3 does not observe things being much any better and sees future as 
challenging: 
“Hmm.. I think there is a gap here, to be able to describe to people where the 
data is, what these virtual places are, what part of the information is 
transmitted and to where […] to further complicate if there are cloud services 
it get’s difficult… here is a problem to understand the big picture well enough, 
there are discontinuities and these discontinuities are naturally what the 
attacker is seeking.  
SME4 understands limitation of the perceived cases. However he still 
highlights the lack of visibility in networked operations: 
“It’s a hunch only, it could be that I’ve heard one story and not the one 
hundred others. I guess they know their own assets and some governmental 
bodies are probably better at this who have worked in security related 
responsibilities than other are. But the visibility to the guy next to them is 
probably very low, which I see as a problem.” 
SME5 comments on the very basic of things – can the CISP even locate their 
assets: 
“[To a question on if CISP can locate their assets] – not taken into control 
well enough” 
 
143 
9.7.3 CISPs information quality management approach – 
reactive/proactive 
Usually, when information management and especially information quality 
management maturity is low, there is hardly any room for proactive 
information quality management, i.e. capability to observe information 
quality as per quality dimensions described in Chapter 4.2 with lifecycle 
management of the information to prevent non-compliant information 
(information definitions, technical quality rules& business rules) from either 
being created/changed or at least preventing it from flowing in system and 
operations landscape further than the point of control, where the quality is 
assured. 
The view of how SME’s saw CISPs capability to execute proactive information 
quality management or was it more on the reactive is classified as  CISPs 
information quality management approach – reactive/proactive and coding 
is simple active / reactive. The answers are reflected in TABLE 11. 
TABLE 11. Information quality management approach 
Respondent Reactive / Proactive 
SME1 reactive 
SME2 reactive 
SME3 reactive 
SME4 reactive 
SME5 N/A 
 
SME 1 noted the general trend being: 
“Unfortunately it is reactive, but we get proactivity out of it later […] but too 
much reactive we are at the moment”. 
While similar general view on the approach exercised is elaborated by SME2: :  
144 
“I see it, without naming any parties, that even critical infrastructure 
operators are some in the reactive mode that it means that there must always 
first come the ‘stop’, before anybody does anything to the thing. This is, 
especially considering continuity, everything but an optimal situation. I see 
this a critical risk, which will more and more grow as different systems are 
increasingly linked to each other[…] we should be able to constantly monitor 
the situation and understand it and implications and interfere fast when 
needed, not only once we are at zero operations”. 
SME3 same thoughts as previous – reactive mode prevails: 
“An impression, not a hard fact, but I’d say it is reactive.. an improvement is 
through a list of cases that happened and try to learn from these and thus 
become more active” 
SME4 further brings in the view of current mode being reactive: 
“My general view on the thing is that it is on a reactive mode.” 
  
9.7.4 Importance of information quality for CISP to operate in crisis 
situations 
When things go wrong relevance of things can almost turn upside down. 
Hence, hearing out, if information quality had different importance in crisis-
situations (e.g. national emergency) than it had in day-to-day business was 
done. This is classified as importance of information quality for CISP to 
operate in crisis situations and as open comments are of most interest, the 
coding of lower than normal, same as normal & higher than normal was used, 
where “normal” refers to average state operations of business. TABLE 12 
summarizes the coding results. 
TABLE 12. Importance of DQ in crisis situations 
Respondent Perceived importance 
SME1 higher than normal 
SME2 higher than normal 
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Respondent Perceived importance 
SME3 higher than normal 
SME4 higher than normal 
SME5 higher than normal 
 
SME1 noted on the change of importance over “business as usual” with: 
“That is totally fundamental and centric. If we think for example leading and 
administration … or that we are doing business… we’re talking possibly 
millions wasted, if information quality is low [for decision making] or there 
is not enough of it – definitely core thing on”.  
SME2 sees this through “business as usual” being optimization, crisis totally 
different situation relying on high quality decision making information:  
“Good that you asked. When in normal day we are talking about optimization, 
then in crisis situation this plays [DQ] greatly larger role, when we need to do 
hard priorization choices and if you start doing wrong decisions in that 
situation, where the scarce resources are even fewer, well then the impacts of 
that will be exponentially higher and more serious”. 
SME3 sees the quality of information even existential: 
“It is utmost important for the company’s survival in crisis, where those who 
survive and will not are decided much on who had control over their 
information quality and who did not. We are missing this one big cyber 
tsunami, so cannot tell for sure how things are, but sure there are lack in 
preparedness” 
SME4 is promoting a need to further enhance the quality-aspects of assets: 
“Definitely in the center. If the information is distorted, then the conclusions 
drawn from it and the decisions made are compromised or wrong. We must 
struggle harder to get the raw material of better quality.” 
SME5 needs putting concepts into context with still agreeing on the 
importance: 
“It’s very important, but it much depends also of the organization so, 
organization should educate their personnel in a way that they can suffice with 
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information of not perfect quality, which still “works” and can take actions 
based on it or correlate it some more” 
 
9.7.5 SME’s view on relevance of named information ownership 
In general, one critical facilitating factor for data quality improvement is 
establishment of ownership over information assets. Ownership brings 
responsibility and neglecting of responsibilities brings consequences.  
SME’s own concept of information ownership’s relevance was asked. 
Ownership was told to include also responsibility over set scope of 
information’s quality and e.g. change management (only persons and systems 
explicitly having a role in the change process can affect it, other changes are 
violations of data quality). This was classified as SME’s view on relevance of 
named information ownership and rough rounding was done to tell it apart 
by not important, N/A and important. TABLE 13 provides the coded answers. 
TABLE 13. Relevance of information ownership 
Respondent Perceived relevance 
SME1 N/A 
SME2 important 
SME3 important 
SME4 N/A 
SME5 important 
 
The answer was not coded for SME1 due to much of interpretation bias 
possibility – on the one hand it was seen important, then on the other also as a 
possibility of misusing the ownership-concept. In the end it was tied to 
process ownership, through which it could be perceived of relevance - the 
quote is left open for interpretation: 
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“Well, it matters, but it cannot be a thing we cannot proceed without, but the 
information management and the security management of it must be things 
happening automatically by the functions. […] but I would not stress this 
ownership too much as there are always those, who use this position for their 
own purposes and get zealous of it [as it should be the organization, which 
owns the information]. Process owner should own the information and thus 
the information ownership is not important but the ownership of the 
processes”. 
SME2 had a view on the matter and tells:  
”A & O! Greatest shortcoming and if this would be in good shape … we’d 
receive most [general] benefits from developing the information ownership”. 
SME3 is presenting an approach, where ownerships of concepts would be 
joined and sees IT as a bad home base for the ownership: 
“One solution could be that the ownership of the information is taking place at 
high enough level in organization, like that if I own some process, I also own 
the information in that process, data quality, information security and risk 
management related would be on my responsibility. That might work, but it 
should not reside in some support organization like IT.” 
SME5 seems also lifecycle-management perspective of the ownership: 
“This is very important in my opinion. In fact a thought popped up that if I 
am an owner for some information, what happens, when I leave the company, 
is the responsibility over it transferred to someone else?” 
 
9.7.6 Summary of the theme 
Firstly it was checked how the respondents had formed their conceptual 
models of information management and especially data quality. It turned out 
to have similar characteristics as secure information, i.e. C-I-A was presented 
several times, and  also novel viewpoints were presented, which eventually all 
translate into earlier presented DAMA quality dimensions in Chapter 4.2.  
As one of the key themes in the thesis has been the “information as an asset”, 
it was needed to get a view from the SMEs on how they perceived CISPs 
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capability to identify their assets, locate them (physically) and identify which 
part of the asset is critical. Generally, the results were devastating. Not only 
do the CISPs seem to be unable to tell the critical information (which they 
should do at minimum via critical processes’ information needs) -  generally 
they are perceived not to know, where the information resides, which is not 
good at all and last. Neither do they seem to be very good at even identifying 
what information they possess in general. Although the details are presented 
in the quotes, the author still wishes to underline and stress the dire need of 
addressing this issue, which presents the CISPs to not just one or two threat 
vectors, but a army of them. On the positive side this indicates that the created 
model could very well be welcomed with pleasure to remedy a situation like 
that. Re-quoting SME1 to emphasis this one more time: “Altogether bad … that 
is the situation, have to admit. Information is taken as granted and the criticality of it 
is not generally understood. […] one could describe it as social vulnerability. […] As 
a needed trend I see that more and more we must be able to tell what information is 
mission critical and what is not” 
It does not come as an surprise - more of an expectation from observation like 
just made -  it was noted that the CISPs are in reactive mode for their data 
quality management. Logically sound, as if they are not able to tell their assets 
and critical parts of or where it resides, how could the proactively manage 
data quality? More evidence for the need of the model and its capabilities to 
remedy this situation. In times of crises this is even more critical as the CISP 
need to act fast, there is no time for anything but the essential and decisions 
must be made fast, which might provide cascading and dramatic results, if 
based on data and information not fit to be used for decision making. This 
was well formed by SME2: “[…] when we need to do hard priorization choices and 
if you start doing wrong decisions in that situation, where the scarce resources are 
even fewer, well then the impacts of that will be exponentially higher and more 
serious”. 
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One last thing studied was the data/information named ownership. 
Something, which is quite in the center of discipline like MDM for ensuring 
the responsibility over quality of the critical data. SMEs responded that it 
important. The view presented by another SME was brought to surface again 
that the ownership could be on the process level. It was also noted that the 
best quick wins could be achieved by establishing rigorous information 
ownership. IT was seen as not optimal place for the information ownership, 
which should be on high enough level. Findings present more expectations for 
the model as they underline many times the fundamentals the model is based 
on.  
The author’s personal perception, from tens of corporate and public 
institutions, in short is that a very small part of Finnish organizations have 
clear understanding of what information they have at their hands, yet alone 
tell, where it resides in functions or system landscape and as usage of cloud 
services is getting more common, the visibility is dim, if not close to totally 
vanishing – not to mention what happens to controls over information in such 
a state of asset management maturity.  
Data in the systems is of mediocre quality by any metrics – redundancy, 
conflicts, shortages in content, lack of ownership, zero quality metering, 
definitions of data much missing or in form of architects’ diagrams, which 
could interest business less than number of stars in the universe. The only 
short glimpses of “understanding” are seen, when things go wrong, but as 
“business as normal” (although through heavy casualties of time and money 
to recover the business) resumes, there are “more important” things to 
consider, and the experienced relevance of DQ is forgotten. 
There are exceptions, nevertheless the general situation is as described. Best 
driver the author sees for “dramatic and general” improvement of the 
situation is drive of regulations and compliance. Although compliance for its 
own right everything but ensures things improving significantly, at least it 
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opens a door for considering the business opportunities available through 
really taking the best out of information assets and ensuring quality for e.g. 
predictive analytics of production or business in general. The author wishes to 
give special credit to Solvency II and its Technical Provisions data quality 
requirement. Although much abstractions and absolutes, they still – even 
partly explicitly – require the insurance company to form some mock up at 
minimum of data governance and data quality management. The author has 
perceived MDM –principles and model working great for Solvency II –
purposes. 
9.8 Theme: Situation awareness and the relevance of the created model of 
critical information asset integrity-information sharing  
Although all the themes presented and analyzed are important in themselves, 
they all are building blocks for this “theme of themes” and the ultimate 
research questions Q1 and Q2. First, this theme covers situation awareness as 
a concept. Second, it places the role of SA into context of Finland’s Cyber 
Strategy and operational execution of it. 
As a climax, it introduces the model created from the pieces of presented 
common concepts to provide a novel and innovative, yet “low entry cost” 
solution for both the organizations of critical infrastructure for establishing 
control and visibility of critical information assets integrity, sharing that 
information and for Cyber Defence Command Center to have situation 
awareness over organizations’ critical information assets for early warning 
and control of cyber threats directed to degrade information. This represents 
the real core of the whole research. 
The classification of the theme divides as: 
 Situation awareness - defined 
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 The role of situation awareness in Finland’s Cyber Strategy and in 
overall cyber security capability 
 Maturity of situation awareness of critical infrastructure service 
providers’ objective view on their critical information quality 
 The created model – significance of the presented capability, novelty 
and value of further development 
9.8.1 Situation awareness - defined 
Before the Grande closure of the theme interview with its most significant 
questions yet to be asked, it is still needed to align the concept of the 
respondents’ on their observation of what situation awareness means and 
perhaps of what it consists of or what is of utmost importance for it,. This 
classification is: situation awareness – defined. 
SME1 concentrates on the characteristics of situation awareness, which are of 
importance. 
“SA is a critical factor [for cyberdefence], and I see it as something, which 
should scale to multiple levels, so that decision makers on each level can make 
their decision [this implicitly defines the SA for the person]base on it – 
that there is no as one static situation picture. It is.. it is one of the most 
critical handicap we have here in this cyber world, the lack of these [SA 
capabilities] , that we have so many areas, where situation awareness just 
does not work. There are nations, who do not even know that they are stolen of 
information constantly, which is the saddest state, naturally” 
SME2 seems things rather similarly, although on the function of SA he 
elaborates:  
“Definition the situation awareness in the context is crucial, i.e. what is the 
situation awareness we need build and what do we get out of it. Situation 
awareness’s only function is to support decision making, meaning producing 
information to the decision maker that is needed. Situation awareness must 
support a decision – if it is only situation awareness for the sake of having one, 
I see little value for such.”  
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SME3 sees the layers of SA as situated and context and information need-
based stacked pictures: 
“SA comes in different forms for different people, there is technical SA, 
operative SA, i.e. where we are in the situation. It’s a stack of things, sensor 
data at the bottom, technical analysis layer next, own picture for the 
management. So, it’s stack of these pictures with at the very bottom 
information sources, and information travels through these layers to produce 
the picture level needed.” 
SME4 observes the key point of improving understanding (and thus building 
more knowledge too): 
“It’s a composition from different sources with possibly different methods of an 
situation, based on which a professional or a decision maker can either improve 
his understanding of the situation or make other conclusions. Situation Target 
of it is to enhance situational understanding.” 
SME5 differentiates awareness from knowledge: 
“This one is interesting… like at NATO there might be this SA in use, which 
tells that there are these 50 battle tanks here and here, but it is missing the 
situational knowledge of how to use the tanks. I make these stand apart as 
many forget that knowledge does not automatically pop up from the product 
itself [e.g. command and control battle SA-system]” 
  
9.8.2 The role of situation awareness in Finland’s Cyber Strategy and in 
overall cyber security capability 
Although it was noted in literature study that many countries (like USA) 
stress the importance of situation awareness in their cyber strategies and 
guidelines, as does Finland, it remains still to be asked the SMEs for their 
weight of SA for overall Finland’s Cyber Strategy and the capability the 
strategy should through operational plan achieve.  
Classification of the role of situation awareness in Finland’s Cyber Strategy 
and in overall cyber security capability was provided and coding is familiar: 
low, medium, high, N/A. First the question about role’s relevance for strategy is 
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posed and presented in TABLE 14, which has the coded answers for the 
relevance of the role in overall cybersecurity operational capability. 
TABLE 14. Relevance of role of SA in Finland’s Cyber Strategy and in overall 
operational cybersecurity capability 
Respondent SA in strategy SA in operational execution 
SME1 high high 
SME2 medium high 
SME3 high high 
SME4 high high 
SME5 high N/A 
 
Few open comments are presented starting with SME1: 
“Situation awareness and forming the situation picture are central and it 
must be a multi-stakeholder process that everyone involved, produces 
information and on the other hand the system produces information for the 
same stakeholder – two-way street. Only then we can start talking about really 
working situation awareness”. 
SME2 takes a skeptic view on part of the topic. In his previous comments he 
sees SA important, however he states that current execution is uncoordinated 
and without set target (relevance is thus coded from previous and later 
following comments):  
”Well, it is there in the paper and I guess even ranks as number one and what 
that means in the field is that everyone’s now building their own situation 
awareness or trying to define what it is. But, it is characterizing that one 
bureau even had a project called ‘Situation awareness of situation awareness 
project’, which describes the confusion we are having in the society over this 
matter […] at least there is no common understanding that what the heck this 
situation awareness should now be and what is supposed to do – things are 
really loose here.” 
SME3 sees the role of Cyber Security Command center as very centric: 
154 
“It’s high already through being in the strategy and driving the imperative of 
Cyber Security Command Center, which has the primary mission of providing 
the SA based first on Cert-FI and later expand it to cover a 24/7 situation 
picture for this internet world of ours. I would feel very hard to establish any 
operational defences or structures without knowing where we are.” 
SME4 has seen already results from the strategy’s implementation: 
“Important yes and as first outcome the establishment of Cyber Security 
Command center, which has already improved the co-operation between 
different departments.” 
SME5 on the contrary is still standing by for the strategy to get realized: 
“At least it has been underlined a lot in the strategy and its execution plan, 
then all we are missing is the implementation.” 
 
9.8.3 Maturity of situation awareness of critical infrastructure service 
providers’ objective view on their critical information quality 
Earlier in Information management-theme, it was investigated, how mature 
was the critical infrastructure service providers’ capability to identify and 
control their critical information assets. Here, that overall capability to 
manage the information assets is viewed through lens of situation awareness. 
Two main assisting questions were presented – one to have a general 
understanding of the CISPs capability to form situation awareness over their 
own critical information assets. Another to form an opinion on the CISPs 
visibility to data quality into their supply chain for critical services. These 
combined are coded as visibility of own and value chain’s objective 
information quality. It is coded to be presented via coding of poor, adequate, 
good & N/A. Results are shown in TABLE 15 and comments further will 
elaborate the status of SA. 
TABLE 15. CISPs’ SA over their own and supply chain’s critical information 
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Respondent SA on crit. Inform.(CI) SA over supply chain CI 
SME1 N/A N/A 
SME2 adequate poor 
SME3 adequate poor 
SME4 poor poor 
SME5 adequate N/A 
 
SME2 has already commented on the matter in information management- 
theme, and further elaborates::  
“There is some reactive situation awareness capability, but is more on like 
reporting on quarter –basis, but as it should, like for master information, be 
continuous operation. These things like SOX and so on are not just not 
sufficient. There is not enough of this and it is outdated”. 
SME3 sees that there is no general capability to tell data either corrupted or 
being what it should be and seems holes for possible attacks left unfilled: 
“It’s just an impression I have not hard evidence, but I’d say that they [CISPs] 
are having hard time identifying corrupted information of theirs, if it has not 
been thoroughly thought and implemented that how can they tell if the data is 
correct or not. And when we go to a company [not CISP] then there is a high 
risk that they cannot tell if their data is corrupted or not. Classic way has been 
to put it into some silo and protect the silo. Visibility to supply chain.. most 
probably even worse, I’s say this is not in control, which does not mean that 
things are all problem, but that there pretty sure are gaps and holes, but if 
someone at some point in time wants to leverage this situation, it is possible. 
We are not on the right level with this one.” 
SME4 has a more positive view that there would be visibility over the quality, 
however he sees clear need for establishing more visibility for the internal 
monitoring: 
“An educated guess but I don’t believe they can form it… No, they’ll have no 
understanding of the quality of the data. This is due to this belonging into 
internal monitoring of those parties, and they do not do that too much, really. 
In the supply chain – even less! Close to zero. Even in the best cases visibility 
is restricted to immediate chain loops, not further.” 
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SME5 seems linear problem solving as not innovative and is asking for more 
innovative answers: 
“Not perhaps too mature as such. Many think this in a linear way so we need 
to find a solution to a problem instead of investigating what else might exist 
[instead of the problem solution per se]. Like in ISM-scene there is this 
HAVARO, which has produced some success stories and in which the 
importance of sharing information has been understood.” 
 
9.8.4 The created model – significance of the presented capability, novelty 
and value of further development 
Much of this research’s literature study have been ensuring that the author’s 
conceptual model is in line with the one found in science and practice. Most of 
the interview questions have been targeted to ensure compatibility of the 
interviewees’ conceptual models of scope management and change 
management to the ones of the author. All this has driven the work done to 
the ultimate research question presented: Was a model, asked for in Research 
Question Q1, doable, which partly was evidenced in Chapter 7 and later 
concluded in Chapter 10. 
The previous classifications of this theme have been there to build evidence on 
need for a created model or decide that the model as such is not answering the 
challenges Finland’s cybersecurity is facing via perceived lack of actual SA, 
although many people talk of it and its importance.  
As the last concept of SA was interviewed, the model was presented to 
interviewees and they were given the chance to tell their opinion on 1) 
significance of the presented capability model is arguing to present, 2) novelty 
of the model and last 3) value of further developing the model. These 
questions have a shared classification of: the created model – significance of 
the presented capability, novelty and value of further development and 
although quotes are of most relevance a summary of answers was coded to 
TABLE 16 with coding of, low, medium, high & N/A. 
157 
TABLE 16. The Model – Significance, novelty and relevance of developing 
Respondent Significance Model’s novelty Relevance of future dev. 
SME1 high high high 
SME2 high N/A  high 
SME3 high high N/A 
SME4 high high high 
SME5 N/A N/A high 
 
SME1 seems the connection with his earlier views realized here: 
“This is thoroughly central and I think this as a good idea. And I think we 
need also this interaction between the parties [...it is important, because...] 
we have no current capability to know if our information is degrading, but we 
think… well, we come back to this that we have the whole process and the 
situation picture with it and then should be able to predict the implications to 
own processes and.. .. yes, you are on the right tracks with this one here. My 
hunch is that this is not yet researched as presented and should be researched 
further, and should be done… this is on the very core of what this cyber world 
is.  
SME2 is rather excited about the model and its potential: 
“Yes… if we take the threat you described [as per threat –description in 
Chapter 7] then the ice cold fact is that we are totally defenceless against such 
threat with existing processes and systems and it would be sheer luck, and 
very lucky sheer luck, to detect such a treat when the need would be. This 
model is see it as stupendous and especially for business continuity 
management too. All in all, I’m really excited about this model and its 
potential.”  
SME3 seems the model as valuable and possible helper for national resilience 
– he also observes the mode in which model work (prevention) as good 
approach and the threat described, which the model is addressing as very 
nasty and difficult to control: 
“Definitely this is valuable – protecting the critical infrastructure and 
working on national level, so this is in the very core of national cyber security 
and national safety […] offering true national resilience, which is based on the 
situation picture – and for purposes like that, this model is very much 
supporting that sort of activity. If operating well and we can step in very early 
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in the threat detection, which if managed (or not managed in practice at all) 
poorly would lead to major escalation, we could tackle that sort of threat 
[persistent and difficult to spot through slow data corruption not detectable 
easily], which I see essential for the security measure to be efficient. […] I have 
not encountered this thought this far to the date, so you definitely have 
something here, mostly there has been questions what we should do […]. 
SME4 is promoting the further development and sees the potential (although 
also the possible of barriers hard to collapse) of having some visibility into 
inside of operations: 
“With [a model like] this we’d be able to catch the strange things inside the 
borders of the organization I say this is very good idea, especially as it forces to 
things happening also inside and their status, which is missing at the moment. 
Thumbs up on this, carry on researching too and think, how this could work 
perhaps even better in the context of public authority departments [as there is 
less legislation challenges to tackle].” 
SME5 is supportive for the model and highlights that it should be done simple 
to adapt and sees much value in the continuous exchange of information, not 
just incidents a driver for building trust: 
“There are many things here again – reflecting against the presented threat 
scenario [per Chapter 7], this brings the added value that there is more of 
information exchange than mere incident information[…] as when you 
exchange information on a regular basis it pays back for a longer period […], 
and when sharing more than just the incident information it build trust, 
which is important once things start happening […]– this would be good to 
highlight here. Yes, it’s worth developing further and it should be kept as 
simple enough, which would ensure that it’s taken into use – so easy that one 
cannot say “no”.” 
 
9.9 Summary of the theme 
This theme was to investigate the most important research question Q2 by 
first aligning situational awareness, significance of it for Finland’s Cyber 
Strategy and cybersecurity capability. Then the model created from bits and 
pieces was submitted to SME’s verdict over its relevance. Last it was 
investigated, if the model was innovative and worth more development. 
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The conceptual models the SMEs had on situation awareness itself were pretty 
aligned with one observing it from functional view, one from characteristic’s 
of it one through the layer of pictures SA consists is consisting of, SME 4 
underlines the understanding presented by SA and SME5 highlights that there 
is a significant difference with awareness and knowledge, which is as per SA-
model (i.e. the observer brings her knowledge into the model). 
The importance of SA for Finland’s cyber security was asked and the answers 
were aligned as high with one medium, which was due to scientism that does 
anyone now know, what the SA should do or what purpose it should fill – a 
solid point presented, which needs focus from Cyber security command 
center – obviously there is lack of direction for the execution at the moment. 
Also the importance of SA in operations was deemed systematically high, i.e. 
it is needed for efficient cybersecurity capability. A good summary on the 
importance is presented by SME3: “I would feel very hard to establish any 
operational defences or structures without knowing where we are.” 
For purposes of double checking previous (there was many double check in 
the interview, asking the same things from a different viewpoint) data quality 
and information management –topics, the SMEs were asked for their opinion 
on the SA capability of the CISP on DQ of their own information and possibly 
the SA of their supply chain’s DQ. Although the answers show an mediocre 
status (confirms the previous findings), it builds more momentum for the 
model to be presented. It is observed that generally CISPs have “adequate 
minus” –SA on their own critical information quality, however to the supply 
chain’s DQ the SA-capability was seen “poor” systematically. Observation is 
naturally good emphasis for the model and at the same time bad for national 
continuity, as this implies that it might prove out to be pretty easy feat to 
corrupt some of the CISPs’ critical information assets. The presented is just an 
easy and obvious possible attack vector, however a more alluring vector 
would be to influence the service production operations of the CISPs on the 
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light of the fact that they have no visibility on their supply chain’s information 
quality.  
SA’s significance for Finland’s Cyber strategy and its deployment as well as 
for effectiveness of cybersecurity efforts made was deemed as of utmost 
importance and one thing to focus on. It was noted at the same time that 
although situation awareness has been there (in the strategy and plans) for 
some time already, very little concrete exist on it yet. A pick from SME3: “It’s 
just an impression I have not hard evidence, but I’d say that they [CISPs] are having 
hard time identifying corrupted information of theirs, if it has not been thoroughly 
thought and implemented that how can they tell if the data is correct or not. And 
when we go to a company [not CISP] then there is a high risk that they cannot tell if 
their data is corrupted or not”. This quote summarizes the hole through which 
many threats could crawl, or even walk in head held high no-one noticing.  
As a climax the SMEs were presented with the model and explained through 
the high level concept of it and on what it is based and it might provide. They 
were asked for the possible significance of the model to enable targets set in 
cyber strategy and its operational plan. The ones being able to comment on 
this all ranked the value as “high”. A quote from SME2: “This model is see it as 
stupendous and especially for business continuity”. Similar support for the 
significance was through received through e.g. SME 3’s quote: “Definitely this 
is valuable – protecting the critical infrastructure and working on national level, so 
this is in the very core of national cyber security and national safety […] offering true 
national resilience, which is based on the situation picture – and for purposes like that, 
this model is very much supporting that sort of activity”.  
On the novelty of the model the comments, which coded were “high”. It was 
seen as not yet researched and developed to even this maturity level e.g. 
SME3: “I have not encountered this thought this far to the date, so you definitely have 
something here”. Last it was asked, if the model should be developed further, 
i.e. was there enough value potential included. It was concluded “high” for 
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relevance of future research, which is very encouraging and best summarized 
by SME4’s comment: “I say this is very good idea, especially as it forces to things 
happening also inside and their status, which is missing at the moment. Thumbs up 
on this, carry on researching too”. 
On a personal note author does not have too much to elaborate. The most 
important things this study was pursuing after, have been proven with this 
limited scope to stand examination by SMEs very skilled in security and 
information security. Feeling content, it is just better to proceed to closing 
part. 
9.10 Closing the analysis part 
The most relevant part of the interview data was classified, coded and the 
findings were presented in the previous theme Sections. A notion should be 
made that much more data was gathered in the interviews, however in the 
author’s judgment the data does not provide relevant addition of insight into 
main research questions, although they are surely interesting and can be 
utilized in later studies. Subjects, which were not covered are listed along the 
covered subjects in the interview frame, which is presented in APPENDIX II – 
Interview frame. 
The analysis part of the research has broken the ”big picture” down into 
smaller pieces, themes, and classified the theme key elements with the 
appropriate coding, and made a comparison with the secondary research 
data, the literature study data, where applicable. The following Chapter 10: 
Conclusions, limitations and future research will proceed back to the big 
picture with interpretation of the holistic findings. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Much of the conclusions from the primary data (interview data) and its 
analysis were already presented in the interview study analysis in Chapter 9. 
Possible repetition of those in this chapter would be exactly that: repetition 
and thus not done. The summaries in the interview theme Section capture 
well the conclusions drawn. Neither are systematic comparisons to the 
secondary data (literature study) presented as it is also made familiar in the 
previous chapter, where special mention provided value. Otherwise, as it was 
noted earlier, the interview questions grounded back to literature and model 
building parts of the thesis. 
This chapter concentrates on concluding the answers to the research 
questions, although it will additionally provide some further conclusions. It 
will also comment on the reliability of the study, possible limitations and also 
to the significance of the research. Later on, the author will express his 
personal view on the findings. Lastly, further research possibilities provided 
by findings of this research are suggested. 
10.1 Concluding research question 1 
The first, and most important, research question was presented as: 
Q1: Can a novel model be built leveraging from established disciplines of 
master data management (and data governance), information security 
management (and information security governance) combined with 
situation awareness for purposes of: 
1. providing organizations capability to identify their critical 
information, build controls over it and identify any attempts 
to tamper the critical information assets 
2. presenting command and control -type operator (like Cyber 
Security Command Center) with a situation awareness and 
early warning capability over threats compromising 
information assets of identified critical service providers? 
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Both “1.” and “2” of the Q1 were answered through the literature study’s 
secondary data findings utilized in Chapter 7, where the actual model was 
built and proofed for concept. The components (disciplines) presented were 
capable building pieces for combining them for something, where the holistic 
value of them was more than mere sum. As a conceptual model, it needed to 
be presented to SMEs in cyber security to have initial validation for the 
model. This was done in Chapter 9.8. 
The author was not left into doubt that the respondents would not have had 
similar enough conceptual models of the presented concepts as presented in 
this research and owned by the author.  
The conclusion is that a model like presented could be made and the 
prototype proofed that the conceptual model is feasible and it should be 
developed either to a working prototype or further formalized via e.g. ISDT-
theories for building a design science –based model of system of systems. 
The direct implication from this finding is that both practitioners as well as 
researchers should think with wider scope than their own silos of e.g. MDM 
or ISM. It was noted several times in interviews also that silos in general are 
bad and synergies should be sought out from combining the disciplines. Four 
of the SMEs commented that information security and data management/-
quality overlap in a way that there would be synergy-benefits expected, if 
organized accordingly. This would provide potential for both cost savings as 
better management of resources to activities, which matter the most and 
provide momentum and organizational change management “muscle” for the 
combined forces. 
Another direct implication is that universities and applied science 
universities, especially those providing cyber security education, should 
consider their scope of education to consider a fusion like presented here to 
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establish novel new models of operations for an industry sector which is 
growing rapidly and has huge potential for society benefits. 
The mentioned will be done with a tactical mindset, not rushing into 
conclusions, instead promoting the concept, gathering requirements, assessing 
its feasibility on larger scope of experts and via promoting the possibilities to 
both university for rigorous scientific study as well to applied university for 
technology demonstration or pilot.  
10.2 Concluding research question 2 
Second research question was aimed to validate through empirical study, 
whether the possibly, theoretically feasible, model created for Q1 was on high 
conceptualization level valid, of value and of further research. This was done 
via theme interviews of considerable track record security and cyber security 
professionals, both researchers and practitioners. Levels they operated were 
mostly strategic, some tactical-strategic and one of tactical-operational.  
Q2: If such a novel model (as per Q1) could be built, what would be its 
potential value for national cybersecurity capability of Finland? 
As the model is not build per e.g. design science theories, it needed to get 
either confirmation for its possible initial applicability as well as the value it 
might present to Finland’s cybersecurity development, if studied further. This 
was done in Chapter 9.8.4. The comments from some of Finland’s leading 
cyber strategists, tactician and operational experts were confirming that the 
model made sense, it could potentially solve a dramatic current problem 
having direct impact on safety of the Finnish society, and it was definitely 
worth more research and development. It was also encouraged to develop it 
further fast and present it to Finland’s Cyber Security Command Center and 
several other governmental bodies. 
Direct implication of this is the same as in Q1. 
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10.3 Concluding research question 3 
Last of the research questions was a “added value” research question to 
further provide insight into topics, which are of relevance for the model and 
for providing insight to build momentum for its possible further 
development. 
Q3: In Finland’s cybersecurity context, is information understood as an 
asset by critical infrastructure service providers: 
1. Are these assets identified and protected accordingly? 
2. Are there decent controls over information assets? 
3. Is the concept of data quality and its monitoring present? 
Answers to these questions were already covered in Chapter 9. As the details 
are there – especially in the Summary -chapters, no repetition is made. Instead 
a summary of summaries to questions is presented as follows: 
Are these assets identified and protected accordingly? 
They are not – capabilities are at level “decent” at their best. 
Are there decent controls over information assets? 
No, the controls seem to be missing and even monitoring capabilities of 
data quality are at their best minimal – note, technical controls like 
system administration etc. are not of concern in this scope. The answer 
is provided only for purposes of the presented concepts of data DG, 
DQ, MDM and partly for ISG and ISM.  
Is the concept of data quality and its monitoring present? 
As per previous answer – no, they are not in place for even decent 
level. 
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First direct implications of this is further to migrate the best features of these 
disciplines into the created model development. 
Another direct implication, on wider scope, is to promote the wide gap 
Finland has in its cyber security defences, which, if (when) exploited, could 
tax our cyber resilience to its maximum of beyond, seriously endangering 
national continuity or at least locking up key continuity resources, which 
would be needed elsewhere. This will be made aware to Cyber security 
command center to consider in their operative and tactical plans as well as 
promoting critical information’s relevance. 
It could prove out that although findings are very much in line between the 
respondents that very different views are provided by different set of people. 
Things are not black and white, however the shade of gray needs to be found 
out first before any major activities can be taken. 
10.4 Other conclusions 
The author would like to highlight few additional conclusions. First is “the not 
presented hypothesis” of the author (motivating for this large research) that 
complex disciplines like DG and ISG, MDM and ISM as well as DQ and SA 
could be combined for holistic benefits. A hypothesis was also present in 
author’s mind that mentioned concept overlap both positively and negatively. 
From the positive overlaps would synergy benefits rising and the negative 
overlaps could be eliminated through efficiency thinking. It seemed there is a 
big picture which is relevant for the large scope of this research. This was 
proved implicitly in Chapter 7. 
Another conclusion is that the same disparity, which seems to exist in so 
many other disciplines does show up in this study too. The business 
operations and IT (or even ICT) do not either want to or just cannot 
comprehend each other. The only remedy the author has is to educate CIOs to 
167 
be really Chief Information Officers, not Chief Technology Officers, which they 
more to author’s perception are. It would mean either business oriented CIOs 
or tasking CIO-offices with direct development responsibilities over e.g. 
business process development instead of sourcing new, neat, tools. Only via 
the understanding of business and its needs could the CIO –operations be 
something else than mere “support organizations”.  
A more of a secondary conclusion is made to further underline the fact that 
the terms definition for cyber- prefix terms is rather in-mature and this causes 
lots of misunderstanding and could complex further the high speed evolving 
phenomenon. Cyber security control center and its operations as well as 
education bodies in co-operation, have a task to formalize the terms into 
Finland’s context maintaining the compatibility with the wide array of terms 
outside Finland’s perimeter. 
10.5 Significance of the findings 
The conclusions and findings presented can be considered very significant, as 
cyber threats are coming more eminent, advanced and target to specific 
purposes and organizations. The complexity of cyber environment is getting 
even more complex with introduction of e.g. internet of things, industry of 
things, BYOD, BYOA –concepts and no set international rules for nation-scale 
operators on what can and cannot be done and with what possible 
consequences. Nations, as well as single organizations are sprinting fast to 
stay onboard and be a bit ahead of others in cyber capabilities.   
The research is rather unique, with the innovative and novel model presented 
and verified for significance by Finland’s leading cyber strategists and 
tacticians and operative persons. It encompasses many complex concepts to 
facilitate the understanding of their dependencies, interactions and holistic 
sum and makes a fusion of those. A similar study has not been made earlier 
and the research conducted is expanding both academic doors for further 
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research. More importantly it could provide an instrument for solving some of 
the Finland’s national cybersecurity challenges, which have direct 
implications on large society context. Should the model prove out valuable via 
the upcoming iterations, it could perhaps presenting Finland and its CISP as 
well as e.g. national emergency supply network as a whole, something that 
few countries (if any) in the world have. 
10.6 Reliability of the study and limitations 
Much of the limitations have been explained in Section 8.3: Reliability of the 
selected interview approach. Scientific rigor in both the research setting and 
conducting the interviews has been exercised to the author’s best ability and 
requirements of applied university’s thesis. As it has been noted many times, 
things are only perceived for their value in the right context. Hence, this thesis 
must be perceived in the context of applied sciences, where theory is in lesser 
role than practical results. For real scientific rigor, the model should be further 
investigated via e.g. design science models like ISDT. 
Worth noting is also that the sampling strategy is limited both in the number 
of interviewees as their possible self bias on some of the interviewed themes. 
The author has done his best (with the given resources) to ensure the needed 
data saturation and receiving as accurate data (not biased) as possible. 
Also, the study is aimed to explore studied concepts only in context of 
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, many of the findings as well as the general basic 
model are probably well worth considering in e.g. supply chain risk 
management outside the scope of critical infrastructure service providers. In 
general the findings and conclusions should only be viewed in the context of 
the given research setting. The author does not claim for any outright 
generalization of the findings and conclusions  - on the contrary, encompasses 
to critical utilization of the conclusions with the given limitations in mind. 
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For the purposes of the model creation, SA-approach was in author’s 
perception, ideal as it is well recognized model used in for example tactical 
and strategic systems, where users are taxed with highly complex cognitive 
duties requiring high performance in decision making. The author argues that 
the presented model is best perceived (as well as comprehended and projected, 
although these “steps” of SA or situation assessment are out of scope of the 
study) via SA. Partly this is due to a perceivable analogy with large-systems 
operations like nuclear plants (Endsley, 1995) and that of a cyber command & 
control. At the same time author recognizes his familiarity with SA-theory-in-
depth knowledge missing. Thus it could prove out that SA is not a fit theory 
to serve the information sharing purposes required by the model. 
Further study is required to validate the findings with a larger count and 
more heterogeneous data sources, and more detailed research and interview 
questions. The author proposes adhering to the interview approach as the 
concepts are quite complex and survey research can easily lead to 
misconceptions and corrupted data, if not elaborated to the very last extent of 
the concept and validated the conceptual model of the respondent.  
10.7 The author’s professional view on the findings and improvement 
suggestions 
The author would like to use the opportunity to encourage both academic as 
well as practitioner organizations (especially critical infrastructure service 
providers) to put special attention to understanding cybersecurity and its 
connection with classic information security management. The author also 
encourages all, especially service provider for critical infrastructure to pay 
much effort into understanding the critical information asset and establishing 
controls over it. It was already noted in literature study and further 
underlined by interviewed subject matter experts that there is no absolute 
defence and focus should be more on the information, not technology. The 
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author proposes some concrete steps forward and will later summarize his 
personal “free word”-thoughts on the findings. 
10.7.1 Few suggestions by the author on the conclusions 
From my experience and perceptions from the interviews one thing can be 
considered as a fact: information management, be it MDM or other discipline 
and information security do not work well together with current models. In 
author’s experience, there has always been mixed responsibilities, which 
eventually end up in situation of no-one taking the responsibility. Also, these 
disciplines are making half-futile effort for goal far beyond their reach and 
fail, where they could consider combining forces for joint goals. This notion 
was one of the basis for this research and this research thrives to offer advice 
and guidance for developing possible co-operation.  
Another suggestion the author wants to make, is data quality as a whole. The 
analysis findings state that the situation is not on the needed level and the 
author can only agree. What could organizations and educational institutions 
do to enhance the situation? 
Organizations: Management must recognize first the importance. This can be 
done via studies like this and further evidence. The importance must be 
grounded to money and efficiency lost, which is partly already evidenced in 
this study. 
Organizations can and must also consider the time of their information 
security professionals. Studies have shown in the theory part and interviews 
confirmed the findings that the professionals with latest know-how are few. It 
should be really considered, where to invest those resources. If the premises 
are somewhat in order, then sub-optimizing those and trying to tackle 
information leaks on device level could prove out futile effort. Perhaps it 
would be better to concentrate on the asset itself – the information, which is 
supposed to be protected. The author sees clear need for widening the 
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perspective of ISM professionals with at least basic data management and 
governance studies – these could result to new models of working and 
reducing some of the redundancy data management, risk management and 
information security management organizations currently do have. 
Educational institutions: Institutions like universities and polytechnics must 
come to understand that the cybersecurity –education they provide is, 
naturally, relevant, however it is of very narrow scope. The author perceives 
that there is demand for generalists, who do understand basics of business 
operations, information management and information security. Could such a 
mix be created via co-operation of university’s (unfortunately often very silo-
operating) departments? 
10.7.2 The author’s ”free word” 
The author has always been a “big picture” -thinker and seeing connections 
and possibilities between concepts. The “pros” are precisely the things 
mentioned, but on the cons-side, details sometimes escape me or are of no 
interest. Hence, I call for supporters to continue parts of the work, which need 
eye for rigorous and pedant work and eye for details. I see the concept 
presented as very exciting and much loaded with potential. However, at the 
same time I must admit the facts that help is needed. This is a call out for co-
operation on development of the model. 
Although reading my “sharing”-experience view on the results, one could 
start to doubt the findings are being biased, I have to admit that, naturally, I 
have not agreed with all the interviewees’ opinions and have done my best to 
stay as objective as possible, not putting words to their mouth. A possible 
reason for so many shared conclusions is that the findings really are a quite 
general phenomenon. That is to be validated by further research, which is 
covered next. 
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10.8 Further research possibilities 
Several future research topics can be suggested on the basis of the findings, 
conclusions, and also the limitations of the study. The following could be 
considered: 
1. Validating the findings of this research – do they withstand a larger 
audience and more heterogeneous research environments? If not, what 
are the limits of the findings environment where they do still apply? 
 
2. Conducting design science study for the model presented for the 
purposes of describing it as a system e.g. according to ISDT –theory. 
 
3. Prototyping a technical solution, which could source critical 
information inside the organization, take a stand on its quality, 
especially the consistency and form a “status message” as few of the 
data quality meters presented in this study and further send it out 
perhaps utilizing models and later standards being developed for 
threat information sharing. At the receiving end, react to the 
information received and present it at simple observation-view of an 
SA-tool or integrate it directly to existing SA-tools of Cyber security 
command center, police force or the military. 
 
4. Further comparison of the presented concepts ISM and MDM for 
realizing more synergies and proposing operational models and 
systems, in which overlaps are removed and common goals foster 
commitment and “drive” as well as get buy-in from top management 
more easily. 
 
5. As analyzed and concluded, there seems to be a disparity with business 
goals and IT goals. This leads to a situation where IT is not executing its 
activities efficiently for realizing business strategy and therefore the 
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best for the company. This might be much due to “not proper” 
governance structure of ISG/DG and ISM/MDM. A model could be 
researched, where (as suggested by interviews) process ownership 
takes ownership of information, its security as well as associated risks. 
It could turn out that this sort of model is not working due to same 
information utilized by several processes and ownership is getting 
scattered and thus vanishes. It might still be worth investigating 
 
6. Also, a model, where all the mentioned disciplines are governed 
centrally by risk management, could be studied. This would fit more 
easily to institutions like banks, who already thing through risks.  
 
7. What kind of learning programs and learning paths could be 
introduced for better combining ISM and IM education? At the 
moment it seems both work as their own disciplines, however many of 
the goals and responsibilities overlap, although perceptions could alter 
a bit or terms be different. The author is quite sure there would be pull 
for future professionals, who understand information as a key asset of 
the organization and at the same time understand the needed security 
measures and risk management 
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APPENDIX I - INTERVIEW SLIDES 
 
 
Von Solms – Information Security –
The Fourth Wave
• 1st  wave: ”was characterized by Information Security being a technical 
issue, best left to the technical experts”
• 2nd wave: ” was driven by the realization that Information Security has a 
strong management dimension, and that aspects like policies and 
management involvement are very important”
• 3th wave: ”consisted of the need to have some form of standardization of 
Information Security in a company, and aspects like best practices, 
certification, an Information Security culture and the measurement and 
monitoring of Information Security became important”
• 4th wave (2006) “This wave relates to the development and crucial role of 
Information Security Governance [...] drivers behind this Fourth Wave are 
closely related to developments in fields of Corporate Governance and the 
related legal and regulatory areas. Top management and Boards of 
Directors felt the heat as they started to become personally accountable 
for the health (read Information Security) of their IT systems on which 
they base their planning and decisions”
Threat description
• Persistent Stealthy deception attack, where organization’s (and its supply and 
value chain’s) data - critical operational and tactical assets - is silently degraded 
over longer period of time.
• Attack is advanced and targeted in nature and does not:
– present e.g. significant network traffic trail
– does not communicate with C&C servers,
– nor create abnormalities in WLAN usage etc., 
• It masquerades itself as “normal user activity”.
• Detection of the threat is difficult due to its silent nature and non aggressive attack 
philosophy.
• Characteristics of the attack, once threat either is detected by security measures 
or users’ reports (strange data changes etc) or in an orchestrated larger scale 
attack on larger critical infrastructure composition (multiple parties of critical 
infrastructure affected by the threat realization), where threats existence becomes 
obvious, makes it dangerous:
– Parties involved possibly could not, with required certainty, reference the point in time, the 
attack started, making back up recovery and business continuity challenging tasks.
– Even though the degraded data could be identified and fixed, the impact to victim 
organization could still prove out to be enormous. 
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APPENDIX II – INTERVIEW FRAME 
Basic information 
 For the background of the data collection  
 
ISM, Information management or security -experience 
 For the background of data collection 
Theme Cyber 
 Difference between cyber security and cyber defence 
 Cyberdefence defined 
 Do cybersecurty and information security differ in which parts 
 In a context of single company not CISP – what is cybersecurity and its 
relation to traditional ISM 
 Von Solm’s 4 waves –where are we riding as a nation 
 How’d you perceive Finland’s national cybersecurity capability 
 What have been 2014’ topics of discussion or relevance 
 What about 2015 
Theme Environment 
 How’d you describe CISP’s capability to govern and manage their 
information 
 Do CISPs know what their info assets are 
 Do they know where they reside 
 Do they know the critical information apart from whole asset 
o How do yousee previous in context of data volumes arise 
o Where should the effort thus be on information based model or 
technology based model and why so 
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 What is CISPs capability to estimate their critical informations’ quality 
e.g. consistency, CIA or other metrics on objective level? 
o How does this capability change (if it does) when moving in the 
supply/value chain? 
Theme Resources usage 
 Where is the bias currently – on technology defences building or 
managing the information and its security directly 
 Do the CISP have what possibilities and capabilities defending their 
perimeters 
 Where should the limited resources directed to 
Theme Information and information security 
 Definition information security 
 Definition data quality 
 How do you perceive information of good quality, characteristics etc 
 Is the action to perceived information quality reactive or proactive by 
nature 
 How do you see information quality in crisis situations 
 What is the perceived efficiency of ISM in CISPs 
 How situation aware CIPS are of their DQ 
o What about their supply chain partners DQ 
 What is the relevance of information security policies and its 
effectiveness to operations 
 Where should ISM and ISG reside in organizations for maximum 
efficiency and effectivity 
 How important do you perceive information ownership 
 What about ownership of information security 
 Do you perceive ISM and IM as overlapped and if, on what parts 
 Are they operating better separated or united and why so 
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 Could the functions receive synergy form uniting them for central parts 
if so, what synergy – what problems would arise 
   
Theme: Situation awareness 
 What is SA 
 What is relevance of SA in F’s Cyber strategy 
 What is its relevance to operations via cyber strategy 
 What could be the role of information quality in a SA, if the CISPs 
could transfer DQ information between them and cyber command or 
even among each other 
 What value would it present 
 Whast obstacles 
 How could capability like this expand e.g. HAVARO concept 
 Presented with the model and threat description how’d you describe 
o The relevance of the model as something solving an existing or 
future problem 
o Novelty of the model – have you seen similar concepts 
o What value could the model bring for SA 
o Should the model be researched further, e.g. do you see 
potential or should it remain as academic study 
o How much researched this topic is in genera 
o What requirements would you present to the model to be 
developed 
o What obstacles must it overcome 
 
 
